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FOREWORD 
The Exp los i ve  Sa fe ty  Execu t i ve  Lec tu re  Ser ies  was 
designed t o  g i v e  t op  management a  b e t t e r  understanding o f  
t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  s a f e t y .  Each l e c t u r e  o f  t h e  
s e r i e s  covers a  s i g n i f i c a n t  major  problem area i n  
e x p l o s i v e  sa fe ty .  The l e c t u r e  content  i s  in tended t o  be 
\ 
o f  s u f f i c i e n t  t e c h n i c a l  depth t o  be mean ing fu l ,  w h i l e  a t  
the  same t ime p r o v i d i n g  a b road  coverage o f  the sub jec t .  
The group o f  s i x  l e c t u r e s  i s  6esigned t o  p rov ide  a  
genera l  survey o f  exp los i ve  s a f e t y  problems as r e l a t e d  t o  
launch area opera t ions .  
Th i s  r e p o r t  i s  a  comp i l a t i on  o f  t he  course notes,  l e c t u r e  
t r a n s c r i p t s ,  and sub jec ts  d iscussed on the f l o o r .  The 
r e s u l  t s  a r e  presented as a compre:hensive re fe rence  t o  
a f f o r d  t he  manager a  f a m i l  i a r i t ) .  w i t h  space v e h i c l e  
ordnance and e x p l o s i v e  sa fe t y  problems. 
It i s  hoped t h a t  those i n  a t tendance a t  t h e  Execut ive 
Lec tu re  Se r i es  ga ined a  g r e a t e r  a p p r e c i a t i o n  f o r  the  KSC 
Safe ty  Program - and t h e i r  s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l  i t i e s  as 
managers. 
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Lec tu re  Nwber  One 
"TOP MANAGEMENT RESPONS I 9  I L IT  I ES"  
P a r t  I 
Dr. G .  J. Bryan 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  f a t a l  acc iden t s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  r a r e ,  b u t  t o  w i tnesses  t h e i r  
ser iousness i s  v i v i d l y  c l e a r .  Most near-misses a r e  n o t  documented. 
The comp lex i t y  o f  modern spaceships i n  launch c o n f i g u r a t i o n  i s  f a r  g r e a t e r  than 
t h a t  o f  e a r l y  m i s s i l e s .  Ordnance and p r o p e l l z n t  subsystems and dev ices  a r e  
p resen t  f o r  p ropu l s i on ,  c o n t r o l ,  separa t ion ,  d e s t r u c t ,  and a c t u a t i o n  purposes 
throughout  these spaceships. The number o f  systems on Sa tu rn  approaches 1CO.  
High-energy RF f i e l d s ,  s t r a y  cu r ren t s ,  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  f i e l d s ,  and flammable 
vapors a r e  o f t e n  p resen t .  
The c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  d e s t r u c t i v e  acc iden t s  i s  enormous. There i s  no excuse f o r  
n o t  u t i l i z i n g  t he  s a f e t y  kncwledge we have gained. Much o f  t h i s  knowledge has 
been gleaned f r c m  the  r e p o r t s  o f  acc iden ts ,  some o f  wh ich  were f a t a l .  
I s  ordnance s a f e t y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom o r d i n a r y  s a f e t y ?  I s  i t  any more s e r i o u s  t o  
k i l l .  a person by an ordnance acc iden t  than t o  have a t r u c k  d r i v e r  employee be 
i k i l l e d  i n  a highway acc iden t?  
The answer t o  b o t h  o f  these ques t ions  i s  "YES." The immediate f o l l o w i n g  
q u e s t i o n  i s  'WH'I'?" There a r e  t h ree  ma jo r  d i f f e r e n c e s  invo lved :  
e Employee's Dependence Upon Employer 
F i r s t ,  t he  t r u c k  d r i v e r  has l a r g e l y  i n  h i s  own b r a i n ,  due t o  h i s  p a s t  
, t r a i n i n g  and exper ience,  the  knowledge t o  a v o i d  an acc iden t .  The i n d i -  
v i d u a l  wo rk i ng  w i t h  ordnance i s  l a r g e l y  dependent on the  procedures 
riipp: l ed  A -  L:- LL^ ..-c^ A.. -c C h ^  - m , . : . . m - n +  
LU 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ,  LllC G L y  uI L l l G  C.yUIyI I IGI IC a d  f s c ! !  i t  ies which  he Is 
us ing ,  and the  t r a i n i n g  and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  p rov ided  him. For  t h i s  reason, 
t h e  blame may we1 1 r e s t  a t  some h i g h e r  l e v e l  i n  the o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
P u b l i c  A t t i t u d e  
The second reason i s  t h a t ,  due t o  the  l a c k  o f  a general  unders tand ing  o f  
ordnance s a f e t y  problems, there  i s  an immediate r e a c t i o n  t o  a dea th  due 
t o  ordnance causes. Th i s  r e a c t i o n  i s ,  'Was i t  j u s t  l u c k  t h a t  kep t  t h i s  
a c c i d e n t  f rom k i l l i n g  many people r a t h e r  than one?" I n  o t h e r  words, pas t  
exper ience  has shown t h a t  o c c a s i o n a l l y  exp los i ves  and/or p r o p e l l a n t s  have 
caused mass i ve 'des t ruc t i on  o f  l i v e s  and proper ty .  The tendency i s ,  
there fore ,  t o  equate one death t o  the poss ib le  r i s k  o f  many l i v e s  asso- 
c i a t e d  i n  the  minds o f  t h e  general p u b l i c  w i t h  any ordnance accident .  
(see Tab1 e  1 :, page 1 -22 ) 
e Unrecognized Factors 
The t h i r d  reason t h a t  an ordnance accident  i s  d i f f e r e n t  i s  t h a t  exper ts  
i n  ordnance sa fe ty  a r e  cont inuously  aware t h a t  there  i s  danger due t o  
unrecognized fac to rs .  Any ordnance accident  requ i res  d e t a i l e d  examinat ion 
t o  determine the cause so t h a t  i t  can be added t o  the  body o f  accumulated 
experience i n  p revent ing  fu tu re  acc idents.  
There i s  o f t e n  new in fo rmat ion  a v a i l a b l e ,  and we cannot a f f o r d  t o  miss 
t h i s  in format ion.  The statement has been made t h a t  ordnance manuals have 
been w r i t t e n  i n  blood. This  statement i s  311 t oo  t rue .  
The reason tna t  I have gone over d i f f e rences  between ordnance sa fe ty  and 
o r d i n a r y  sa fe ty  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  u n f a i r ,  and, i n  some cases, a  ser ious shock 
f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  a t  a  midd le  t o  very h igh  management p o s i t i o n  t o  suddenly 
r e a l i z e  tha t  he i s  suspect f o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  an ordnance accident .  I t  
i s  even more o f  a  shock i f  an i n q u i r y  shobs t h a t  he i s  responsib le.  There 
have been cases of mental breakdown under such circumstances. 
An issue o f  the Armed Services Explos ive Safety Board P u b l i c a t i o n  r e l a t e d  
the  case o f  a  person who a c t u a l l y  committed su i c ide  when t o l d  o f  an accident .  
Th i s  man took h i s  l i f e  because he thought he could have prevented the a c c i -  
dent ,  had he been present .  
2.0 B A S I C  RULES 
There a r e  two bas ic  gu ide l i nes  t o  a  r e a l i s t i c  ordnance sa fe ty  program. F i r s t ,  
no hazardous opera t ions  a re  t o  be performed. Second, any d e v i a t i o n  from t t ' i s  
r u l e  must be approved by top  management. Approval w i l l  normal ly  not  be g iven 
w i t h o u t  o v e r r i d i n g  reasons, such as a  na t i ona l  emergency o r  the f a c t  t h a t  the  
r i s k  taken i n  per forming a  dangerous opera t ion  i s  l ess  than t h a t  involved by no t  
per fo rming the operat ion.  Now w i t h  hazardous opera t ions ,  I wish  t o  mention here 
t h a t  I ' m  no t  i nc iud ing  p o t e n t i a i i y  hazardous operatTofis. Ve have p e t e n t i a l l y  
hazardous operat ions a t  a l l  t imes a t  KSC, bu t  i f  we t r e a t  these operat ions 
c o r r e c t l y ,  they a re  not  hazardous. 
One quest ion  commonly asked i s :  "What i s  the d i v i d i n g  l i n e  between a  hazardous 
and non-hazardous opera t ion?"  I n  o the r  words, what c o n s t i t u t e s  a  r i s k ?  This 
i s  c l e a r l y  a  gray area. As a  rough guide, the f o l l a - l i n g  comments may be usefu l .  
An ordnance opera t  ion should invo lve  cons iderab ly  l e s s  probabi  l i t y  o f  i n j u r y  
than a  normal j o b  (such as machine shop work).  Why i s  t h i s ?  The reasons go 
back t o  some o f  the  e a r l i e r  comments. There a r e  s t i l l  unknown areas. One 
should assume t h a t  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  are somewhat worse than one c a l c u l a t e s .  
Second, w i t h  ordnance, t h e  hazard sometimes has a  cha in  e f f e c t  wh ich  can 
g r e a t l y  en la rge  t h e  i n j u r y  t o  people and the  damage t o  p roper ty .  The hazard 
i nvo l ved  i n  an ordnance o p e r a t i o n  should no t  even approach the  hazard t he  
i n d i v i d u a l  takes i n  the  use o f  l oca l  highways. 
4.0 MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
4.1 Dete rmina t ion  o f  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
The head o f  any o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  a lways have s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l  i t i e s .  One o f  
h i s  f i r s t  t asks  i s  t o  have those r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  c l e a r l y  de f i ned ,  b o t h  as t o  
e x t e n t  and l i m i t a t i o n s .  I t  i s  a l s o  impor tan t  t h a t  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  be 
accompanied by a u t h o r i t y .  Where t he re  i s  any doubt concern ing t h i s ,  i t  must 
a l s o  be c l a r i f i e d  and c o r r e c t l y  es tab l  ished. 
D ischarq inq  o f  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
Once t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and a u t h o r i t y  a r e  es tab l i shed ,  t h e  head o f  an  o rgan i -  
z a t i o n  must see t h a t  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l  i t i e s  a r e  discharged. Th is  may be done by 
one o r  more o f  t he  f o l l o w i n g  methods: 
He p e r s o n a l l y  d ischarges them (normal ly  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  i n  small o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) .  
6 He de lega tes  cons ide rab le  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  q u a l i f i e d  subord inates.  
. 
a He c o n t r a c t s  and p rov ides  f o r  o t h e r  o rgan i za t i ons  t o  assume these respons- 
i b i l i t i e s .  
He g e t s  w r i t t e n  agreement w i t h  some Government o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  assume t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  two cases, r e s i d u a l  m o n i t o r i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  must be performed t o  
assure  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t e d  o r  Government o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  d u t i f u l l y  and success- 
f u l  1 y per fo rmi  ng i t s  c o n t r a c t  o r  agreement. 
4.3 Organ i za t i on  
One o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  management i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h a t  can 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  per fo rm i t s  s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a t  a l l  l e ve l s .  A l a r g e  
o rgan i ' za t i on ' s  s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be shared between t he  
l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and a  separate Safety  D i v i s i o n .  I n  a  c o r r e c t l y  o r i e n t e d  
company, t h i s  p a r a l l e l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i l l  c r e a t e  l i t t l e  f r i c t i o n  because i t  
a r i s e s  f rom a  need f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
. 
There w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be some people i n  the  l i n e  o r  nonsafety  s t a f f  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
who w i l l  have a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t ime  des ignated toward s a f e t y  func-  
t i ons .  Th i s  a r i s e s  f rom two demands: t h e  s c a r c i t y  o f  h i g h l y  q u a l i f i e d  people 
i n  s p e c i a l i z e d  f i e l d s  o f  sa fe t y ,  and t he  need f o r  some concen t ra t i on  o f  s a f e t y  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h i n  l i n e  o rgan iza t ions .  I n  a  s a f e t y  conscious o r g a n i z a t i o n  
the  l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  be ask ing  f o r  more h e l p  than  the  Safety  D i v i s i o n  can 
g i ve ,  and t he  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  w i l l  be eage r l y  r eques t i ng  a i d  f rom s p e c i a l i s t s  
ass igned t o  o t h e r  d i v i s i o n s .  
k.4 Leadersh ip  
The head o f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  must p rov ide  l eade rsh ip  i n  the  f i e l d  o f  sa fe t y .  He 
must s e t  an example f o r  o t h e r s  t o  f o l l o w  i n  a t t i t u d e ,  a c t i o n ,  and p o l i c y  s t a t e -  
ments. Th i s  w i  11 d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  h i s  immediate subord inates and be r e f l e c t e d  
th roughout  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  He w i l l  se t  an example when he i s  p resen t  d u r i n g  
an o p e r a t i o n  by  f o l l o w i n g  s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s  and showing an a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  
sa fe t y  aspec ts  o f  t h e  opera t ion .  
Th is  same l eade rsh ip  f u n c t i o n  must be p e r f o r ~ e d  down the  l i n e  th rough each 
supe rv i so ry  l e v e l .  
4.5 M o n i t o r i n g  and Probinq 
A l l  l e v e l s  o f  management have t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p e r i o d i c a l \ y  p rob ing  and 
m o n i t o r i n g  the  s a f e t y  requirements wh ich  they have p laced  on t h e i r  subord inates.  
It i s  n o t  enough t o  p l a c e  t h e  requirements and then  say, "I have done my par t . "  
Any o r g a n i z a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  c a r e f u l  p rob ing  and t e s t i n g  t o  assure i t  i s  a l i v e  
and h e a l t h y .  
The head o f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  may make occas ional  i nspec t i ons  a t  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  
l e v e l .  He w i l l  then  l o o k  c l o s e l y  f o r  any evidence o f  s a f e t y  s lackness. He w i l l  
t a l k  b r i e f l y  w i t h  employees per forming t h e  work. He w i l l  f i n d  ou t  i f  they know 
what t h e i r  sa fe t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a r e ,  i f  they understand the s a f e t y  r egu la -  
t i o n s  which they  a r e  t o  f o l l o w ,  and i f  they show an i n t e r e s t  i n  safety .  Any 
weakness which he may f i n d  t e l l s  him t h a t  somewhere between t o p  management and 
t h e  work ing  l e v e l  o f  h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s a f e t y  weakness. 
He w i l l  t hen  t ake  a c t i o n  t o  determine where t h a t  weakness i s  and t o  c o r r e c t  i t .  
There a r e  severa l  approaches t o  t h i s .  Bas i c a l  l y  , they  a r e  s tandard  management 
techniques which cou ld  app l y  t o  any prob lem so they w i l l  no t  be d e t a i l e d  here.  
Norma l l y ,  t r a i n i n g ,  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n ,  o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w i l l  
f i x  a weakness. Sometimes a  t r a n s f e r  t o  a  l e s s  c r i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  may be needed. 
Occas iona l l y  an employee may have t o  be  f i r e d .  
A  l i t t l e  thought  w i l l  revea l  t h e  need f o r  a  s a f e t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h  many 
s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  p a r a l l e l  t o  those  o f  a  l i n e  o rgan i za t i on .  T h i s  i s  due 
t o  a  need f o r  reduc ing  t h e  s a f e t y  l oad  on t h e  l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  (which a l r e a d y  
has many v a r i e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s )  w i t h o u t  r educ ing  t he  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  
sa fe t y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h a t  o rgan i za t i on .  One o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  o f  a  
separa te  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  i s  t o  assure t h a t  a  p i p e l i n e  f rom t h e  worker  t o  t h e  
t o p  management i j  ever  p resen t  and f u n c t i o n i n g .  
5.1 T r a i n i n g  and I n d o c t r i n a t i o n  
T r a i n i n g  and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  a re  impor tan t  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Each 
s u p e r i o r  must f e e l  t h a t  i t  i s  up t o  h im t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  h i s  subord ina tes  a r e  edu- 
c a t e d  and superv ised  on sa fe t y .  
I n  a  c e r t a i n  sense, s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  can3ot be delegated. I n  a  p r a c t i c a l  
sense, t h e r e  musc be some de lega t ion .  I n  s a f e t y  ma t t e r s ,  as i n  o t h e r  m a t t e r s ,  
i t  i s  impor tan t  t h a t  one be c a r e f u l  i n  t h e  cho i ce  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  whom p e r f o r -  
mance o f  s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  delegated. I f  a person i s  chosen who i s  no t  
competent i n  t h e  ordnance and p r o p e l l a n t  f i e l d ,  i t  must be c l e a r l y  o u t l i n e d  t o  
h i m  t h a t  he must p e r s o n a l l y  o b t a i n  t h e  necessary t r a i n l n g ,  o r  a c q u i r e  (pernianentiy 
o r  on l oan )  an i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  competent t o  pe r f o rm  t h e  necessary f u n c t i o n s .  
I f  n o  one i s  p resen t  i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  do t h e  r e q u i r e d  j o b ,  then zn i n d i v i d u a l  
must be t r a i n e d ,  h i r e d ,  o r  b rough t  i n  on a  consu l t an t  bas i s .  
A l l  l e v e l s  o f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  which a r e  concerned w i t h  ordnsnce and p r o p e l l a n t  
wo rk  must have sene s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  i n  ordnance and p r o p e l l a n t  sa fe ty .  Super- 
v i s o r y  personnel  need such knowledge i n  o rde r  t o  s e l e c t  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  whom a u t h o r -  
i t y  i s  t o  be de legated,  t o  assess the  magnitudz o f  the  s a f e t y  problem i n  t h e i r  
area o f  o p e r a t i o n ,  and t o  take  adequate s teps  t o  m a i n t a i n  s a f e t y  i n  t h e i r  area 
o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Normal ly ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be a  b a s i c  s a f e t y  course g i v e n  t o  a l l  
employees. Th i s  w i l l  u s u a l l y  be ar ranged by t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  i n  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  T r a i n i n g  D i v i s i o n  and l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  There w i l l  a l s o  no rma l l y  be 
more s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  courses g iven  t o  those who d i r e c t l y  hand le  ordnance o r  . 
must work i n  c l ose  p r o x i m i t y  t o  i t .  I t  i s  necessary t o  g i v e  occas iona l  r e f r e s h e r  
courses as w e l l  as b r i e f i n g s  on new changes o f  equ ipment 'o r  ope ra t i ons .  
l n d o c t r i n a t i o n  i s  always impor tan t  a t  a l l  l e v e l s .  O f  course, once t h e  importance 
o f  s a f e t y  i s  recognized,  h a l f  t h e  b a t t l e  i s  won. An i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  s a f e t y  
consc ious w i l l  f i n d  o u t  what h i s  s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a re ,  he w i l l  reques t  
adequate t r a i n i n s ,  he w i l l  l o o k  f o r  problems, he w i l l  r e p o r t  prob lems,  and h2 
w i l l  s o l v e  problems. l n d o c t r i n a t i o n  i s  impor tan t  a t  each l e v e l  f r om  top  manage- 
ment on down. Each supe rv i so r  must f e e l  t h a t  i t  i s  up t o  him t o  i nsu re  t h a t  
h i s  men a r e  educeted and superv ised  i n  sa fe t y .  He must s imu l t aneous l y  promote 
s a f e t y  by persuas ion  and by  f o r c e  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  
5.2 Sa fe t y  P l a n r i n q  
S a f e t y  p l a n n i n g  i n v o l v e s  a  number o f  f u n c t i o n s  and i s  c r i t i c a l  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  and 
e f f e c t i v e  opera t ion .  One o f  these i s  t h e  e a r l y  i s o l a t i o n  o f . o p e r a t i o n s  which 
r e q u i r e  p a r t i c u l e r  a t t e n t i o n  i n  order  t o  be safe.  Another o f  these i s  e a r l y  
r e c o g n i t i o n  and ~ e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  spec ia l  f a c i l i t y  and equipment requi rements  f o r  
safe  ope ra t i ons .  The advance r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a  need f o r  an inc rease  i n  t r a i n e d  
p e r s o n n e l ,  o r  o f  new procedures i s  impor tan t  i f  schedules a r e  t o  be s a f e l y  mzt. 
A r e l a t e d ,  b u t  somewhat d i f f e r e n t ,  prob lem i s  t he  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  R and D 
phases so t h a t  s a f e t y  i s  adequate ly  cons idered  i n  des ign  o f  equipment, f a c i l i t i e s  
and spaceships.  
5.3 Procedu r s  .
The l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  no rma l l y  b e  respons ib l e  f o r  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  o v e r a l l  
procedures.  As soon as they  b e g i n  pe r f o rm ing  t h i s  f u n c t i o n ,  they  w i l l  immediate ly  
need Standard Opera t ing  Procedures f o r  hand1 ing  c e r t a i n  s tandard ized  s a f e t y  s i  t u -  
a t i o n s .  O r d i n a r i l y ,  they  w i l l  eage r l y  accept  those prepared by t h e  Sa fe ty  D i v i -  
s i on .  Norma l l y ,  t h e  Sa fe ty  D i v i s i o n  w i l l  p repare  an o f f  i c i a  1 handbook c o n t a i n i n g  
a l l  S tandard  Opera t ing  Procedures and p r a c t i c e s .  Th i s  w i l l  be r e g u l a r l y  updated. 
The l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  respons ib le  t o  see t h a t  s a f e t y  i s  adequa te ly  covered 
i n  a l l  t h e i r  procedures.  Due t o  t h e i r  many o t h e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  l i n e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  personnel  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  l ean  h e a v i l y  on t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  ( p l us  
any s p e c i f i c a l l y  des igna ted  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e i r  o p e r a t i n g  s e c t i o n )  t o  assure  
themselves t h a t  s a f e t y  i s  adequate ly  covered. 
There a r e  many dangers which may be v i s i b l e  t o  o n l y  a  few s p e c i a l i s t s  o r  a few 
i n d i v i d u a l s  pe r f o rm ing  c e r t a i n  opera t ions .  I n  a  "safe ty  respons ive"  o r g s n i -  
z a t i o n ,  such problems w i l l  be brought  o u t  i n t o  t h e  open and d iscussed.  Th i s  
w i l l  no rma l l y  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  requi rement  t h a t  a l l  procedures be rev iewed by t he  
Safety D i v i s i o n  and by  s p e c i f i c a l l y  des igna ted  s p e c i a l i s t s .  
Good procedures a r e  t h e  co rners tone  o f  sa fe  ope ra t i ons  w i t h  p r o p e l l a n t s  and 
exp los i ves .  I f  w e l l  i n d o c t r i n a t e d  and t r a i n e d  employees a r e  a l s o  equipped w i t h  
h i g h - q u a l i t y  p r x e d u r e s ,  t he  b a s i c  requi rements  f o r  sa fe  o p e r a t i o n s  have been 
met. Safe equi?ment and f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  a l s o  a  r e q u i s i t e ;  however, good p ro -  
cedures can, i n  many cases, overcome recognized d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  equipment and 
f a c i l i t i e s .  A l l  o p e r a t i o n s  must be per formed by a  procedure;  a l l  p rocedures 
must be rev iewed by  competent i n d i v i d u a l s ;  a l l  changes t o  procedures must be 
rev iewed by comDetent i n d i v i d u a l s .  No excep t i ons  t o  procedures shou ld  o the rw i se  
b e  pe rm i t t ed .  Th is ,  o f  course, means procedures must be workable  and they must 
be adequate. 
The i n d i v i d u a l  do ing  t h e  work, i n  most cases, i s  no t  b e s t  q u a l i f i e d  t o  w r i t e  
procedures f o r  pe r f o rm ing  t he  opera t ion .  N e i t h e r  i s  he t h e  b e s t  f o r  j udg i t i g  
t h e  s a f e t y  o f  des ign.  In .most  cases, a  h i g h - l e v e l  supe rv i so r y  o r  s t a f f - l e v e l  
i n d i v i d u a l  per forms t h e  f i n a l  d e t a i l e d  review. Normal ly ,  t h i s  r ev i ew  w i l l  
n o t  be spread among many i n d i v i d u a l s ,  because ve ry  few people  a r e  competent t o  
make such a review. 
I f  no one i s  p resen t  t o  w r i t e  t h e  procedures,  then  an i n d i v i d u a l  must be 
t r a i n e d ,  h i r e d ,  o r  b rough t  i n  on a c o n s u l t a n t  bas i s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  i s  
no  s imp le  t r a i n i n g  course t h a t  w i l l  assure competence; however, t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
gene ra l  approach should  g i v e  an i n d i v i d u a l  t h e  knowledge t o  d r a f t  procedures:  
P e r t i n e n t  documents and manuals should  be read. 
There should  be a b r i e f  res idence t ime a t  a f a c i l  i t y  which has s i m i l a r  
s a f e t y  problems. 
0 Specialists in related areas should be consulted. 
With such preliminary training, an individual without previous specialized 
training, but with related knowledge, may be in a position to recognize many 
safety problems and to draw up rough procedures. When reviewing rough pro- . 
cedures, an individual recently trained in ordnance safety should ask the 
advice of experienced individuals working in related fields. 
Once these procedures are developed, there is no substitute for the trained 
individual observing the procedure in detail during its first use, preferably 
on inert ordnar,ce. Some revisions will normally result. This same walk- 
through is a1 so a good time to have consul tsnt assistance. Once ssfe ordnance 
procedures have been developed, it follows sutomatically that they should not 
be carelessly changed for format or similar purposes. In many cases, sequence 
is critical. 
It is the responsibility of the supervisor in charge of an operation to check 
that procedure: are being followed and that any unexpected problem is not 
treated with a makeshift procedure. If the individual performing the job devi- 
ates knowingly from a procedure, without permission of his supervisor, he will 
generally be considered personally responsible. This is so, provided he has 
been carefully indoctrinated in the importance of rigorously following procedures 
and provided the procedure was reasonable to follow. 
If an accident results from a mistake in s procedure, those reviewing the pro- 
cedure may bea: responsibility. This will not be true if it is an unrecocnized 
problem which an expert in the field would not have foreseen. Unfortunately, ' 
hindsight is often much clearer than foresight. This statement alone shov~s the 
importance of careful development and review of all ordnance procedures. If an 
i n d i v i d u 2 !  writins the prcce-jures i s  net q u = ! i f i e d  to do t h i s  J A ,  his ssper -  
visor may be held responsible. This responsibility may reflect completely up 
the line unless each individual from the top to the bottov has been made clearly 
aware that no hazardous operations are to be performzd. Only top management can 
make exceptions, and only qualified people will, therefore, review procedures. 
This might be considered, thus, as a third rule, although it is a result of 
application of the first two. 
Acc iden ts  may r e s u l t  d u r i n g  an o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  i s  no t  recogn ized  as an ordnance 
ope ra t i on .  It i s  thus  c l e a r  t h a t  any o p e r a t i o n  per formed around o r  near  a  motor ,  
i g n i t e r ,  de tona to r ,  squ ib ,  o r  exp los i ve  charge o r  r e l a t e d  dev ice  be examined f o r  
p o s s i b l e  ordnance i m p l i c a t i o n s  by  a  q u a l i f i e d  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Pro- 
+ 
cedures wh ich  a r e  no t  a t  f i r s t  thought  hazardous may i n  a c t u a l i t y  be q u i t e  
dangerous. A thorough rev iew may reveal  t h a t  they  have t o  be r e c l a s s i f i e d  o r  
changed t o  make them non-hazardous. T h i s ,  o f  course, should  occur  b e f o r e  t h e y  
a r e  performed the  f i r s t  t i n e ,  no t  i n  r e t r o s p e c t .  The same sequence o f  respons- 
i b i l i t i e s  ho lds  he re  as i t  does f o r  a  c l e a r l y  d e f i n a b l e  ordnance ope ra t i on .  
5.4 M o n i t o r i n q  of Operat ions t o  Detect  Sa fe t y  Problems and t o  Determine t h a t  
Sa fe t y  Procr:dures a r e  be i nq Adequate1 y  Performed 
There w i l l  a lways be a need f o r  repeated s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  ope ra t i ons  t o  d e t e c t  
unrecognized s a f e t y  problems and t o  de te rmine  t h a t  s a f e t y  p o r t i o n s  o f  procedures 
a r e  b e i n g  adequa':ely performed. Th is ,  aga in ,  i s  a  j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  between 
l i n e  and s a f e t y  o rgan i za t i ons .  I t  i s  no rma l l y  d e s i r a b l e  t o  make d r y  runs o f  any 
new procedures.  I n  these cases, s a f e t y  m o n i t o r i n g  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t .  
I n  c e r t a i n  opera: ions,  s a f e t y  f a c t o r s  r e q u i r e  a  member o f  t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  
i n  cons tan t  a t te , idance  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h a t  a l l  s a f e t y  p recau t i ons  have been met. 
5.5 Techn ica l  L i a i s o n  w i t h  I n t e r n a l  and Ex te rna l  Orqan iza t ions  on Sa fe ty  Ma t t e r s  
Close and e a r l y  t echn i ca l  l i a i s o n  on s a f e t y  m a t t e r s  between a l l  e x t e r n a l  anc 
i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i nvo l ved  i s  impor tan t .  Geographic and d i s t a n c e  b a r r : e r s  
shou ld  n o t  be a l lowed t o  s t i f l e  such in terchange.  
It i s  necessary t h a t  t h e  l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  be i n  c l o s e  com- 
mun i ca t i on .  I n  l a r g e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h i s  g e n e r a l l y  i nvo l ves  c e r t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l s  
i n  t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  be ing  c o n s t a n t l y  employed as mutual  con tac t s .  These 
i n d i v i d u a l s  may sometimes be ass igned t o  s p e c i f i c  areas o r  b u i l d i n g s .  
5.6 A Source o f  Ass i s t ance  and a Depos i to ry  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  on Sa fe ty  Ma t t e r s  
The Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  and c e r t a i n  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  t h e  l i n e  department w i l l  no rma l l y  
per fo rm t h i s  d u t y ,  which i s  sel f -e: :p lanatory i n  nature.  
5.7 F a c i l i t i e s  and Equipment 
The des ign  o f  new f a c i l i t i e s ,  new equipment, and t o o l s  should  r e c e i v e  t he  same 
c a r e f u l  s a f e t y  rev iew as do new operat ions.  Des igners  should  remove t he  human 
f a c t o r  f rom hazards b y  making p r o t e c t i o n  as permanent and as au tomat i c  as 
poss ib l e .  
Adequate maintenance f rom a  s a f e t y  v i ewpo in t  i s  a l s o  a  r e q u i s i t e .  Th i s  i s  a  
j o i n t  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  and a  l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
5.8 Report  i nq Acc iden ts  
The f a c t s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  any acc i den ta l  f i r e ,  d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  o r  e x p l o s i o n  must 
be r e p o r t e d  comple te ly  and a c c u r a t e l y  so t h a t  o t h e r s  do ing  s i m i l a r  work may be 
warned, and so t h a t  t he  b e s t  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  may be taken t o  p reven t  s i m i l a r  
acc i den t s .  
Minor  i n c i d e n t s ,  wh ich  i n  themselves do l i t t l e  o r  no harm, f r e q u e n t l y  g i v e  warn- 
i n g s  o f  unsuspeczed hazards. These i n c i d e n t s  should  be w i d e l y  r e p o r t e d  and 
t h e i r  s i gn i f i can :e  g i v e n  thorough cons ide ra t i on .  
I t  i s  t h e  du t y  O F  t h e  l i n e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  see t h a t  a l l  t h e  f a c t s  a r e  p r o v i ~ e d  
t o  t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n .  Norma l l y ,  t h e  Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  w i l l  ' a l so  i n v e s t i g a t e  as 
w e l l  as r e c o r d  s ~ c h  a c c i d e n t s  and spread t h e  r e s u l t s  throughout  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
t o  o t h e r  areas w ' i i ch  may be a f f ec ted .  The Sa fe t y  D i v i s i o n  and 1 i ne  o r g a n i z ~ t i o n  
w i l l  n o r m a l l y  sh3re r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  deve lop ing  p r e v e n t i v e  measures. 
5.9 I n d i v i d u a l s  
Each employee must be i n d o c t r i n a t e d  t o  t h i n k  o f  s a f e t y  c o n s t a n t l y ,  as t h i s  i s  
t h e  o n l y  way i n  which i n j u r y - f r e e  performance can be r e a l i z e d .  I t  i s  imposs ib le  
t o  b r i n g  about a  f o o l - p r o o f  phys i ca l  env i ronment  and se t  o f  r u l e s ;  a  s e t t i n g  i n  
wh i ch  no i n j u r y  can happen. Personal s a f e t y  depends on s i nce re  s a f e t y -  
rnindedness and good judgment on the p a r t  o f  each i n d i v i d u a l ;  n o t  a t  occas iona l  
i n t e r v a l s ,  b u t  c o n t i n u o u s l y  as an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  d a i l y  a c t i v i t y .  
Safety-consc iousness o f  most new techn i ca l  employees needs t o  be developed. I t  
i s  commonplace t o  f i n d  many shades o f  f a t a l i s m ,  e x e m p l i f i e d  i n  such p a t  expres-  
s i o n s  as "acc iden ts  a r e  bound t o  happen." These a r e  s imp ly  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  f o r  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  o r  bravado. Most i n j u r i e s  a r e  caused by  s p e c i f i c  ca re lessnsss  o r  
poor judgment on t he  p a r t  o f  someone. Each i n d i v i d u a l  worker must be the  major  
f a c t o r  i n  h i s  own s a f e t y  and t h a t  o f  h i s  ne ighbor .  Every i n d i v i d u a l  i.n t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  has s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  these may va ry  g r e a t l y  i n  magnitude. 
I f  eve ry  i n d i v i d u a l  understands h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and d ischarges  them i n  an 
. 
e f f e c t i v e  and e f f i c i e n t  manner, a  s a f e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  r e s u l t .  
6.0 A C C I D E N T  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  REACTION 
F i gu re  1-1 
The above f i g u r e  shows how an a c c i d e n t  can r e f l e c t  throughout  an e n t i r e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  You a r e  n o t  safe anywhere i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  There a r e  many 
o t h e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  connect ions bes ides  those shown; anyone i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  
may become invo lved .  For any who have n o t  been i n  on t he  r e p o r t i n g  and i n v s s t i -  
g a t i o n  o f  acc i den t s ,  I can assure you t h a t  i t  i s  ve r y  s e r i o u s ,  consumes a  g r e a t  
amount o f  t ime ,  and t h e r e  i s  an enormous amount o f  paper work invo lved .  
7.0 CONCLUSION 
Top management has heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t he  f i e l d  o f  Ordnance and Prope l -  
l a n t  Safety.  These cannot be dodged. One cannot t r u s t  " luck."  T h e i r  d ischarge  
i s  l a r g e l y  by the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s tandard management techniques,  b u t  even manage- . 
ment needs some s p e c i a l i z e d  t echn i ca l  i n f o rma t i on .  The remain ing l e c t u r e s  a r e  
designed t o  g i v e  t h i s  t e c h n i c a l  in fo rmat ion .  
Inadequate s a f e t y  can l e a d  t o  h o r r i b l e  l o s s  o f  l i f e ,  enormous r e b u i l d i n g  c o s t s  
and cos t s  due t o  de lay o f  programs, and even p o s s i b l e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  p r o j e c t s .  
One acc iden t  can g r e a t l y  exceed the cos t  o f  a  good s a f e t y  program. 
Ordnance and P ro i~e l  l a n t  Sa fe ty  must be an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  eng inee r i ng  o p e r s t  ions. 
Top management i s  r espons ib l e  f o r  seeing t h a t  Zveryone understands and d ischarges  
h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
Lec tu re  Number One 
"TOP MANAGEbiENT RESPONS I B I L IT  I ES" 
Pa r t  I I 
M r .  L. T .  Dombras 
1 .0 INTRODUCTION • 
KSC i s  one o f  the  most p u b l i c i z e d  areas i n  t he  w o r l d ,  and one wh ich  p robab l y  
w i l l  be i nvo l ved  w i t h  t he  g r e a t e s t  aggregate o f  p o t e n t i a l  hazards conceived 
by  modern man. I n  cons ide r i ng  t h e  acc iden t  r a t e  a t  KSC, i t  i s  a  t r i b u t e  t o  
t he  KSC Acc iden t  P reven t i on  Program t o  know t h a t  one i s  s a f e r  a t  work than a t  
home. 
Management must be concerned w i t h  s a f e t y .  T h i s  concern i s  no t  based on s e l f -  
s u r v i v a  1 o r  humane cons ide ra t i ons  a lone.  Ra ther ,  i t  i s  because management 
r e a l i z e s  t h a t  acc iden t s  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  program schedules and a r e  ex t reme ly  
expensive i n  d o l l a r s ,  equipment, and i n  some cEses, the  loss  o f  s k i l l e d  person-  
n e l .  T h i s  may seem t o  be a  v e r y  co ld  and d i s p ~ s s i o n a t e  v i ewpo in t ;  however, i t  
i s  a  p o s i t i o n  which s u b s t a n t i a t e s  the fund ing  i o r  s a f e t y  eng ineer ing .  
2.0 MISSION 70 
Recen t l y  t h e  P res iden t  o f  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  appealed t o  Federa l  Agencies t o  
reduce t h e  carnage and d i sab  i 1 i t  i es  which have cos t  o u r  space program cons ider -  
a b l e  t i m e  and expend i tu res .  As a r e s u l t ,  a  program was i n i t i a t e d  e n t i t l e d  
"Miss ion 70". The purpose and t he  o b j e c t i v e  o f  "Miss ion 70" i s  t o  reduce t h e  
i n j u r y  f requency r a t e s  o f  a1 1 Federal  Agencies t o  a t  l e a s t  7% o f  t h e  1963 
f i g u r e s  by  1970. 
Du r i ng  1963, t h e  i n j u r y  f requency r a t e  f o r  KSC was 2.78 d i s a b l i n g  i n j u r i e s  f o r  
eve ry  m i  1 1  i o n  manhours worked. Your "Miss ion 70" t a r g e t  i s  t o  reduce t h i s  
f i g u r e  t o  1.95 i n j u r i e s  p e r  m i l l i o n  manhours. T h i s  i s  q u i t e  a  t a r g e t  f o r  your  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  because i n c r e a s i n g l y  more hazardous ope ra t  ions wi l 1 occu r  w i t h  
the  l a r g e r  and more compl icated space programs fo recas ted  f o r  KSC. 
D u r i n g  P res iden t  Johnson's speech concerning "Miss ion 70," t h e  f o l  lowing 
s t a t i s t i c s  were p resen ted :  
OCCUPATIONAL A C C  l DENT STAT l ST l CS 
FED ERA L NAT l ONA L 
1958- 1964 ANNUAL RATE 
DEATHS 1,200 13,800 
DISABLING INJURI ES 300,000 I ,960,000 
LOST MAN -DAYS 18,500,000 235,000 ,OOO+ 
F i gu re  1-2 
3 .O INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT PROGRAMS 
I n  1963, t h e  cos t  t o  a l l  Government Agencies as a  r e s u l t  o f  i n j u r i e s  was 
36.6 m i l l  i o n  do1 l a r s .  From 1958 t o  da te ,  t h e  t o t a l  cos t  o f  a c c i d e n t a l  i n j u r i e s  
i s  es t ima ted  t o  be i n  excess o f  1; b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  S tagger ing  as these s t a -  
t i s t  i cs a r e ,  i t  .;s a  f a c t ,  based upon t h e  accor.ip 1 ishments i n  every  ma jo r  branch 
o f  i n d u s t r y ,  that: p r a c t i c a l  l y  every one o f  the,;e acc iden t s  cou ld  have been p r e -  
ven ted  by dynamic s a f e t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  en joy ing  complete suppor t  and the  back ing 
o f  t o p  management. 
a S ince  1926, t l a t i o n a l  Sa fe t y  Counci l  data s!iows t h a t  occupa t i ona l  acc iden t s  
i n  a l l  i n d u s t r i e s  were reduced t o  va lues a1,proaching zero.  
a The expend i t  ~ r e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  insure  a  good s a f e t y  program a r e  ex t reme ly  
sma l l  as compared w i t h  t h e  cost  o f  acc iden t s .  Imagine how much o f  t h e  
I& b i  I 1  i o n  do1 l a r s ,  ment ioned above, cou ld  have been saved i f  s a f e t y  
o f f i c e s  were p r o v i d e d  w i t h  more t r a i n e d  personnel  and s a f e t y  educat iona 1 
p  rog  rams . 
Some degree o f  hazard i s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  every  o p e r a t i o n .  A  p e r f e c t  
sa fe ty  pruy rdlll, t ha t  i s  one w i t h  no  acc iden t s ,  can o n i y  be achieved by 
g i v i n g  me t i cu lous  a t t e n t i o n  t o  every  form o f  a c t i v i t y  t h a t  i s  c a r r i e d  
on .  
I n j u r y  p r e v e n t i o n  does n o t  r e q u i r e  spec ia l  t h e o r i e s  o r  h i g h l y  t e c h n i c a l  
s k i  I 1  b u t  depends t o  a  g r e a t  degree on " sa fe t y  mindedness." T h i s  
" s a f e t y  mindednessI1 may be de f ined  as a  cons tan t  a c t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
s a f e t y  i.n every  d e t a i l ,  every  day, on t he  p a r t  o f  every  i n d i v i d u a l  
inLiolved i n  every  manner. 
a Any management, r ega rd l ess  o f  the s i z e  o f  t he  bus iness o r  t ype  o f  
i n d u s t r y ,  can e l i m i n a t e  a lmost  a l l  i n j u r i e s .  Sa fe t y  i s  your  bus iness ,  
and i t  i s  one o f  your  management r e s p c n s i b i l i t i e s .  Your o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  your  employees i s  t h a t  t h e i r  s a f e t y  shou ld  n o t  be s a c r i f i c e d  o r  
j eopa rd i zed  i n  any way. 
e Most i n j u r i e s  r e s u l t  f rom f a u l t y  equipment o r  hazardous operat :ons.  I f  + 
you c o r r e c t  e i t h e r  o f  these causes, you may p reven t  i n j u r i e s .  F a u l t y  
behav io r  can be covered by t r a i n i n g  and c r e a t i n g  the  " sa fe t y  mindedness" 
among your  workers.  However, minimum i n j u r y  r a t e s  can o n l y  be ach ieved 
b y  reduc ing  t h e  p h y s i c a l  hazards assoc ia ted  w i t h  your  area o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  
o O f f - t h e - j o b  acc i den t s  shou ld  be reduced. The ga ins  scored 'by i n d u s t r y  i n  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  area have been s i g n i f i c a n t .  Promot ional  a c t i v i t i e s  
d i r e c t e d  toward l essen ing  o f f - t h e - j o b  a c c i d e n t s  have proven v e r y  wor th -  
w h i l e .  
I n d u s t r y  and t h e  KSC Sa fe t y  Proqram 
How does t h e  KSC Sa fe t y  Program compare w i t h  i n d u s t r y ?  KSC o p e r a t i o n s  appear 
t o  combine t h e  work conducted by  p r a c t i c a l l y  a ; l  i n d u s t r i e s :  chemica l ,  manu- 
f a c t u r i n g ,  e l e c t r o n i c ,  a i r c r a f t ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  and t he  t o y  i n d u s t r y .  The 
s p a c e c r a f t  and boos te r  programs i nvo l ve  many p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous opera t :ons  
i n t e r r e l a t e d  i n t o  a  ve r y  complex pa t t e rn .  I n  i n d u s t r y ,  the  g u i d e l i n e s  and 
f u n c t i o n s  of t h e  s a f e t y  supe rv i so r s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  and t h e  i n t e r -  
faces  a r e  capable  o f  o r d e r l y  ana l ys i s .  KSC's ope ra t i ons  w i t h  boos te r  systems 
and space v e h i c l e s  a r e  c o n t i n u a l l y  changing f r om launch t o  launch and f r om 
program t o  program. 
4.0 KSC SAFETY 2ROGRAM 
KSC o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  complex and i n v o l v e  many o p e r a t i o n s  wh ich  a r e  p o t e n t i a l l y  
dangerous. The Sa fe t y  O f f  i c e  i s  r espons ib l e  t o  t h e  D i  r e c t o r  (KSC) f o r  c o n t r o l  
o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  s a f e t y  program performed by NASA o r  i t s  c o n t r a c t o r  personne l .  
S p e c i a l l y  t r a i n e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  implement a l l  s a f e t y  aspects  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  
and launch  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  e x p l o s i v e s ,  a c c i d e n t  p reven t i on ,  
t r a f f i c  s a f e t y ,  e t c .  
The KSC Acc iden t  Prevent  i o n  Program i s  b a s i c a l l y  executed by t h e  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e .  
B a s i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and f i n a l  a u t h o r i t y  on a l l  ma t t e r s  o f  s a f e t y  d u r i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  per formed by NASA and i t s  c o n t r a c t o r s  s r e  assumed b y  t h e  KSC Safe ty  
O f f i c e .  The t a s k  ass igned  t o  your  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  i s  enormous -- t h e  respons- 
i b i l i t i e s  a r e  t e r r i f y i n g  and t he  personal  rewards a r e  n e g l i g i b l e .  When t h i n g s  
go r i g h t ,  t h e  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  i s  do ing i t s  j o b ;  b u t  i f  acc i den t s  occur ,  t h e  
w ra th  o f  h i g h e r  management descends upon t he  S a f e t y  O f f i c e .  To a  g r e a t  degree, 
pure  l u c k  and chance p l a y  a  b i g  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  Acc iden t  Prevent i o n  Program. 
4.1 KSC Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  
The f u n c t i o n  o f  a  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  i s  t o  develop s a f e t y  s tandards,  s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  launch ope ra t i ons ,  and t o  p r o v i d e  eng inee r i ng  s e r v i c e s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p l o -  
s i v e s  and o p e r a t i o n a l  sa fe ty .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  s a f e t y  personnel  conduct surveys and 
eva lua te  acc i den t s  and conduct s a f e t y  t r a i n i n g  and p romot iona l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
work assignments cover  many many areas over  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  geograph ica l  
area.  I n  a  r ecen t  s tudy  conducted by  STL, we found t h a t  t h e  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  i s  
n o t  adequa te ly  s 3 f f e d  w i t h  a  s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  personnel  t o  cover a l l  areas 
o f  hazardous ope ra t i ons  a n t i c i p a t e d  d u r i n g  1965. Recent Government p o l i c i e s ,  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  f r eeze  on t he  number o f  personnnl  wh ich  KSC may a c q u i r e ,  may 
n e c e s s i t a t e  a c q u i r i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  h e l p  th rough  the  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  and c e r t a i n l y  
t h e  h e l p  o f  managers. 
Top management's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  approve, s a n c t i o n ,  and suppor t  t h e  Sa fe ty  
O f f i c e .  Wi thou t  t h i s  suppor t ,  t h e  s a f e t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l  d i s i n t e g r a t e  and 
become i n e f f e c t i v e .  Acc iden t  p r e v e n t i o n  i s  a good, sound bus iness  p o l i c y .  As 
managers, you mu;t a l s o  a s s i s t  i n  s a f e t y  promot ion,  educa t i ona l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
and t r a  i n  i ng programs. 
Every  supe rv i so r  has personnel  work ing  d i r e c t l y  f o r  h im who a re  i n v o l v e d  i n  
some fo rm  o f  p h y s i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  Since some degree o f  hazard i s  assoc ia ted  
w i t h  eve ry  fo rm o f  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  h i g h e s t  desree o f  i n j u r y  p r e v e n t i o n  can o n l y  
be  ach ieved  by  i n s u r i n g  t he  s a f e t y  o f  every  o p e r a t i o n  i n  each ass igned area 
o f  supe rv i s i on .  These a reas  may no t  appear hazardous, b u t  renember, acc i den t s  
do n o t  r e q u i r e  exp los i ves ,  p r o p e l l a n t s  o r  dangerous m a t e r i a l s .  And acc i den t s  
d o n ' t  j u s t  happen -- they  a r e  caused. How can manag2ment p reven t  acc i den :~?  
S imp ly  by c r e a t i n g  a  s a f e t y  awareness among t he  e n t i r e  work f o r c e .  The l a r g e  
number o f  personnel  wo rk i ng  a t  Cape Kennedy cannot be mon i to red  a t  a l l  t imes 
by  a sma l l  f o r c e  o f  Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  personnel .  A l l  personnel  must h e l p  t o  
e l  im i  n a t e  t h e  causes o f  a c c i d e r t s .  
As managers, you must back up your Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  i n  a l l  o p e r a t i o n s  and respec t  
t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  Your e f f o r t s  w i l l  be rewarded i f  you p r a c t i c e  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s :  
e Back UD t h e  Sa fe ty  O f f i c e  i n  a l l  ope ra t i ons .  
P rov ide  approva l  , ' sanc t i on ,  and suppor t .  
o A i d  i n  s a f e t y  promot ion. 
Create s a f e t y  awareness. 
e Assume s a f e t y  r e s p o n s i b i l  i t y  as hart o f  management. 
6.0 NASA's SAFETY RESPONSI B l  LIT1 ES 
The respons i b  i 1  i t  i e s  o f  NASA Headauarters as ou t1  ined i n  t h e  Management Manual , 
Chapters 2 and 23, a r e  t h e  ove ra l  1  d i r e c t i o r  o f  t h e  NASA Safe ty  Program. The 
NASA Sa fe t y  O f f i c e  a t  Headquarters i s  r e s p o r s i b l e  f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  NASA Sa fe t y  Program. The i n s t r u c t i o n s  c u t 1  ined  i n  t h e  Management Manual 
a p p l y  t o  NASA Headquarters and a l l  i t s  f i e l d  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  These i n s t r u c t i o n s  
a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  b road  i n  t rea tment  and genera l  i n  na tu re ,  t he reby  a l l o w i n g  each 
f i e l d  i n s t a l l z t i o n  t o  develop i t s  own s a f e t y  program t o  meet t h e  s p e c i f i c  needs 
f o r  problems which a r i s e  a t  each l o c a t i o n .  
In s t u d y i n g  t h e  NASA program, STL found t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  ve r y  l o g i c a l  p l a n  and 
S a f e t y  Acc iden t  Preven t ion  Program. Th i s  p l a n  i s  ve r y  adequa te ly  desc r i bed  by 
a s t o r y  t o l d  t y  Dr. John Furbay, a  no ted  l e c t u r e r .  D r .  Furbay desc r i bes  a  bug 
wh ich  was bo rn  i n  t h e  w o r l d ' s  most expens ive and b e a u t i f u l  p e r s i a n  rug. 
F i gu re  1-3. THE RUG BUG 
1-17 
T h i s  bug i n  t h e  rug spent h i s  e n t i r e  l i f e  scampering around between t h e  f i b e r s  
e a t i n g  crumbs and f i n a l l y ,  a f t e r  a  v e r y  f u l l  l i f e ,  i t  d ied .  That bug l i v e d  
i n  t h a t  rug a l l  o f  i t s  l i f e ,  y e t  i t  d i e d  never r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  i t  had l i v e d  i n  
a  p a t t e r n ,  a  m a g n i f i c e n t  design. You cannot l i v e  l i k e  the  bug i n  t he  rug.  
. 
You must l e a r n  t h e  p a t t e r n  and your p a r t i c u l a r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h a t  p a t t e r n .  
The o v e r a l l  des ign  o f  t h e  NASA Safe ty  and Acc iden t  Preven t ion  Program s t a r t s  
r i g h t  a t  t he  top  a t  NASA Headquarters i n  Washington. I t  i s  o u t l i n e d  i n  NASA 
Management Manual, Chapter 23, I n s t r u c t i o n  23-1-IA. 
The responsi  b i  1  i t  i e s  o f  Headquarters a r e :  
o Overa l  l d i r e c t i o n  o f  NASA Safe ty  Program. 
r Development o f  b a s i c  p o l  i c i e s  and s tandards.  
E v a l u a t i o n o f  program e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
7.0 POLICIES - NASA SAFETY ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROGRAM 
The NASA Sa fe t y  O f f  i c e  i s  respons ib le  f o r  t he  o v e r a l l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  NASA 
S a f e t y  Program. Headquarters i s  respons ib le  f o r  t he  development o f  b a s i c  
p o l i c i e s  and s tandards w i t h  regard t o  t he  Sa fe t y  Program a t  each f i e l d  i n s t a l -  
l a t i o n ,  and 1's a l s o  respons ib l e  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  these programs w i t h  regard  t o  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  o r d e r  t o  reduce the number o f  acc iden t s  and i n j u r i e s  among 
Government O f f i c e r s  and employees. F i n a l  a u t h o r i t y  a t  the  top  management 113vel 
i s  ass igned  t o  t h e  Assoc ia te  Deputy A d m i n i s t r 3 t o r  o f  Adm in i s t r a t i on .  P o 1 i c . e ~  
and t h e  NASA S a f e t y  Acc iden t  Preven t ion  Program a r e  o u t  l ined i n  t h e  NASA 
Management Manual. l n s t r u c t i o n s  app ly  t o  a l l  f i e l d  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  K S C .  
l n s t r u c t i o n s  i n  t h e  NASA Management Manual o u t l i n e  the  f o l l o w i n g  b a s i c  p o l i c i e s  
f o r  t h e  NASA Sa fe t y  Acc iden t  Preven t ion  Program: 
i Ensure s a f e t y  o f  NASA and con t rac to r  employees. 
A v o i d  de lay  o f  NASA programs due t o  acc iden ts .  
Prevent  damage t o  p r o p e r t y  and equipment. 
Assure p rope r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the p u b l i c .  
P r o v i d e  r i s k  and l oss  f a c t o r  data. 
The p reced ing  po l  i c i e s  a r e  t o  i nsu re  the s a f e t y  o f  NASA and c o n t r a c t o r  employees 
d u r i n g  t h e i r  work on N4SA programs. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  these p o l i c i e s ,  NASA Head- 
q u a r t e r s  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  sa fe t y  r u l e s  and gu ides f o r  the  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  i n j u r i e s ,  
acc i den t s ,  and d e s t r u c t i o n  t o  p rope r t y .  Un i fo rm s a f e t y  s tandards a r e  b road  i n  
scope and p l ace  l i m i t s  upon t he  f o l l o w i n g :  
o Design and c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  equipment, f a c i l i t i e s ,  and b u i l d i n g s .  
e Procedures f o r  t h e  performance o f  hazardous opera t ions .  
a Standards f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  hygiene. 
e Standards f o r  s a f e t y  and r e l a t e d  requirements i n  c o n t r a c t u a l  c lauses.  
e Acc iden t  and i n j u r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  r e p o r t i n g .  
8.0 KSC SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES 
The John F. Kennedy Space Center s a f e t y  r espons ib i  1 i t i e s  a re  t o  develop a  S a f e ~ y  
Acc iden t  P reven t i on  Program i n  accordance w i t h  NASA i n s t r u c t i o n s .  These respons 
i b i l i t i e s  a re :  
o Develop a  s a f e t y  and acc i den t  p reven t i on  program. 
e Prov ide  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  acc i den t  p reven t ion .  
e Acc iden t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and r e p o r t i n g .  
6 Ensure s a f e t y  o f  a1 1  opera t  i ons  and f a c i  1 i t  i e s  a t  KSC. 
These i n s t r u c t i o n s  r e q u i r e  t h a t  you p rov i de  cont inuous l eade rsh ip  i n  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  
o f  i n j u r i e s  t o  personnel  and damage t o  equipment and f a c i l i t i e s .  You must have 
t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  r e p o r t i n g ,  i n v e s t i g a t i n g ,  and f o l l o w i n g - u p  a c t i o n  on acc i den t s  
i n v o l v i n g  a l l  persons on o r  near NASA i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  and you a re  t o  i nsu re  t he  
s a f e t y  o f  a l l  o p e r a t i o n s  and f a c i l i t i e s  used by NASA i n s t a l l a t i o n s  o r  i t s  con t rac -  
t o r s  wo rk i ng  a t  these i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  When f a c i l i t i e s  a t  one i n s t a i i a t i o n  a re  b e i n g  
u t i l i z e d  by one o r  more c o n t r a c t o r s  o r  one o r  more NASA o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  r e s i d e n t  
d i r e c t o r  s h a l l  be r espons ib l e  f o r  the s a f e t y  o f  a l l  ope ra t i ons  and f a c i l i t i e s  i n  
such cases. These r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and t he  g u i d e l i n e s  by which they  a r e  c a r r i e d  
o u t  a r e  be ing  executed by the  KSC Safety  O f f i c e .  They r e q u i r e  your  h e l p  i f  an 
a c c i d e n t - f r e e  program i s  t o  be achieved. 
- 
9.0 KSC SAFETY PROGRAM INTERFACES 
The n a t u r e  o f  t h e  work a t  KSC requ i r es  numerous groups, agencies,  and c o n t r a c t o r s  
work ing  c l o s e l y  t oge the r  under p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous c o n d i t i o n s .  
9.1 Con t rac to r  - KSC . 
Since KSC i s  r espons ib l e  f o r  t h e  sa fe t y  o f  a l l  ope ra t i ons  a t  t h e  Space Center ,  
t h e  work performed by c o n t r a c t o r s  must be mon i to red  and t he  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  s a f e t y  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  must be de f ined .  
9.2 NASA Tenant Orqan iza t ions  
P r a c t i c a l l y  every  o p e r a t i o n  p lanned f o r  KSC w i l l  i n v o l v e  seve ra l  NASA o r g a n i -  
za t i ons .  Each one i s  r espons ib l e  f o r  s p e c i f i c  p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  launch prograr i  
and each agency i s  r espons ib l e  t o  i t s  personnel  f o r  sa fe t y .  However, KSC and 
t he  D i r e c t o r  a r e  r espons ib l e  f o r  the o v e r a l l  ope ra t i ons  w i t h  r ega rd  t o  s a f e t y .  
I t  i s  impor tan t  t h a t  t enan t  NASA o r g a n i z a t i o n s  unders tand t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t . i e s  
and t h a t  every  e f f o r t  be made t o  insure  adequate coverage o f  a l l  aspects  o f  
launch programs. 
9.3 I n t e r n a l  KSC Groups 
You, a s  managers, i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  the c o n t r a c t o r s ,  must i n t e r f a c e  w i t h  t h e  
KSC s a f e t y  O f f i c e  and i nsu re  adequate p r o t e c t i o n  o f  a l l  NASA and c o n t r a c t o r  
personnel  wo rk i ng  i n  your  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  
Du r i ng  some ope ra t i ons ,  severa l  NASA o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w i l l  be wo rk i ng  c o n c u r r e n r l y  
on t h e  space v e h i c l e  o r  boos te r  system. I n  thzse  ins tances  t he  g u i d e l i n e s  
shou ld  be c l e a r  and w e l l  de f i ned .  
9.4 AFETR - KSC 
J o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  e x i s t  between DOD - NASA; these i n t e r f a c e s  a re  d e f i n e d  i n  
t h e  DOD/NASA   ebb-~c~amara) Agreement, da ted  17 January 1963, and subsequent 
j o i n t  1 y  sponsored amendments. 
SUPERVI SORS ' SAFETY CHECK L l  ST 
Here a r e  some i tems which you shou ld  cons ider  du r i ng  your normal 
work day and which should he lp  reduce acc iden t s  t o  you and personnel  
work ing f o r  you: 
1 .  Accept s a f e t y  as p a r t  o f  your  j o b .  
2 .  Recognize t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  good s a f e t y  and good 
management. 
3 .  Give good s a f e t y  i n s t r u c t  ions t o  new employees. 
4. .Make known t o  a1 l tha t  you w i  I 1  dea l  h a r s h l y  w i t h  
c h r o n i c  v i o l a t o r s .  
5. P rov ide  s a f e t y  equipment. 
6 .  Form and a s s i s t  s a f e t y  meet ings.  
7 .  I n v e s t i g a t e  every  acc iden t  and every i n c i d e n t .  
8. P rov ide  p roper  t r a i n i n g .  
TABLE 1 
SOME D l  SASTERS l NVOCVl NG PROPELLANTS AND/OR EXPLOS 1 VES 
(EXCLUD ING M l NE EXPLOS I ONS) 
1917, December 6 - H a l i f a x ,  Nova Sco t i a ,  Canada. 
Exp los ion  o f  war m a t e r i a l s  and f i r e ;  over  1,500 k i l l e d ;  
4,000 i n j u r e d ;  20,000 homeless; p r o p e r t y  l o s s  $35,000,000. 
1921, September 21 - Oppau, Germany. 
Exp los ion  o f  ammon ium n i t r a t e  k i  1 1  s about 600 persons. 
- 
1937, March 18 - New London, Texas. 
Na tu ra l  gas exp los ion  dest roys schoolhause; 413 c h i l d r e n  
and 14 teachers k i l l e d .  
1939, March 1 - Osaka, Japan. 
Huge mun i t i ons  dump explodes, w i p i n g  ou t  v i l l a g e ;  500 
k i l l e d  and i n j u r e d :  300 houses destroyed: 8,313 homeless. 
1939, J u l y  10 - Penandara de Bracamonte, Spain. 
Approx imate ly  100 k i l l e d ;  1500 i n j u r e d ;  town demolished 
i n  e x p l o s i o n  o f  mun i t i ons  f a c t o r y .  
1941, June 8 - Smederevo, Yugoslavia.  
Ammunition p l a n t  explodes; k i l l i n g  1,600 and demol ish ing 
most o f  town. 
1942, May 1 - Tessenderlo,  Belgium. 
Exp los ion  i n  chemical works k i  l l s 250 workers,  i n j u r e s  1,000. 
1944, A p r i l  14 - Bombay, Ind ia .  
128 d i e  i n  s h i p  f i r e  which causes e x p l o s i o n  i n  ammunit ion 
dump; 1,000 i n j u red .  
1944, J u l y  17 - P o r t  Chicago, C a l i f o r n i a .  
Exp los ions  a t  two ammunition dumps k i l l  more than 300. 
1947, A p r i l  16 - Texas C i t y ,  Texas 
Exp l r s ion  rf Frciich vesse? GRANZCHAHP b e s t r ~ y ;  G G ; ~  sf city; 
more than  500 dead o r  missing. 
1947, August 20 - Cadiz, Spain. 
Three hundred t o  500 k i l l e d  i n  exp los ion  o f  shipyards. 
1948, March 9 - Ts ing tao ,  China. 
Exp los ion  o f  ammunit ion storehouse k i l l s  a t  l e a s t  200; 
severa l  hundred i n j u red .  
TABLE 1 (cont 'd)  
1948, J u l y  28 - Ludwigshafen, Germany. 
Explos ions and f i r e  wreck chemical works o f  I. G .  Farben Company; 
some 200 k i l l e d  and severa l  thousand i n j u r e d ;  damage $15,000,000. 
1948, September 22 - Hong Kong, China. 
F i r e  and chemical e x p l o s i o n  i n  warehouse; 135 k i l l e d ,  57 i n j u r e d .  
1953, October 16 - Boston, Massachusetts. 
Exp los ion  and f i r e  aboard U. S. a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r  LEYTE k i l l s  37, 
i n j u r e s  40. 
1956, August 7 - C a l i ,  Columbia. 
Seven t r u c k s  c a r r y i n g  dynamite explode; dead es t imated  a t  1,100. 
1958, June 23 - Santa Amaro, B r a z i l .  
F i  reworks e x p l o s i o n  causes about 100 deaths. 
1960, March 4 - Havana, Cuba. 
French m u n i t i o n  s h i p  blows up, k i l l i n g  75 - 100 and i n j u r i n g  200. 
Reference: Encyclopedia Americana 
Lecture Number Two 
"EXPLOS I VES AND PROPELLANTS I N ACT1 ON" 
Part I 
Mr. J. Larks 
1 .0 THEORY OF DEFLAGRAT l ON AND DETONAT l ON 
Before any d iscuss ion  o f  exp los ives  can be undertaken, the meanings o f  a t  
l eas t  th ree  words must be c l e a r l y  understood: exp los ion ,  d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  and 
detonat ion.  
1.1 Explos ion 
Explode - ( ~ k ~ ~ ~ l ~ d ' )  
General : To cause t o  bu rs t  n o i s i l y .  
Expl i c i t :  The sudden re lease of pressure i n  which a  shock wave i s  
created. 
An exp los ion  i s  a r e s u l t ,  no t  a  cause o r  a  chemical reac t i on  i n  i t s e l f .  The 
pressure which causes an exp los ion  may be b u i l t  up g radua l l y  or  r a p i d l y .  I f  
the pressure i s  b u i l t  up g radua l l y ,  i t  must be i n  a  conf ined volume t o  cause 
an explos ion.  The exp los ion  of a  steam b o i l e r  i s  a  good example o f  pressure 
b u i l d u p  i n  a  conf ined volume; the  explos ion occurs when the conta iner  
ruptui-es. 
Many h i g h l y  r e a c t i v e  chemicals can cause an explos ion.  The burn ing  of powde- 
i n  an a r t i  1 l e r y  round i s  an example o f  r a p i d  bu i l dup  o f  pressure i n  a  conf in2d 
volume. When the  f i r i n g  p i n  detonates the p r i n e r  o f  a  s h e l l ,  the r e a c t i v e  
m a t e r i a l  (powder) i n  the case 1 iberates ho t  gases. As  the gases expand, they 
f o r c e  the  p r o j e c t i l e  through the b a r r e l  o f  the gun. When the p r o j e c t i l e  leaves 
the  b a r r e l ,  the  pressure i s  released suddenly and an exp los ion  occurs. Note 
t h a t  t h e  e x p l ~ s i ~ n  i s  N O T  the r e a c t i s n ,  b e t  t he  release of presst -~re ,  
Extremely r e a c t i v e  chemicals can cause an exp los ion  i n  unconf ined areas. I n  
t h i s  case, t he  chemicals b u i l d  up pressure fas te r  than i t  can be d i ss ipa ted  
t o  the  surrounding atmosphere; the atmosphere, ra the r  than a  s o l i d  ob jec t  o r  
con ta ine r ,  a c t s  as the c o n f i n i n g  agent. Explosions, t he re fo re ,  a re  dependent 
upon r e a c t i o n  r a t e  and a  s i z e  e f f e c t  o r  scale.  
1.2 D e f l a g r a t i o n  
De f l ag ra te  - ( d ~ f ' 1 ; ~ r ~ t )  
General: To cause t o  burn  away w i t h  sudden e v o l u t i o n  o f  f lame and 
rap  i d  , sharp combust i on. 
E x p l i c i t :  A chemical r e a c t i o n  p roduc ing  v i go rous  e v o l u t i o n  o f  heat  
and sparks 0.r f lame and moving through the m a t e r i a l  a t  
a  speed l e s s  than t h a t  o f  sound. 
D e f l a g r a t i o n  i s  an exothermic r e a c t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  heat  i s  l i b e r a t e d  d u r i n g  the  
process.  The exothermic r e a c t i o n  may be decomposit ion, o x i d a t i o n ,  o r  combust ion 
and the  most f a m i l i a r  example o f  d e f l a g r a t i o n  o r  f lame i s  commonly termed 
burn ing .  D e f l a g r a t i o n  can cause an e x p l o s i o n  i f  t h e  process i s  con f i ned  and 
causes a  r a p i d  p ressure  bu i l dup .  I n  t he  de te rm ina t i on  o f  d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  the 
impor tan t  f a c t o r  i s  t he  r e a c t i o n  ra te .  To v i s u a l i z e  and d e f i n e  the  mechanism 
of d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  t he  f lame i s  de f ined  as s tand ing  s t i l l  w i t h  the  f u e l  o r  
unreacted m a t e r i a l  f l o w i n g  i n t o  the f lame and the  p roduc ts  o r  reac ted  mater-  
i a l  f l o w i n g  away f r om it. The r a t e  a t  wh ich  the unreacted m a t e r i a l  o r  f u e l  
f l ows  i n t o  the  f lame i s  termed the  bu rn ing  v e l o c i t y .  Many m i x t u r e s  and f u e l  
m a t e r i a l s  have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  burn ing  v e l o c i t i e s  wh ich  a r e  dependent on 
temperature and p ressure .  Burn ing  v e l o c i t i e s  o f  gases range f rom a  few 
cen t ime te rs  pe r  second t o  about one meter per  second. 
When c e r t a i n  m a t e r i a l s ,  termed exp los ives ,  a r e  sub jec ted  t o  r a p i d  increases i n  
temperature,  a  temperature l e v e l  i s  a t t a i n e d  where v o l a t i l i z a t i o n  f rom the  
sur face,  p r i o r  t o  the r e a c t i o n  o f  the m a t e r i a l  i t s e l f ,  c rea tes  hea t  r e s u l t i n g  
i n a  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  r e a c t i o n .  Th is  temperatLre l e v e l  i s  termed the " i g n i t i o n  . 
temperature"  o f  t he  m a t e r i a l ;  i t  i s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  d e f l a g r a t i o n  begins.  
D e f l a g r a t i o n  can be termed a  d i f f u s i o n  phenomenon, ( s i m i l a r  t o  the spreading o f  
an odor  i n  s t i l l  a i r ) .  
Exp los i ves  may be d i v i d e d  i n tn  t w o  c!asses; !ex exp!cslves 2nd h i m h  .., - J c v  + A , 2 s W  awn'--
s i v e s .  P y r o t e c h n i c  m i x t u r e s  and loose b l a c k  powder a r e  termsd low exp los i ves  
and w i l l  undergo v i o l e n t  d e f l a g r a t i o n  when s u f f i c i e n t  heat  i s  generated. 
N i t r o c e l l u l o s e  m a t e r i a l s  o r d i n a r i l y  undergo r a p i d  d e f l a g r a t i o n  b u t ,  i f  
con f i ned ,  t h i s  can become de tona t ion .  Lead az ide ,  termed a  h i g h  exp los i ve ,  
w i  1 l n o t  def l a g r a t e  b u t  w i  1 1  detonate even a t  one atmosphere p ressure .  TNT 
( t r i n i t r o t o l u e n e )  w i l l  d e f l a g r a t e  when l oose l y  con f ined ;  however, i f  i t s  con- 
f i nemen t  i s  such t h a t  h i g h  pressures a r e  developed, t h i s  i n i t i a l  d e f l a g r a t i o n  
w i l l  be f o l l o w e d  b y  d e t o n a t i o n .  N i t r o g l y c e r i n ,  a l s o  termed a  h i g h  e x p l o s i v e ,  
w i l l  d e f l a g r a t e  a t  o r d i n a r y  pressures i n  smal l  q u a n t i t i e s ;  however, the  d e f l a -  
g r a t i o n  w i l l  produce a  l a r g e  amount o f  t he  hea t  and, d e t o n a t i o n  ensues i f  
l a r g e r  q u a n t i t i e s  a r e  p resen t .  In l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s ,  even ammonium n i t r a t e  
(a v e r y  i n s e n s i t i v e  m a t e r i a l  ) can be caused t o  de tona te  i f  con f  inement i s  such 
t h a t  h i g h  p ressures  can be developed d u r i n g  de f  l a g r a t  ion.  An example o f  r a p i d  
d e f l a g r a t i o n  i s  b u r n i n g  o f  a  s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  r e t r o  r o c k e t .  The s tar -shaped 
c o r e  a f f o r d s  a  l a r g e  i n i t i a l  su r f ace  area wh i ch  inc reases  t he  mass b u r n i n g  
r a t e  ( k ) .  
F i gure  2- 1 . RETRO ROCKET 
T h r u s t  i s  k e p t  app rox ima te l y  cons tan t  by m a i n t a i n i n g  an e s s e n t i a l l y  cons tan t  
s u r f a c e  a rea  p resen ted  t o  t h e  f lame f r o n t  f rom i g n i t i o n  th rough  t o  d e p l e t i o n .  
1.3 De tona t i on  
De tona te  - (dg t  '8.  n a t  ) 
Genera l :  To produc6 a loud n o i s e  by t he  sudden l i b e r a t i o n  o f  gas 
i n  connec t i on  w i t h  chsinical  decompos i t i on  o r  comb ina t ion ;  
t o  exp lode  w i t h  sudden loud  r e p o r t .  
E x p l i c i t :  A  chemical  r e a c t i o n  p roduc ing  v i go rous  e v o l u t i o n  of  heat  
and sparks o r  f lame and moving th rough  the  m a t e r i a l  de to -  
na ted  a t  a speed g r e a t e r  than t h a t  o f  sound. 
A de tona t i on  can be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  f rom a d e f l a g r a t i o n  by comparison o f  t h e  
manner i n  which t h e  p roduc ts  f l o w  and t h e  r a t e ,  o r  speed, o f  t he  r eac t i on .  
De tona t ion  can be cons idered a  wave phenomenon s i m i l a r  t o  t he  p ropaga t ion  o f  
sound w h i l e  d e f l a g r a t i o n  i s  a  d i f f u s i o n  phenomenon. I n  a  de tona t i on ,  t he  
p roduc ts  o r  r e a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s  f l o w  toward t he  area o f  t he  r e a c t i o n ;  i n  a  
d e f l a g r a t i o n  t h i s  i s  oppos i t e ,  t h a t  i s ,  they  f l o w  away f rom t h e  r e a c t i o n .  
The speed o f  p ropaga t i on  o f  t he  r e a c t i o n  i s  f a s t e r  i n  a  d e t o r ~ a t i o n  than  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  speed o f  sound i n  the  m a t e r i a l ;  t he  d e t o n a t i o n  be ing  c a r r i e d  
- 
forward on the  c r e s t  of t h e  shock wave. A d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  con- 
f inement and b u i l d u p ,  can become a  de tona t i on ;  however, t h e  i nve rse  cannot 
occur.  Due t o  t h e  f o rma t i on  o f  t he  shock wave and t h e  sudden re l ease  o f  
p ressure ,  a  d e t o n a t i o n  i s  a.lways assoc ia ted  w i t h  an exp los i on ;  however, an 
e x p l o s i o n  i s  n o t  always due t o  a  de tona t ion .  
To v i s u a l i z e  t h e  mechanism o f  de tona t ion ,  t h e  shock wave i s  f r o z e n  i n  t ime  and 
cons idered  t o  be  s tand ing  s t i l l .  A s l i c e  o f  the  m a t e r i a l  c o n t a i n i n g  t he  wavz 
f r o n t  o f  t he  shock wave i s  considered. Ma t t e r  under exac t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  p res -  
su re ,  s p e c i f i c  volume, s p e c i f i c  energy,  and a  p a r t i c u l a r  v e l o c i t y  stream i n t o  
t h i s  s l i c e ;  however, t h e  m a t t e r  emerges f rom t h e  s l i c e  under d i f f e r e n t  con- 
d i t i o n s  o f  p ressure ,  v e l o c i t y ,  s p e c i f i c  volume and s p e c i f i c  energy.  
The hydrodynamic t heo ry  o f  de tona t i on  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  much research  and i t s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n .  T h i s  t heo ry  i s  based on t h e  known c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of shock waves and uses t h e  chemical t h e o r y  o f  a b s o l u t e  r e a c t i o n  r a t e s .  
The t h r e e  laws o f  conse rva t i on  o f  mass, energy,  and momentum a r e  used t o  
e s t a b l i s h  t h r e e  equa t ions  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  f i v e  v a r i a b l e s ;  p ressure ,  d e n s i t y ,  
temperature,  d e t o n a t i o n  r a t e ,  and t r a n s i t i o n a l  r a t e  of  t he  gaseous molecu les 
of the reac t i on ,  p roduc ts .  
EOUATIONS OF NOTlOt\l FOR A  




t = t ime  Q = hea t  added per  u n i t  mass 
Po = i n i t i a l  d e n s i t y  V = s p e c i f i c  volume 
u = p a r t i c l e  v e l o c i t y  X = d i s rance  
P = p ressure  x = LaGrange coo rd i na te  
E = energy 
F igu re  2-2 
These laws express t he  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t s :  
Conserva t ion  o f  Mass 
The mass f l o w  r a t e s  i n t o  and out o f  the  s l  i c e  a r e  equal .  
o Conserva t ion  o f  Energy 
The d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  t o t a l  energy,  i n t e r n a l  and k i n e t i c ,  i n t o  
and o u t  o f  t h e  s l i c e ,  i s  equal  t o  t h e  n e t  w o r t h  work per formed by t h e  
gas. 
a Conserva t ion  o f  Momentum 
I .  P C  The r a t e  o f  momentum change i n  t he  s l i c e  i s  equai  t o  t h e  a l r l e r e i ~ c e  lii 
pressure .  
EOUATION OF STATE 
where : p  = pressure R = gas cons tan t  
v = volunie T = temperature 
n = constant  a (v) = average covol  ume 
F igure 2-3 
The equa t i on  o f  s t a t e  i s  de r i ved  u s i n g  t h e  va lues  shown i n  F i g u r e  2-3 and 
a f i f t h  equa t i on  i s  ob ta ined  by a p p l y i n g  a p h y s i c a l  p r i n c i p l e .  Th i s  p r i n -  
c i p l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  a  shock wave passes through a gas w i t h  a  v e l o c i t y  equal  t o  
t h e  sum o f  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n a l  v e l o c i t y  o f  t h e  gas, p l u s  t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  sound 
i n  t he  gas a t  i t s  f i n a l  temperature and d e n s i t y .  By s o l u t i o n  o f  the  f i v e  sirnui 
taneous equat ions ,  t he  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a g i v e n  e x p l o s i o n  can be c a l c u l a t e d .  
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, F i gu re  2-5 
SHOCK FRONT ---Sp 
* 
what a r e  shock waves and how do t hey  occu r?  F i g u r e  2-4 d e p i c t s  an i d e a l  i z e d  
shock wave c rea ted  by a  sudden expansion and inc rease  i n  p ressu re  hav ing  taken 
p l a c e  a t  t h e  0  p o i n t  o f  t h e  coo rd i na te  system. T ime i s  no t  cons idered  i n  l ook -  
ing  a t  an i s o l a t e d  shock wave, bu t  r e f e r r i n g  t o  F i g u r e  2 - 5  i t  can be seen t h a t  
. 
w i t h  i nc reas ing  t ime,  as shown by n u n i e r i c a l l y  i nc reas ing  s u b s c r i p t s  on t h e  t 
parameter ,  t h e  shock wave e s s e n t i a l l y  r e t a i n s  i t s  b a s i c  shape as i t  moves o u t  
from the  source cen te r  bu t  s t e a d i l y  d im in i shes  i n  peak ove rp ressu re  va lues  u n t i l ,  
a t  some d i s t a n c e  f rom the  source--and t o g e t h e r  w i t h  some r e l a t e d  t i m e  T, t h e  
wave w i  11 have been reduced t o  a  neg 1 i g  i b l e  ove rp ressu re .  
From t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  through t h e  hydrodynamic t h e o r y ,  a mechcnisrn o f  
d e t o n a t i o n  can be v i  sua 1 i zed. A f t e r  t h e  de tona to r  f u n c t i o n s ,  a  de tona t  i a n  zone, 
i n  wh ich  t he  chemical  r e a c t i o n  i s  t a k i n g  p l a c e ,  t r a v e l s  th rough  t h e  co lunn  o f  
e x p l o s i v e .  
EXPLOSIVE 
7 DETD"A1OR 
F i g u r e  2 - 6  
T h i s  d e t o n a t i o n  zone i s  g e n e r a l l y  cons idered  t o  i n c l u d e  a  ve r y  narrow shock 
z o n e  (10-~cm)  o r  shock wave. L i t t l e  o r  no chemical  r e a c t i o n  occu rs  i n  t h i s  
shock zone, b u t  t he  p ressure  reaches i t s  peak. The d e t o n a t i o n  zone i nc l udes  
n o t  o n l y  t h i s  shock zone, b u t  a l s o  t h e  chemical  r e a c t i o n  zone (0.1-1.0 cm). 
F o l l o w i n g  t h i s  d e t o n a t i o n  zone a re  t h e  d e t o n a t i o n  p r o d u c t s .  I n  f r o n t  o f  t he  
shock zone i s  t he  unreac ted  e x p l o s i v e  i n  i t s  o r i g i n a l  s t a t e  o f  d e n s i t y ,  p r e s s u r e ,  
v e l o c i t y ,  and temperature.  A t  o r  near  t he  beg inn ing  o f  t h e  chemica l  r e a c t i o n  
zone, the h igh  temperature t o  which the ma te r ia l  i s  ra i sed  by compression i n  
the shock zone i n i t i a t e s  chemical reac t ion .  Maximum dens i t y  and pressure occur 
a t  the beginning o f  the reac t i on  zone, w h i l e  the temperature and r e a c t i o n  r a t e  
reach t h e i r  peaks a t  the complet ion o f  the chemical reac t i on .  The detonat ion  
products f low w i t h  great  v e l o c i t y ,  bu t  o f  lesser  degree than the v e l o c i t y  o f  . 
the detonat ion  zone, toward the undetonated exp los ive .  This  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of de tonat ion  i n  c o n t r a - d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  i n  which case the r e a c t i o n  
products f low away from the unreacted m a t e r i a l .  The v e l o c i t y  o f  advance o f  
the  de tonat ion  zone i s  termed the detonat ion ra te .  
As each i n d i v i d u a l  molecule o f  exp los ive  undergoes o rd ina ry  thermal reac t i on ,  
s t a r t i n g  w i t h  a  low i n i t i a l  temperature, there i s  a  l a g  e f f e c t  o r  i nduc t i on  
p e r i o d  t h a t  depends exponen t ia l l y  on the rec ip roca l  o f  the i n i t i a l  abso lu te  
temperature. Wi th  an i n i t i a l  temperature o f  725O~, the i nduc t i on  pe r iod  i s  
of the order  of 1 0 ' ~  second. Wi th  h i g h  i n i t i a l  temperatures, i t  appears 
- 1  1 t h a t  the l a s t  75 percent  o f  the reac t i on  requ i res  o n l y  about 10 second. 
EXPLOS l VES 
DETONATION CHARACTERISTICS 
F igure  2-7 
N i t r o g l y c e r i n  
T e t r y l  
TNT 
Ammonium N i t r a t e  
Load i ng 

























Lec tu re  Number Two 
"EXPLOS I'JES AND PROPELLANTS IN ACT1 ON" 
Par t  I I 
Dr .  G. J. Bryan 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The behav io r  o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  and exp los i ves  can be exp la i ned  by a  few b a s i c  
ideas. Most o f  these a re  r e l a t i v e l y  s imp le ,  as so many impor tan t  t h i n g s  a re .  
I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  s i m p l i c i t y ,  o n l y  a  few people  f u l l y  use these b a s i c  ideas i n  
t h e i r  t h i n k i n g  and work. - 
2.0 DEFINITIONS 
Webster 's  D e f i n i t i o n s  
e Burn 
To be on f i r e ;  t o  g i v e  f o r t h  l i g h t  and heat  - and e leven  o t h e r  meanings. 
Def l a q r a t e  
To bu rn  w i t h  sudden and s p a r k l i n g  combustion; t o  b u r n  o r  v a p o r i z e  suddenly.  
Exp los i on  
A v i o l e n t  b u r s t i n g  w i t h  n o i s e ,  as i n  t h e  case o f  exp los i ves .  
8 Detonate 
To exp lode w i t h  sudden v i o l ence .  
2.2 S c i e n t i f i c  g e f i n i t i o n s  and D iscuss ion  
Exothermic  React ions 
An exo thermic  r e a c t i o n  i s  one i n  wh ich  heat  i s  released. I n  a  f i r e ,  d e f l a -  
g r a t i o n ,  o r  detonat ion,exothermic  chemical  r e a c t i o n s  a re  always invo lved .  
Bu rn i nq ,  Combustion, and D e f l a q r a t i o n  
Bu rn i ng  and combust ion a re  e q u i v a l e n t  terms used t o  descr ibe  t he  process 
by which f i r e s  and d e f l a g r a t i o n s  p rogress .  These processes a r e  g e n e r a l l y  
l i m i t e d  t o  those i n  which heat  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  f rom t h e  h o t  zone t o  t h e  
r e a c t a n t s  by convec t i on ,  conduct ion,  o r  r a d i a t i o n .  There i s  no c l e a r  
d i v i d i n g  l i n e  between a f i r e  and a d e f l a g r a t i o n ,  s ince  the d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
p u r e l y  one o f  r a p i d i t y  o r  v io lence .  
e Exp 1'0s i on s  
An e x p l o s i o n  i s  a  sudden re lease  o f  pressure.  I t  i s  a  r e s u l t ,  n o t  a  cause 
i n  i t s e l f .  A  f i r e  o r  d e f l a g r a t i o n  may cause an e x p l o s i o n  i f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
con f ined .  A  d e t o n a t i o n  i s  always an e x p l o s i o n ,  b u t  n o t  v i c e  versa. 
I n  a  d e t o n a t i o n ,  t he  r e a c t a n t s  a re  heated by t h e  a d i a b a t i c  compression 
r e s u l t i n g  f r om  a shock wave. Th is  heated zone then  r e a c t s  r a p i d l y  enough 
t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  shock wave. C l e a r l y ,  t he  r e a c t a n t s  must be premixed. 
S t r i c t l y  speaking, a  d e t o n a t i o n  may be l i m i t e d  t o  those processes i n  which 
a  shock wave o f  s teady v e l o c i t y  i s  ma in ta ined .  Some r e a c t a n t s  may de tona te  
a t  e i t h e r  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  v e l o c i t i e s .  I t  i s  impor tan t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  shock 
waves a r e  r a p i d l y  a t t enua ted  i n  non - reac t i ve  media. 
A  shock wave i s  a  s t r ong  pressure d is tu rbar .ce  which i s  p rog ress i ng  t h roush  
a m a t e r i a l  a t  a  v e l o c i t y  g rea te r  than  t he  v e l o c i t y  o f  sound i n  t h a t  m a t e r i a l .  
The v e l o c i t y  o f  sound may be descr ibed  as t he  v e l o c i t y  a t  wh ich  a  weak p res -  
su re  d i s t u rbance  progresses i n  a m a t e r i a l .  T h i s  v e l o c i t y  i s  a  cons tan t  s t  
cons tan t  temperature o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l ,  b u t  a  shock wave may cover  a  w ide  
range o f  h i g h e r  v e l o c i t i e s .  The r a t i o  o f  t h e  shock-wave v e l o c i t y  t o  t h a t  o f  
sound i s  ca 1 1 ed Mach number. 
See F igu re  2-7 below f o r  a  comparison between d e t o n a t i o n  and d e f l a g r a t i o r , .  
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ALWAYS I NTERNAL 
ALWAYS EXTERNAL 
(except i n  vacuum) 
Fue l s  and O x i d i z e r s  
Combustion i s  o f t e n  e x p l a i n e d  as be ing  t h e  chemical comb ins t ion  o f  a  f u e l  
( reduc ing  agen t )  and an o x i d i z e r .  
An o x i d i z e r  may be l o o s e l y  de f i ned  as a  substance c o n t a i n i n g  an excess o f  
oxygen o r  halogen, w i t h  f l u o r i n e  and c h l o r i n e  be ing  t he  most u s e f u l  halogens. 
Fue ls  may be l o o s e l y  d e f i n e d  as substances c o n t a i n i n g  carbon,  hydrogen, 
and 1 i g h t  n;etals. I n  many cases, t h i s  c l z s s i f  i c a t  i o n  i s  unsat  i s f a c t o r y ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  when bo th  t ype  r a d i c a l s  a r e  con ta ined  w i t h i n  one mo lecu le .  
Such border1  i n e  cases can g e n e r a l l y  be squeezed i n t o  a  r e l a t e d  c l a s s i f  i -  
c a t i o n  o f  " o x i d i z e r  r i c h "  o r  " o x i d i z e r  poor."  An o x i d i z e r - r i c h  corn~ound 
w i l l  decompose i n t o  compou~ds o f  r !h ich one o r  more w i l l  d e f i n i t e l y  be an 
o x i d i z e r .  An o x i d i  zer -poor  ccmpour~d w i  1 l decompose i n t o  compcunds o f  wh ich  . 
one o r  more wi  1 1  d e f i n i t e l y  be a f u e l .  
e S p e c i f i c  Impulse ( and Exhacst V e l o c i t y  (c)  
I s , L  
S p e c i f i c  impulse i s  a  measure o f  p r o p u l s i v e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a  p r o p e l l a n t .  
T h i s  i s  bes t  expressed i n  c n i t s  o f  Ibi - sec/ lbm,  which has a  d i r e c t  p h y s i -  
c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The e f f e c z i v e  exhaust v e l o c i t y  can be cons idered  as 
t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  t h e  exh&us t  p roduc ts  which have had an e q u i v a l e n t  f o r - e  
a p p l i e d  t o  them p e r  u n i t  mass f o r  one second, s i n c e  one Ibf / lb,  w i l l  i m ~ a r t  
2 .  an  a c c e l e r a t i ~ n  o f  g  f t / s e c  , 
c =  I g  , where c  i s  ir, f t / s e c .  
SP 
Note  t h a t  t h i s  e f f e c t i v e  v e l c c i t y  has h idden w i t h i n  i t  c o r r e c t i o n s  so t h a t  
o n l y  t he  l o n g i t u d i n a l  component o f  t he  v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  o f  a  nozz le  w i t h  a  
g i v e n  expans ion ang le  i s  inc luded ,  and a l s o  a  c o r r e c t i o n  f o r  any d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  e x i t  p rescu re  and e x t e r n a l  ambient p ressu re  i s  a l s o  inc luded .  
Us ing  these c e f  i n i t i o n s ,  t h e  ga in  i n  a  r o c k e t ' s  v e l o c i t y  f o r  g r a v i t y  and 
d r a g - f r e e  space becomes: 
A " =  I g i n [  i n i t i a l  mass 
s P f i n a l  mass -1
(where t h e  c tange i n  mass i s  due t o  p r o p e l l a n t  combust ion).  I i s  o f t e n  
d e f i n e d  f o r  convenience i n  computat ions as a  cons tan t ,  equal  t z P t h e  I 
s P  under  vacuum c o n d i t i o r , ~ ,  p l u s  a v a r i a b l e  which i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he  e x t e r n a l  
ambient  p ressu re .  
3.0 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
The mass o f  a  p r o p e l  l a n t  o r  ex?losi lre i s  a gcod measure o f  i t s  maximum hazard 
p o t e n t i a l  under wo rs t  case a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  des ign  
o f  a reas  where they  a r e  handled. O f  course,  eqtial masses c f  exp los i ves  and 
p r o p e l l a n t s  a re  po t  necessar i  l y  o f  e q ~ a l  maxinilrn hazard p o t e n t i a l .  Sol  i d  p r o -  
p e l l a n t  motors  wi 1 1  g e n e r a l l y  bear a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  m i l i t a r y  Class 2 
o r  C lass  9 o r  the  e q u i v a l e n t  Classes B and A  (Type 3) f o r  I C C  usage.. The 
p r i n c i p a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between these  c lasses  i s  i n  t h e  ease o f  de tona t i on ;  
c l a s s  2   or'^) . i s  n o t - c o n s i d e r e d  detonable  i n  t h e  fo rm p resen t  whereas c l a s s  9 
(or A ( ~ ~ p e  3 ) )  i s  detonable .  
3.2 Mass Consumpt i o n  Rate,  Conf inement , and Impact 
. 
I n  most cases, t h e  r a t e  a t  which a p r o p e l l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  re leases  energy i s  
t h e  most impor tan t  f a c t o r  i n  de te rmin ing  i t s  damaging p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .  See below. 
A - 
= dm/dt where: m = mass and t = t ime 
PROPELLANTS EXPLOS l VES 
S = su r f ace  area p = d e n s i t y  
p = d e n s i t y  U = shock v e l o c i t y  
r = l i n e a r  b u r n i n g  r a t e  S = area o f  shock wave 
n 
= bp  
b = c o e f f i c i e n t  
p  = p ressure  
n = exponent 
ril = p s u  
F igu re  2-9. MASS BURNING RATE 
A p i e c e  o f  p r o p e l l a n t  bu rn i ng  i n  the  open would s imp l y  be a f i r e  hazard  t o  
nearby  o b j e c t s .  I t  m i g h t ,  o f  course, s e t  up a cha in  o f  d i s a s t r o u s  even ts .  
I f  t h e  b u r n i n g  p r o p e l l a n t  were con f ined  i n  a  r o c k e t ,  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  bu rn i ng  
wou ld  be s h o r t e r ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  energy r e l ease  would be h i g h e r ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  
wou ld  be more i n t e n s e  and d i  r e c t  i o n a l  , and t he  f i r e  hazard would ex tend  f o r  
a much g r e a t e r  d i s t a n c e  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  t h e  nozz le  was p o i n t i n g  than i t  would 
on a n  uncon f ined  bu rn i ng .  The h o i  e ~ i ~ a u s t  p roduc t s  may e x i t  st s vzloclty 
nea r  8000 f t / s e c .  Hot p a r t i c l e s  o f  aluminum o x i d e  may be p resen t  t o  inc rease  
e r o s i o n  and thermal t r a n s f e r .  
I f  t h e  r o c k e t  were f r e e  t o  move o r  i t s  f o r ce  and/or  j e t  cou ld  f r e e  i t ,  then 
t h e r e  wou ld  a l s o  be a p r o j e c t i l e  t h a t  cou ld  do damage t o  peop le ,  spaceship,  
equ ipment ,  and/or a f a c i l i t y .  (The equa t i on  f o r  AV can be used f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  
v e l o c i t i e s  o f  impact .) S ince  t h e  in tense  j e t  would accompany i t ,  damage and 
i n j u r y  c o u l d  e a s i l y  be q u i t e  se r ious .  
As soon as t he  r o c k e t  impacted any o b j e c t ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d e s t r o y i n g  t he  
r o c k e t  would  be p resen t .  Th i s  would undoubted ly  l ead  t o  a  number o f  sma l l ,  
h i g b - v e l o c i t y  f ragments  o f  case and b u r n i n g  p r o p e l l a n t .  T h i s  would  g r e a t l y  
inc rease  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i n j u r y  and d2mage over  a  wide sur round ing  area. 
. 
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  damage caused by such a  r o c k e t  would  a l s o  be a  f u n c t i o n  o f  i t s  
i n i t i a l  s i ze .  
Why i s  i t  t h a t  a  r o c k e t  which explodes o r  i s  des t royed  by impact i s  nea:ly 
- 
always more dangerous than a  s i m i l a r  mass o f  uncon f ined  p r o p e l l a n t ?  I n  the  
a c t  o f  exp lod ing ,  and even more so i n  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  impact,  t h e r e  i s  u s u a l l y  
cons ide rab le  breakup and s h a t t e r i n g  o f  p r o p e l l a n t .  Th i s  may enormously i nc rease  
t h e  b u r n i n g  su r f ace  o f  p rope l  l a n t .  By t h e  b u r n i n g  r a t e  law,  6 i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
t o  su r f ace  area (o ther  v a r i a b l e s  equa l ) .  T h i s  enormous inc rease  i n  area may 
w e l l  be f r om  100 t o  10,000 t imes  the o r i g i n a l  area. Even w i t h  a  s h a t t e r e d  
case, such an enormous area increase may a c t u a l l y  r e l ease  h o t  gases so r a p i d l y  
t h a t  l o c a l i z e d  se l f - con f inement  i s  r e a l i z e d  and h i s  even f u r t h e r  inc reased  by 
l o c a l i z e d  h i g h  p ressure  zones. Present ev idence i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  s e l f -  
conf inement  e f f e c t  increases t h e  v i o l e n c e  o f  t h e  e x p l o s i o n  more r a p i d l y  than 
does i n c r e a s i n g  t he  mass o f  a  rocket .  
A  d e t o n a t i n g  e x p l o s i v e  re leases  i t s  energy w i t h  extreme r a p i d i t y .  S ince a  
d e t o n a t i o n  shock f r o n t  may propagate i n  excess o f  8000 meters/sec (26,300 f t / s e c ) ,  
a sphere o f  2.63 ft. i n  r a d i u s  (equ iva len t  t o  more t han  f o u r  tons  o f  an exp lo -  
s i v e )  c o u l d  be ccnsumed i n  100 microseconds. 
The p ressu re  developed i n  a  d e t o n a t i o n  may reach 1.5 m i l l i o n  p s i  and t h e  r e f l e c -  - 
t i o n  o f  suc5 a  shock wave may e x e r t  p ressures  o f  3.0 m i l l i o n  p s i .  Such p ressures  
a r e  so t e r r i f i c  t h a t  an e x p l o s i v e  r e s t i n g  on heavy s t e e l  p l a t e  may punch o u t  i t s  
o u t l i n e  th rough  t h e  p l a t e .  
V e l o c i t i e s  o f  p a r t i c l e s  f rom c o n f i n i n g  tubes o r  nearby o b j e c t s  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  
be l e s s  than  h a l f  o f  t he  shock wave v e l o c i t y .  Even so, such f r a g m e ~ t  v e l o c i t i e s  
may e a s i l y  reach 7000 f t / s e c .  Drag w i l l ,  o f  course, r a p i d l y  s low down such 
p a r t i c l e s .  Even so, l e t h a l  fragmenzs w i l l  p e r s i s t  f o r  q u i t e  l a i g e  d is tances .  
Even v e r y  t h i n ,  l i g h t  f ragmsnts can be p e n e t r a t i n g  a t  h i g h  v e l o c i t i e s .  
One d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  shown by de tona t i ng  exp los i ves  i s  t h a t  even 
smal l  q u a n t i t i e s  can c l o s e l y  approach t h e  peak p ressure  developed by l a r g e  masses. 
Fragments w i l l  thus  be o f  s i m i l a r  v e l o c i t i e s  t o  those p r o j e c t e d  f rom l a r g e  masses. 
A few grams o f  encased h igh  exp los i ves  can e a s i l y  k i  1 1  o r  s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e  a  
group o f  peopl e. 
Confinement o f  h i g h  exp los i ves  has t h ree  impor tant  r e s u l t s :  i n i t i a t i o n  becomes 
e a s i e r ,  t h e r e  may be a  modest increase i n  de tona t i on  v e l o c i t y ,  and t he  c o n f i n i n g  
case a c t s  as a  source o f  h i g h  v e l o c i t y  fyagments. 
De tona t i on  w i l l  f a i l  t o  occur i n  an uncon f ined  e x p l o s i v e  i f  i t s  dimensions a r e  
below s p e c i f i c  ( c r i t i c a l )  lower  l i m i t s .  Th i s  i s  noi-mal ly c a l l e d  a  " c r i t i c d l  
diameter." Th is  i s  o f  the  o rder  o f  a  few cen t imete rs  o r  l e s s  f o r  most exp los i ves  
and f o r  p rope l lan"  which have been shown t o  be detonable.  Some substances, 
ammonium n i t r a t e  be ing  notewor thy,  appear t o  r e q u i r e  ve ry  l a r g e  masses i n  o rde r  
t o  propagate a  de tona t ion .  O r d i n a r i l y ,  most encas ing m a t e r i a l s  w i l l  have an 
e f f e c t  s i m i l a r  t o  i nc reas ing  the  dimension o f  t he  charge - t h e  h i ghe r  t h e  
d e n s i t y  and the  9.-eater t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h i s  m a t e r i a l ,  t he  g r e a t e r  t he  e f f e c t .  
The s e n s i t i v i t y  O F  a  crushed o r  sha t t e red  m a t e r i a l  i s  n e a r l y  always much h i g t e r  
t han  t h a t  o f  the  b i g h l y  conso l i da ted  m a t e r i a l .  P r o p e l l a n t s  which cannot be deto-  
na ted  under v i o l e i t  i n i t i a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  may be expected t o  become comparable t o  
o r d i n a r y  exp1osivc:s i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  when i n  a  f i n e l y  d i v i d e d  form. 
3.3 B l a s t  E f f e c t 2  
When a  r o c k e t  i g n i t e s ,  t h e r e  i s  n e a r l y  always an i g n i t i o n  shock wave set-up. The 
su r round ing  a i r  has n o t  y e t  been set  i n  mot ion. when a  l a r g e  bu rn ing  rocke t  i s  
s h a t t e r e d  by impact, t h e r e  i s  an enormous increase i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  p roduc t  gas 
gene ra t i on .  A s u b s t a n t i a l  shock wave may thus be set-up. There i s  always a  
shcck l.-!ave du r l nc~  a detonst  Ion I n  a l r  and 2 r e s z ! t l n g  a i r  shcck. 
Even i n  a  vacuum, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  p roduc ts  from a  de tona t i on  w i l l  c r e a t e  an appre- 
c i a b l e  p ressure  on any i n t e r v e n i n g  ob jec t .  C a l c u l a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  one-pound 
charge o f  p e n t o l i t e  i n  a  vacuum w i l l  produce a  peak p ressure  o f  between 36 p s i  
and 79 p s i  a t  a  d i s t ance  o f  128 cm. Using cube r o o t  s c a l i n g  laws, a 1003 pound 
charge i n  a  vacuum would produce the  same peak p ressure  a t  1280 crn (42 f t ) .  Th i s  
v a l u e  i s  rough ly  o f  comparable magnitude t o  t h e  60 p s i  t o  be expected i n  a i r  f o r  
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  exp los i ve .  
A d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  some shock wave c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  f o u r  f i g u r e s ;  
see F igu res  2-4, 2-9, 2-10 and 2-1 1 .  
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F igu re  2 -1  1 
where : u = p a r t i c l e  v e l o c i t y  
U = shock v e l o c i t y  
P = i n i t i a l  d e n s i t y  
0 
I 
P = d e n s i t y  i n  compressed zone 
F i g u r e  2-1 2. PARTI CLE VELOCITY EQUATION 
Damage i s  caused b), the  r e s u l t a n t  e f f e c t s  o f  overp ressure  and dynamic p ressure .  
The dynamic p ressure  increases more r a p i d l y  than t h e  overpressure ,  so t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a cross-over  i n  r e l a t i v e  magnitude. Th i s  dynamic p ressu re  i s  the  same dynami c  
p ressu re  encountered i n  e x t e r i o r  b a l l  i s t i c s .  C a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f o r c e  exe r ted  
on  an o b j e c t  a l s o  r e q u i r e  a  drag c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  computat ion (being one (1.0) 
f o r  a  head-on f l a t  p l a t e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) .  
The human body can sometimes t ake  f a i r l y  heavy overpressures w i t h o u t  f a t a l i t y .  
Even i n  t h e  case or i n i t i a l  s u r v i v a l ,  t h e  impact o f  moving o b j o c t s  o r  t h e  t o s s i n g  
of t h e  .body i n t o  an o b j e c t  may r e s u l t  i n  death.  
A r e f l e c t e d  shock wave a l s o  i s  shown i n  F igu re  2-10 above. 
4.0 PROPELLANTS 
4.1 L i q u i d  P r o p e l l a n t s  
L i q u i d M o n o p r o p e l l a n t s  
P r a c t i c a l  l i q u i d  monopropel lants  a r e  p r e s e n t l y  o n l y  a  few i n  number. Hydra- 
zinc and hydroaen pe rox ide  a r e  represen ta t i ves .  
Hydraz ine  i s  ve ry  i n s e n s i t i v e ;  i n  f a c t ,  i t  has n o t  been detonated by o r d i n a r y  
means. Heat ing  a  c losed  con ta ine r  o r  t h e  presence o f  r e a c t i v e  contaminants 
can,  o f  course, cause a p ressure  exp los ion .  I t  i s  a l s o  poisonous. 
N o t e  t h a t  hydraz ine  i s  a  s t r ong  reduc ing agent .  T h i s  i s  a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
p r o p e r t y  o f  a  f u e l .  Hydraz ine can indeed be used as a  f u e l  i n  a  b i - p r o p e l l a n t  
system, a 1 though i t s  d e r i v a t i v e s  have l a r g e l y  d i sp laced  i t  i n  such systems. 
Hydrogen perox ide  i s  heat  s e n s i t i v e  and i n  h i ghe r  concentrat ions. ,  detonable.  
' I 
Many other monopropellants have been considered for use, and additional - 
ones may be put to practical use in the future. In the past, monopropellants 
Of 'SP greater than hydrazine have generally been too sensitive for use. L i q u ~ d  monopropellants are particularly susceptible to the adiabatic com- 
pression of entrained bubbles causing ignition. 
. 
o Liquid Bi-propellants 
Such systems are of many types. Liquid oxygen (LOX) with kerosene-type hydro- 
carbons, LOX with Hydrogen, LOX with Ethyl Alcohol, and Fluorine with Hydrogen 
are representative of clear-cut fuel-oxidizer systems. High energy fuels, 
such as hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), may be used 
single or as a mixture with oxidizers such as LOX, Fluorine, N204, White 
Fuming Nitric Acid (WFNA), or Red Fuming Nitric Acid (RFNA). 
Each ingredient of these must be considered singly for individual chemical 
reactivity and compatibility. With all of these, the greatest danger is 
present during loading and transfer operations and while the boosters are 
loaded. Spillage of any of these can easily cause fires and sometimes explo- 
si6ns. Some of them are quite poi sonous, and some of them are extremely 
reictive with a wide range of materials. Simultaneously, spillage of fuel' 
and oxidizer is the most serious type problem. Some of these are hypergolic 
so that there is an automatic fire; others form detonable mixtures. 
4.2 Solid Propellants -
Certain aspects OF solid propellants will be described in other lectures. 
Double-Base Propellants 
The principal constituents of double-base solid propellants are nitroglycerin 
and nitrocellulose. Modest quantities of a plasticizer, such as diethyl- 
phthalate, and smaller quantities of a stabilizer, such as diethylcentrallite, 
are also present'. The stabilizer is slowly exhausted with.age. If it b2comes 
completely exhausted, particularly with large grains, self-heating and conse- . 
quent explosion may result. The safe-life of any double-base propellant 
should always be ascertained. When there is any doubt, a manufacturer's rep- 
resentative should be contacted. 
Extrvcled dcub!e-bjse gra i f i s  nay be ~ ; c d  i n  5 ~ 2 1  rockets. Cast bo"bl =-base 
grains can normally, even in small rockets, permit more efficient rocket 
design. In modern rockets, the strictly double-base propellants are little 
used, but composite variations are used instead. 
Double-base propellants are, in general, detonable, but do require strong 
initiation. 
a Composite Propellants 
Composite propellants may conveniently be divided into low energy binder 
systems (normally a type of synthetic rubber such as the older polysulf ide 
o r  t he  newer po lyure thane  o r  po lybu tad iene-acry l  i c  a c i d  copolymer) and h i g h  
energy b i nde r  systems, such as double-base p r o p e l l a n t .  These b i n d e r s  a r e  
h e a v i l y  loaded w i t h  f i n e l y  ground i no rgan i c  s a l t s ,  such as ammonium p e r c h l o r -  
a t e  and f i n e l y  d i v i d e d  meta ls  such as aluminum. 
I n  genera l ,  the h i g h  energy b i nde r  systems a r e  detonable;  whereas w e l l -  
conso l i da ted  low energy b i nde r  systems a r e  not .  As p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned, . 
crush ing ,  s h a t t e r i n g ,  o r  shredding may be expected t o  make most o f  the  low 
energy b i nde r  systems detonable.  
e Pyrotechn i c  
Pyro techn ic  i s  a  term g e n e r a l l y  used i n  modern days t o  denote composi t ions 
which produce a  h i g h  percentage o f  h o t  s o l i d  p a r t i c l e s .  I n  r ocke t s ,  these 
a r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  used i n  t h e  i g n i t i o n  systems, e i t h e r  as the main i g n i t e r  
charge o r  as a  boos te r  charge between t he  squ ib  and main charge. Boron- 
potass ium n i t r a t e  i s  a  t y p i c a l  py ro techn i c  composit on. Rocket p r ~ p e l l a r ~ t s  
a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e p l a c i n g  these as t he  main charge, because o f  t h e i r  g r e a t e r  
r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y  o f  a c t i o n .  The i nc reas ing  use o f  meta ls  i n  r ocke t  p r o p e l l a n t s  
a l s o  makes thzm more s u i t a b l e  f o r  i g n i t i o n  than o l d e r  composit ions. 
I t  i s  dangerous t o  g e n e r a l i z e  on py ro techn i c  composit ions. D e t a i l e d  s tudy  
o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  systems i s  advised. F r i c t i o n  s e n s i t i v -  
i t y ,  s t a t i c  s z n s i t i v i t y ,  c o m p a t i b i l i t y ,  and s u r v e i l l a n c e  r e q u i r e  c a r e f u l  
a t t e n t i o n .  When used as main charges f o r  i g n i t e r s ,  t h e i r  i r r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y  
can cause se r i ous  i g n i t i o n  peaks w i t h  consequent case rup tu re .  
Products  o f  Combustion 
A f t e r  launch, problems o c c a s i o n a l l y  a r i s e ,  due t o  t h e  products  o f  p r o p e l l a n t  
combustion m i x i n g  w i t h  a i r  t o  form pockets o f  combust ib le  o r  e x p l o s i v e  gases. 
T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  o f  m e t a l l i z e d  composite p r o p e l l a n t s ,  whose p roduc ts  
u s u a l l y  c o n t a i n  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  hydrogen and carbon monoxide. ( ~ 0 t h  a r e  
combus t ib le  and form detonable m ix tu res  w i t h  a i r . )  
The p roduc ts  o f  combustion may a l s o  be t o x i c :  f o r  ins tance,  carbon monoxide, . 
h y d r o c h l o r i c  a c i d ,  and h y d r o f l u o r i c  ac id .  
5.0 EXPLOS I VES 
L i q u i d  exp los i ves  have a l r e a d y  been ment ioned under t he  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  head- 
ings. L i q u i d s  a r e  n o t  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  used f o r  exp los i ve  purposes i n  r ocke t s  a t  
t h e  p resen t  t ime. 
5.2 S o l i d  Exp los ives  
a l n i t i a t i n q a n d  Pr im inq  Explos ives 
I n i t i a t i n g  and p r i m i n g  compounds a r e  exp los i ves  which a r e  e a s i l y  detonated. 
I n  rocke t s ,  i n i t i a t i n g  and p r im ing  exp los i ves  a r e  u s u a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  
electrically; they are also carefully p~otected from other methods of ini- 
tiation. Lead azide and lead styphnate are representative initiaEing 
explosives. 
Where detonation is not desired, but rather ignition (priming), initiating 
explosives may be used in conjunction wi;h, or replaced by, pyrotechnic 
compositions (such as a mix:ure of potassium ch1ora;e and lead thiocyanate). 
Whenever possible, such initiating or priming devices should be protected 
by effective saf ing and arming devices ( ~ i . 4 ) .  The S i A  device provides 
physical and electrical isolation until late in launch countdown. This is 
probably the most important point in rocket safety. Unfortunately, small 
rockets and other small systems are often not so protected and special 
work-around procedures, such as late installation, must be used. 
e Boostinq Explosives 
Explosives of intermediate sensitivity (such as tetryl) which can be ini~iated 
by an initiating explosive, often are placed between the initiator and the 
main charge. This insures detonation of the main charge. There is an increas- 
ing trend toward replacing such booster charges with a low density pressed 
charge of matarials such as RDX. This greatly increases the impact sensi- 
tivity of the RDX, but retains the other superior qualities, such as high 
temperature stability. 
e Burstinq or k ~ r k i n q  Charqe 
RDX compositions, TNT, PETN, Tetryl and -other materials are used for this 
purpose. Sore of these materials also may be used as boosting compositions, 
or even as additives in initiating and priming trains. Due to its high 
thermal stability and high brisance, RDX is increasingly beins used in 
rocket and launch vehicle operations. 
Propellants and explosives can cover the full range of uncontrollable fires, 
deflagra;ions, and detonations when accidentally ignited. When we study them 
in detail, it is amazing that our record of success is as high as it is. 
Clearly, painstaking thorou~hness in planning and action is neceqqary  tn ?re-  
vent accidental ignition. We must design our facilities, equipment, and opera- 
tions so that injury and destruction are minimized in case of accidents. 
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M r .  S. H. Rush 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Ordnance system s a f e t y  engineer ing has changed d r a s t i c a l l y  over the  l a s t  f i v e  
years. Engineering advances are  e a s i l y  recognized when comparison i s  made 
between the ordnance systems o f  e a r l y  m i s s i l e s  and one o f  the c u r r e n t  space 
veh ic les .  As ordnance systems have become more soph is t i ca ted  and a d d i t i o n a l  
s a f e t y  hazards have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  t he  methods requ i red  t o  p rov ide  ordnance 
sa fe ty  have become inc reas ing l y  complicated. 
Throughout t h i s  d iscuss ion  the terms e lec t ro -exp los i ve  device and i n i t i a t o r  w i l l  
be used in terchangeably t o  represent e i t h e r  a squib o r  a  detonator.  S t r i c t l y  
speaking, the f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s  apply:  
a I n i t i a t o r  - a  general term tha t  i s  used t o  descr ibe any e lec t ro -exp los i ve  
dev i ce (EEL.). 
a Squib - A pyro techn ic  device. I t  i s  a  d e f l a g r a t i o n  device which produces 
a burn ing  phenomenon. A squib i s  used t o  i g n i t e  p r o p e l l a n t s  which produce 
h igh  temperature gases t o  perform work. 
Detonator - I n i t i a t e s  a  h igh  explos ive.  I t  i s ,  i n  i t s e l f ,  a h igh  exp los ive  
device and produces a  detonat ion which may i n i t i a t e  o the r  h i g h  explos ives.  
A  pr imary  sa f  ing  device i s  requ i red  on a1 1 ordnance systems. The pr imary saf  i n g  
device i s . a  u n i t  which has, as a minimum requirement,  the  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  breaking 
the  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t  ( f i r i n g  c i r c u i t )  t o  the i n i t i a t o r .  Two types o f  sa fe ty  
devices a re  the arm-disarm swi tch and the safe and arm device. 
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2.1 The Arm-?i sarm Device 
An arm-disarm dev ice  makes and breaks t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t  t o  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  
i n i t i a t o r s .  F i gu re  3-1 i s  a ggnera l  e l e c t r i c a l  schematic o f  an arm-disarm 
sw i t ch .  T h i s  dev ice  meets minimum requi rements as i t  i s  capable o f  b r e a k i n g  
t h e  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t .  The arm-disarm dev i ce  can be powered by a motor-operated 
sw i t ch ,  a so leno id -opera ted  sw i tch ,  a r e l a y ,  o r  by any o f  severa l  o t h e r  methods. 
2.2 i n e  s a f e  and Arm Device ( ~ & j  
An SEA dev ice  must be de tona to r  sa fe ;  t h a t  i s ,  i f  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  elements a r e  
i n i t i a t e d  i n  t h e  "safe" p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  subsequent e x p l o s i v e  o r  p y r o t e c h n i c  t r a i n  
w i l l  n o t  be i n i t i a t e d .  To do t h i s ,  a b a r r i e r  must be p laced  between t h e  EED 
and t h e  remainder o f  the  exp los i ve  o r  p y r o t e c h n i c  t r a i n .  Th i s  i s  done w i t h  
s l i d e r s  o r  w i t h  r o t o r s  which, when t h e  system i s  armed, t u r n  t he  r o t o r  o r  move 
the  s l i d e r  i n t o  l i n e  w i t h  t he  r e s t  o f  t h e  e x p l o s i v e  t r a i n .  To conduct t he  de to -  
n a t o r  sa fe t y  t e s t ,  t he  EED i s  i n i t i a t e d  i n  v a r i o u s  p o s i t i o n s  f rom t h e  f u l l - s a f e  
to the full-arm position and the point at which the explosive or pyrotechnic 
train will be set-off is determined. The probability of initiation and the 
detonator safety of the system can be determined from the results of this test. 
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Shown above i s a genera 1 schema t i c of an S E A  dev i ce i n the "safe" pos i t ion. 
This is a redundant device as two initiators are utilized; however, this 
schematic shows only one side of the system. One of the important features is 
the safing pin arrangement. The safing pin holds both the barrier and the 
switches in the "safe" posit ion unt i 1 it is removed and an arming command is 
received. The barrier of this S&A device is between tha initiator and booster. 
Resistors are provided as an integral part of the primary safety device so 
that complete checks of the electrical system can be cdnducted from the power 
supply up to the electrical initiator. The resistors are designed into the 
devices so that electrical circuit checks can be made without utilizing a 
simulator. Using a siniulator requires that the electrical connectors must be 
made and broken several times resulting in a reduction in reliability and safety. 
2.3 Uses o f  Sa fe ty  Devices 
It i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  s tandard ize  t h e  dev ices  i n  any v e h i c l e  where many p r ima ry  
s a f e t y  dev ices a re  used s i nce  a  g rea te r  degree o f  r e l i a b i l i t y  and s a f e t y  can 
be assured. Many more t e s t s  may be made on one t ype  o f  dev ice  than  cou ld  be 
. 
made on severa l  types;  thus,  a  h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  f a c t o r  can be ma in ta ined .  
SEA dev ices a r e  used i n  a l l  exp los i ve  systems where i nadve r ten t  i n i t i a t i o n  
would r e s u l t  i n  an acc iden t  o f  c a t a s t r o p h i c  p r o p o r t i o n s ;  e.g., i nadve r ten t  
engine i g n i t i o n  o r  i nadve r ten t  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  the  d e s t r u c t  system. An S&A i s  
u t i  l i z e d  where - b o t h  e l e c t r i c a l  and exp los i ve  (or py ro techn i c )  s a f e t y  i s  r equ i  red. 
An arm-disarm dev ice  i s  u s u a l l y  used f o r  stage separat ion.  I f  t h e  s tag ing  j o i n t  
i s  a  compressive t ype  j o i n t ,  i nadve r ten t  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  s tage sepa ra t i on  
system would n o t  r e s u l t  i n  c o l l a p s e  o f  t he  m i s s i l e .  I f  t he  m i s s i l e  does no t  
i nco rpo ra te  a  compressive t ype  j o i n t ,  and i f  i nadve r ten t  i n i t i a t i o n  tends t o  
r e s u l t  i n  a  m i s s i l e  co l l apse ,  then an S&A dev ice  should be used. 
The t h r u s t  t e r m i n a t i o n  system cou ld  use an arm-disarm dev ice s i nce  i nadve r ten t  
i n i t i a t i o n  would n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a  c a t a s t r o p h i c  a t x i d e n t .  There a r e  no s tandard-  
i z e d  methods of de te rm in ing  whether an SEA dev i ce  should be used o r  an arm-disarm 
dev ice;  t he  e n t i r e  system must be s tud ied.  The t ype  o f  damage t h a t  would occur 
if t h e  i n i t i a t o r  i n a d v e r t e n t l y  went o f f  must be determined; e.g., would the  
complete m i s s i l e  be dest royed? would personnel be i n j u r e d ?  would t h e r e  be 
damage t o  p r o p e r t y ?  The f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  must be made on t h e  b a s i s  o f  the  degree 
o f  s a f e t y  r e q u i r e d  and t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e s u l t s  o f  an  i nadve r ten t  i n i t i a t i o n .  
3.0 SAFETY C R I T E R I A  FOR ORDNANCE COMPONENTS 
There a r e  many s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a  f o r  ordnance components. A l l  of  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
a p p l y  t o  SEA dev ices and a l l  b u t  the f i r s t  c r i t e r i o n  app l y  t o  arm-disarm switches. 
De tona to r  Safe 
There i s  one requi rement  o f  an SGA mechanism t h a t  i s  no t  r e q u i r e d  o f  an 
arm-disarm dev ice;  i t  must be "detonator  safe."  Detonator sa fe  means t h a t  
i f  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  elements a re  i n i t i a t e d  i n  t h e  sa fe  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  subse- 
quen t  e x p l o s i v e  o r  py ro techn i c  t r a i n  w i l l  n o t  be i n i t i a t e d .  A  mechanical 
b a r r i e r  between the  s e n s i t i v e  m a t e r i a l  and t he  charge accompl ishes t h i s  
i n t e r r u p t  ion. 
o Safe ty  P i n  
A s a f e t y  p i n  must be u t i l i z e d  f o r  t he  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  hand l i ng ,  o r  assembly 
o f  t he  p r imary  s a f e t y  device. Th is  s a f i n g  p i n  has a spec ia l  purpose; i f  
arming power i s  on the  system, the  p i n  cannot be removed. The p i n ,  o f  
course, i s  r e m ~ v e d  p r i o r  t o  launch. I f  a t e c h n i c i a n  a t tempts  t o  remwe the  
s a f i n g  p i n  f rom the  s a f e t y  dev ice and f i n d s  t h a t  he cannot,  i t  i s  an i n d i -  . 
c a t i o n  t 5 a t  something i s  wrong w i t h  the system and t h a t  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
must be taken. 
e Not Manual ly  Armed 
Pr imary s a f e t y  dev ices shcu ld  be designed so t h a t  they  cannot be ntanually 
armed b u t  they  may ba manual ly  disarmed. T h i s  impor tan t  s a f e t y  r e q u i r e -  
ment i s  t o  p reven t  inadver2ent manual arming o f  t he  systen. I f  an a b o r t  
o r  system f a i l u r e  occurs p r i o r  t o  launch  and the systems have been armed 
( e l e c t r i c a l l y ) ,  i t  may be necessary t o  manual ly  d isa rm t h e  s a f e t y  dev ice.  
T h i s  can be d,me by r e i n s e r t i n g  t h e  s a f i n g  p i n s  wh ich  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  move 
t h e  s a f e t y  dev ice  back t o  t h e  "safe" p o s i t i o n .  
a Remotely Armed o r  Disarmed 
It i s  mandatory t h a t  t h e  sa fe ty  dev ices  can be armed o r  disarmed remote ly .  
There shou ld  a l s o  be a remote mon i to r  c i r c u i t  i n  s e r i e s  w i t h  each o f  t he  
s a f e t y  dev ices so t h a t  any movement o f  t he  dev ices  toward t he  "arm" 
p o s i t i o n  w i l l  cause an a la rm  o r  a  power shutdown. 
V i sua l  1adica:ion o f  S ta tus  
A .  v i s u a l  i n d i c a t i o n  a t  t h e  mechanism o f  t he  "arm" o r  "safe" s t a t u s  o f  t he  
u n i t  i s  r equ i red .  T h i s  i s  a  redundant (but necessary) f ea tu re .  When 5 
t e c h n i c i a n  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  remove o r  i n s e r t  t he  s a f i n g  p i n s ,  he must be 
a b l e  t o  determine v i s u a l  l y  t he  "arm" o r  "safe" s t a t u s  o f  t h e  p r ima ry  s a f e t y  
dev ice.  
E l e c t r i c a l  l y  Disconnected i n  "Safe" P o s i t  i on  
Squibs and de tona to rs  should b= shor ted-ou t  i n  t h e  "safe1'  p o s i t i o n ;  i .e., 
t h e y  a r e  e l e c t r i c a l l y  disconnected. T h i s  i s  a  guard acjains: spur ious  
c u r r e n t s ,  as w e l l  as a c c i d e n t a l  c l o s i n g  o f  t he  c i r c u i t ,  and subsequent 
f i r i n g  of  t he  EfD. 
a I s o l a t i o n  
Phys i ca l  a n d  e l e c t r i c a l  i s o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  i s  r equ i red .  That 
i s ,  t h e  a c t u a t i o n  and mon i t o r i ng  c i r c u i t r y  and t he  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t r y  should 
be  p h y s i c a l l y  szparated. The c i r c u i t s  should be i n  d i f f e r e n t  e l e c t i i c a l  
connec to rs  t o  guard a g a i n s t  mismating o r  bending o f  connector  p i n s  which 
c o u l d  bypass the  s a f e t y  dev ice.  T h i s  would cause a hazardous c o n d i t i o n .  
The re fo re ,  i t  i s  bes t  t o  have the m o n i t o r i n g  and a c t i v a t i o n  c i r c u i t s  
p h y s i c a l l y  sepa;-ated from t h e  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  (not o n l y  i n  t h e  conrlector 
i t s e l f  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  w i r i n g  o f  t he  p r ima ry  s a f e t y  dev ice) .  
e One Amp KO-Fi r e  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
The EED should not f i r e  i f  subjected t o  the  e l e c t r i c a l  p w e r  o f  1 wa t t ,  
1 amp f o r  a  1 i m i  ted  time. Range Safety requ i res  t h a t  the EED be subjected 
t o  1 w a t t ,  1 amp f o r  5 minutes w i thou t  f i r i n g  f o r  acceptance. 
High Re1 i a b i l  i t y  
The f i n a l  requirement i s  t h a t  the sa fe ty  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  be demonstrated 
t o  a  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  99.5% a t  a  95% conf idence l e v e l .  This  va lue i s  w i t h  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  the 1 wa t t ,  1 amp n o - f i r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the detonator  
s a f e t y  c r i t e r i o n .  
4.0 MISSILE ORDNARCE WIRING 
I n  ordnance work, people have always been most concerned w i t h  the i n i t i a t o r  
r a t h e r  than the complete ordnance system; however, ordnance goes much fu r the ;  
than t h i s .  A1 1 components which make up the ordnance system (paver supply, 
cab l i ng ,  pr imary sa fe ty  device, etc.)  must be studied. You cannot look a t  the 
i n i t i a t o r  a lone and say, "This i s  i t ,  i f  t h i s  i s  safe,  every th ing  e l s e  i s  sa.?e." 
It may n o t  be t rue !  
There a re  requirements p laced on the w i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  sa fe t y :  
Q Selected Routing o r  I s o l a t i o n  
I s o l a t i o n  requ i res  the e l e c t r i c a l  and phys ica l  i s o l a t i o n  o f  the  f i r i n g  
c i r c u i t s  and o the r  power con t ro l  and e lec t i - on i c  c i r c u i t r y .  The se lec ted  
r o u t i n g  o f  m i s s i l e  ordnance w i r i n g  through a i rbo rne  cables and conductors 
i s  requi red.  The moni to r  and ac tua t i on  l i , i e s  o r  w i res  should not  be nex,c 
t o ,  o r  i n t e r t w i n e d  w i th ,  the f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s .  
. 
Twisted and Shielded Wires 
Tw is t i ng  and s h i e l d i n g  o f  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  must be prov ided t o  s h i e l d  them 
from a l l  i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  (audio and RF) e lect romagnet ic  f : e l d s .  
-. 
e l hermai i y  l nsu ia ted  W i  res 
Thermal ly  i nsu la ted  w i r e  should be used t o  prec lude s h o r t - c i r c u i t i n g  the 
c r i t i c a l  ordnance c i r c u i t s .  
Grounded Wires 
S t a t i c  grounding and RF bonding must be prov ided i n  accordance w i t h  
MIL-B-5087. The grounding po in ts  must be s e l e c t i v e l y  es tab l ished t o  
reduce i nduc t i ve  s t r a y  e l e c t r i c a l  energy coup l ing  paths and t o  reduce 
t he  maximum e f f e c t i v e  antenna ape r tu re  formed by t he  f i r i n g  leads. Range 
Safe ty  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  tw i s ted ,  sh ie l ded  w i r e s  have t he  s h i e l d i n g  grounded. 
The o b j e c t  i s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  ground loops  i n  t he  system. I f  t he  s 5 i e l d  i s  
i s o l a t e d ,  t h e r e  may be d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t he  s t a t i c  p o t e n t i a l  wh ich  cause 
c u r r e n t  surges i n  t he  f i e l d  i t s e l f .  Grounding the  s h i e l d  can e l i m i n a t e  
these loops  i n  the w i r i n g ,  w i t h  t he  s h i e l d  a c t i n g  as the  conductor.  A l l  
. 
v a r i o u s  l ead  w i r e s  must be grounded t o  a common ground i n  t h e  m i s s i l e .  
5.0 DESTRUCT SYSTEMS 
There a r e  two types  o f  d e s t r u c t  systems t h a t  must be on each m i s s i l e .  The 
f i r s t  p rov ides  a  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  command d e s t r u c t  t h e  veh i c l e .  The second serves 
a premature stage sepa ra t i on  des t ruc t  f u n c t i o n .  I f  t h e r e  i s  a  mishap i n  aa  
upper s tage (such as i nadve r ten t  sepa ra t i on  o r  i g n i  t ion ,  o r  a  phys i ca l  breakup),  
t he  s tages below the  mishap must be des t royed  and the  stages above must be 
capable o f  b e i n g  command dest ructed.  
The tendency on m u l t i - s t a g e  veh i c l es  has been t o  have t he  p r o p u l s i o n  c o n t r a c t o r  
f o r  each s tage a l s o  f u r n i s h  the  d e s t r u c t  system f o r  t h a t  stage. Because of  the 
d i f f e r e n t  t ypes  o f  d e s t r u c t  systems wh ich  r e s u l t  f rom t h i s  k i n d  o f  a c t i o n ,  ::he 
i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the  o v e r a l l  v e h i c l e  d e s t r u c t  system becomes ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  and 
r e s u l t s  i n  a  degrada t ion  o f  b o t h  s a f e t y  and re1 iab  i 1 i t y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  overcome 
t h i s ,  some m i s s i l e s  use an i n t e g r s t e d  system which p rov ides  an i d e n t i c a l  d e s t r u c t  
charge o n  each o f  t he  s tages w i t h  a  s i n g l e  command d e s t r u c t  SZA and i d e n t i c a l  
premature s tage sepa ra t i on  S&A mechani sms on each stage. Because o f  t he  cori- 
mona l t y  o f  t he  d e s t r u c t  system, the compo~ents  can be t e s t e d  t o  demonstrate 
h i g h  r e l i a b i l  i t i e s  (a minimum o f  99.5% a t  a  c m f i d e n c e  l e v e l  o f  95%). 
A t y p i c a l  i n t e g r a t e d  d e s t r u c t  system f e a t u r e s  a  s i n g l e  command d e s t r u c t  SEA 
w i t h  i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g  pr imacord and l i n e a r  shaped charges. Each system i s  
i d e n t i c a l  on each stage. Premature s tage sepa ra t i on  (PSS) S&-As a r e  p rov ided  
on a i  i except  t h e  upper stdge. i h e  P S S  SGA i >  lai lyai-d-opei-ated i-ilth the !a i i -yard 
b r i d g i n g  t he  i n te r s tages .  I n  t h e  event  o f  a premature i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t he  rocke t  
moto r  o r  p h y s i c a l  breakup across  the i n t e r s t a g e ,  t he  l anya rd  i s  p u l l e d  and 
r o t a t e s  t he  s e n s i t i v e  e x p l o s i v e  component i n t o  l i n e .  S imul taneously  the l ayna rd  
c l o s e s  a s e r i e s  o f  swi tches between t he  b a t t e r y  and t he  PSS SEA thereby pe rm i t -  
t i n g  c u r r e n t  t o  f l o w  t o  the  detonator  thus i n i t i a t i n g  the  d e s t r u c t  system on 
+ 
. 
the  stage and t he  stages below. The upper s tage o r  stages can be des t royzd  
by i n i t i a t i n g  the  d e s t r u c t  SE-4. The system i s  comple te ly  redundant so t h a t  
a  h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  achieved. 
6.0 HAZAR9S TO ELECTRO-EXPLOS I VE D E V l  CES 
. 
E lec t ro -exp los i ve  devices (EEDS) r e q u i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  f rom the  f o l l o w i n g  sources: 
t e s t  equipinent, e l e c t r o s t a t i c  d ischarge,  e l ec t romagn2 t i c  f i e l d s ,  and induced 
vo l tages .  
6.1 Tes t  Equipment 
The e l e c t r i c a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  exp los i ve  components should have a  minimum o f  one 
ampere n o - f i r e  and 3.5 ampere a l l - f i r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The 1  amp n o - f i r e  
requi rement  means t h a t  t he  i n i t i a t o r  can be sub jec ted  t o  1 ampere c u r r e n t  f o r  
some p e r i o d  o f  t ime  and i t  w i l l  not f i r e .  The 3.5 ampere a l l - f i r e  means t h a t  
t h e  i n i t i a t o r  should f i r e  100% o f  t h e  t ime  when sub jec ted  t o  3.5 amperes. The 
f i r s t  i s  a  s a f e t y  requirement;  the o t h e r  i s  a  r e l i a b i l i t y  requirement.  The 
requi rements as d e l i n e a t e d  by  Range Safe ty  would be 1 w a t t ,  1  ampere n o - f i r e  
f o r  5 minutes t o  demonstrate t h e  n o - f i r e  l e v e l .  I f  poss ib l e ,  a l l  i n i t i a t o r s  
shou ld  be sub jec ted  t o  1 w a t t ,  1 ampere f o r  5 minutes i n  o rde r  t o  c u l l  ou t  
t h e  . u n i t s  wh ich  s r e  marg ina l .  I t  i s  necessary,  however, t o  t e s t  t h e  i n i t i a t o r  
t o  determine whether repeated a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  1 w a t t ,  1  amp n o - f i r e  f o i  5 min-  
u t e s  would degrade t h e  system. 
6.2 E l e c t r o s t a t i c  Discharqe 
P r e s e n t l y  EEDs a r e  designed such t h a t  they  w i l l  n o t  be i n i t i a t e d  by  a  c a p a c i t o r  
charged t o  about 3 k i l o v o l t s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  hav ing t h i s  l a r g e  a  charge 
b u i l d  up a c c i d e n t a l l y  i s  r a t h e r  remote. At t he  p resen t  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t ,  t he  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  go ing  t o  h i ghe r  i n i t i a t i o n  vo l t ages  a re  i m p r a c t i c a l .  W i th  
v e r y  h i g h  v o l t a g e  d ischarges (20 o r  25 K V )  the d i e l e c t r i c  i n  t he  i n i t i a t o r  
wou ld  b reak  down and t h e  system would be o v e r d e s i ~ n e d .  
There  has been q u i t e  a  b i t  o f  1i;erature whic5 shows t h a t  the human body can 
a c t u a l l y  s t o r e  up t o  600,000 ergs;  however, t h e r e  i s n ' t  100% e f f i c i e n c y  i n  
t r a n s f e r .  There i s  a  l o s s  when an EED i s  i n i t i a t e d  under e l e c t r o s t a t i c  d i s -  
charge. I t  i s  presently p o s s i b l e  t o  p reven t  s t a t i c  sccumulat ions o f  a  few 
k i l o v o i t s ,  so t h e r e  i s  no need t o  go t o  h i ghe r  d ischarge  v o l t a g ? ~ .  
6.3 E lec t romaqnet i c  F i e l d s  
A i r  Force Document 80-2 de f ines  the e l ec t r omagne t i c  environment as 2  w a t t s  
per  square meter up t o  50 megacycles (mc) and 100 w a t t s  per  square meter f rom 
50 mc on up t o  40,000 mc. The ordnance system must be designed t o  s u r v i v e  
i n  these  e l ec t r omagne t i c  environments;  i.e., exposure t o  these s p e c i f i e d  
env i ronments  must n o t  r e s u l t  i n  any s a f e t y  problems i n  hand l i ng ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  
i n s t a l l a t i o n  o r  ope ra t i on .  
F u r t h e r  exposure t o  t he  s p e c i f i e d  RF environment should  no t  r e s u l t  i n  degra- 
d a t i o n  t o  performance and shou ld  not  reduce t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t he  dev i ce  t o  
pe r f o rm  i t s  in tended f u n c t i o n .  
The f i e l d  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a t o r  a c t u a l l y  r ece i ves  depends on t h e  s h i e l d i n g  o f  
t h e  system i t s e l f .  I t  depends on t h e  a t t e n u a t i o n  i n  t h e  c a b l i n g  and t h e  
a t t e n u a t i o n  due t o  t he  phys i ca l  l o c a t i o n  o f  t he  u n i t  i n  t he  v e h i c l e  i t s e l f .  
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  have a f i e l d  i n t e n s i t y  o f  100 w a t t s  per  square meter and, 
due t o  a t t e n u a t i o n ,  have a v a l u e  much l e s s  than t h a t  a t  t he  u n i t  i t s e l f .  F3r 
t h i s  reason, t h e  t e s t s  shou ld  b e  done on a conp le te  system. I n d i v i d u a l  com- 
ponents  may no t  be a b l e  t o  meet requi rements  when s i t t i n g  on a t a b l e  and b e i n g  
s u b j e c t e d  t o  100 w a t t s  p e r  square meter;  however, when they  a r e  a c t u a l l y  
mounted i n  t h e  way i n  wh ich  they  a re  t o  be used on t he  v e h i c l e ,  they  may be 
so s h i e l d e d  t h a t  they  can w i t h s t a n d  t h e  f i e l d  i n t e n s i t y  requi rement  o f  100 
w a t t s  per  square meter.  
7.0 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ELECTROMAGNETIC HAZARDS 
There have been t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  e l ec t r omagne t i c  hazards. One i s  
t h e  e x p l o d i n g  b r i d g e w i r e  system ( ~ 8 ~ 1 )  which  i s  a  h i g h  v o l t a g e  and h i g h  energy 
system. The second i s  a  low v o l  tags - medium energy system; a  h o t  w i r e  system 
known as  t h e  1 ampere n o - f i r e  and 1 w a t t  n o - f i r e  f o r  5 minutes. The t h i r d  one 
i s  a  low v o l t a g e  - h i g h  c u r r e n t  w i t h  RF suppression. 
There i s  n o t  much d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the energy requi rements  between t he  low v o l t a g e -  
medium energy systems and low v o l t a g e  - h i g h  c u r r e n t  systems. The c u r r e n t  
requ i rements  a r e  w i t h i n  t h e  rea lm of  a  m i s s i l e  power supply ;  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  a  
s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t he  amount of c u r r e n t  requ i red .  The d i f f e r e n c e s ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  would  be about 3-1/2 amps a l l - f i r e  f o r  a  conven t iona l  h o t  w i r e  versus 
abou t  12 amps on h i g h  energy o r  medium energy i n i t i a t o r s .  
7.1 The Expl od i nq Br idge  C!i r e  (EB~!) Approach 
One a t t emp t  t o  meet t he  RF requi rements  r e s u l t e d  i n  EBW systems be ing  u t i l i z e d  
i n  m i s s i l e  and space v e h i c l e  ordnance systems. EBW systems were i n i t i a l l y  
developed f o r  n u c l e a r  weapons because o f  t h e  f a s t  f i r i n g  t ime  ( l ess  t han  5 
microseconds) wh ich  c o u l d  be rea l i zed .  The EBW i n i t i a t o r  can meet t h e  RF 
requ i  rements and uses o n l y  secondary exp los i ves  o r  py ro techn ics .  The problem, 
o f  course,  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a t o r  may no t  be s e n s i t i v e  b u t  t h e  f i r i n g  u n i t  i s  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  RF r a d i a t i o n .  The f i r i n g  u n i t  can be t r i g g e r e d  by RF w h i l e  t h e  
i n i t i a t o r  i t s e l f  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  safe. Much e f f o r t  has been expended i n  
s h i e l d i n g  t he  f i r i n g  u n i t  a g a i n s t  e l e c t r o m a g n z t i c  r a d i a t i o n .  
An EBW c o n s i s t s  o f  an RF f i l t e r ,  a  t r a n s i s t o r  i n v e r t e r ,  a  h i g h  v o l t a g e  t r a n s -  
former ,  a  r e c t i f i e r ,  a  c a p a c i t o r ,  a  t r i g g e r  gap sw i t ch ,  and the  EBW i n i t i a t o r .  
The RF f i l t e r  e l i m i n a t e s  s t r a y  RF s i g n a l s .  The t r a n s i s t o r  i n v e r t e r  forms an 
apparen t  AC s i g n a l  f rom t h e  DC power and the  h i g h  v o l t a g e  t r ans fo rmer  s t eps  
t he  v o l t a g e  up t o  a  few k i l o v o l t s .  The r e c t i f i e r  increases t h e  c u r r e n t  i n  
t h e  h i g h  v o l t a g e  and a l s o  conver ts  t h e  AC back t o  DC. The c a p a c i t o r  s t o r e s  t h e  
energy wh ich ,  when t h e  p rope r  s i gna l  i s  rece ived ,  sparks ac ross  t he  t r i g g e r  
gap s w i t c h  and i g n i t e s  t h e  EBW i n i t i a t o r .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  mon i t o r  c i r c u i t  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  m o n i t o r i n g  the  c a p a c i t o r  an6 
f o r  b l e e d - o f f  o f  t h e  system. The b l e e d - o f f  c i r c u i t  i s  r e q u i r e d  i n  t h e  even t  
o f  a n  a b o r t  a f t e r  t h e  c a p a c i t o r  has been charged; i f  t h i s  happened, i t  wou ld  
be necessary  t o  b l e e d - o f f  t h e  charged capac i t o r .  One o f  t h e  drawbacks i n  
t h e  system i s  t h e  t ime  r e q u i r e d  t o  b l e e d  t he  charge o f f  t h e  c a p a c i t o r .  T h i s  
t ime  f o r  b l e e d - o f f  (approx imate ly  30 seconds) i s  a  s a f e t y  hazard. W i t h  o t h e r  
systems (safe  and Arm ~ e v i c e s )  the system can be sa fed  i n  m i l l i s e c o n d s .  
The t i r i n g  p u i s e  goes th rough  a  t r i g g e r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  c i r c u i t  i n i o  a p u l s e  
f o r m i n g  network. These a r e  coded s i g n a l s  which a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  i n i t i a t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r i g g e r  sw i tch .  The pu lses have a  c e r t a i n  shape and amp l i t ude  and t h e  
t r i g g e r  s w i t c h  w i l l  r e a c t  o n l y  t o  t h i s  t ype  o f  s i g n a l ;  t h i s  e l i m i n a t e s  i n i t i a -  
t i o n  by  spu r i ous  s i g n a l s .  The t r i g g e r  gap s w i t c h ,  however, i s  s u s c e p t i b l e  
t o  r a d i a t i o n  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  s h i e l d i n g  o f  t he  EBW f i r i n g  u n i t  i s  r equ i r ed .  
The number o f  e l e c t r o n i c  components i n  s e r i e s ,  however, tends t o  degrade t h e  
re1  i a b i l  i t y  o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  system. 
7.2 The Low Voltage - Medium Enerqy Approach 
The one-watt system i s  b a s i c a l l y  a one-ohm b r idge  w i r e  w i t h  a desens i t i zed  
b r i dge  w i r e  head o r  a heat s ink  around the b r i dge  w i r e  t o  conduct the heat 
away from the  s e n s i t i v e  exp los ive  elements. However, the one-watt requirement 
. 
has no phys ica l  meaning when compared w i t h  a f u l l  i n t e n s i t y  requirement o f  
100 wa t t s  per square meter which i s  the human to le rance l eve l .  There has been 
some d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i t h  one-watt n o - f i r e  systems even though much t ime and 
money has been spent i n  t h e i r  development. 
The Range requirements a re  t h a t  the  EED s h a l l  w i ths tand a f i e l d  i n t e n s i t y  of  
100 wa t t s  per  square meter over a frequency range o r  meet the Range requ i re -  
ments. I t  i s  the  b e l i e f  o f  most people t h a t  the  environmental requirement 
o f  100 wa t t s  per square meter i s  more r e a l i s t i c  than the  one-watt n o - f i r e  
requirement. 
There a r e  f o u r  main advantages t o  us ing the  low vo l tage - medium energy EED 
system: : 
e I t .mee ts  ETR requirements. 
e I t  can be used i n  combination w i t h  an arm-disarm switch. 
e On-board power can be used (28 v o l t  power supply and conv.entiona1 cab1 ing) .  
The h igh  vo l tage t ransmiss ion l i n e s  t h a t  a r e  requ i red  i n  the EBW system 
a r e  n o t  necessary f o r  t h i s  type o f  system. 
I t  i s  a l i g h t e r  weight than the  EBW type. 
There a r e  a l so ,  however, disadvantages t o  us ing  the low vo l tage - medium 
energy EED system: 
The system requ i res  the  development o f  a new i n i t i a t o r .  
e Even though the  EED meets the  one-watt requirement,  i t  may not  meet the 
a c t u a l  f i e l d  i n t e n s i t y  requirements o f  100 wa t t s  per square meter. 
7.3 Low Vol taqe Approach 
The l o w  vo l tage  - h igh  cu r ren t ,  w i t h  RF suppression i s  another at tempt t o  over-  
come t h e  e lect romagnet ic  hazards problems. The attempted s o l u t i o n  here has 
been i n  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a t tenuators  i n  the i n i t i a t o r  p lug  o r  i n  c lose  
p r o x i m i t y  t o  the  i n i t i a t o r .  Th is  work has been c a r r i e d  on by the  Navy and the  
Army u s i n g  enc losu re  and suppress ion techniques.  The major  problems have been 
i n  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  a  suppress ion technique o f  reasonable  s i ze .  
The low v o l t a g e  system a f f o r d s  t h e  maximum pre launch  con f idence  checks as 
compared w i t h  an  EBW system. The f i r i n g  d i s c r e i e  s i g n a l s  can be checked 
th rough  a s i m u l a t o r  r e s i s t o r  i n  t h e  p r imary  s a f e t y  dev i ce  w i t h o u t  check ing 
through the  i n i t i a t o r  i t s e l f .  ~ h i s ' ~ e r m i t s  a  system se l f - check  w h i l e  t he  s a f e  
and arm mechanism o r  arm-disarm mechanism i s  i n  t h e  "safe" p o s i t i o n .  The s a f e  
and arm s t a t u s  o f  t h e  system can be commanded remote ly .  The sys tev  can be 
immediate ly  sa fed  i f  a launch a b o r t  occurs.  Most  o f  t h e  sa fe  and arm mechanisms 
and arm-disarm sw i tches  can be sa fed  i n  40 t o  1 G O  m i l  1 iseconds, conlpared t o  the  
20 t o  30  seconds r e q u i r e d  t o  b l e e d - o f f  t h e  EBW systems. The arming and s a f i n y  
c a p a b i l i t y  may be checked p r i o r  t o  launch d u r i n g  systems checkout t e s t s .  An 
EBW system cannot be armed w i t h o u t  charg ing  t h e  capac i t o r s .  . 
The low v o l t a g e  - h i g h  c u r r e n t  system w i t h  RF p r o t e c t i o n  has many advantages: 
a It meets b o t h  t h e  Eas te rn  Test  Range and Western Tes t  Range requi rements .  
a It can be used w i t h  an arm-disarm s w i t c h  and s a f e  and arm dev i ce  because 
i t  uses m i s s i l e  on-board power. 
a E x i s t i n g  i n i t i a t o r s  can be used. 
a The RF p r o t e c t i o n  a t t e n u a t o r s  can be mounted i n  o r  around t h e  e x i s t i n g  
i n i t i a t o r s .  
As i s  t h e  case w i t h  a l l  systems, however, t h i s  dev ice a l s o  has i t s  d isadvantages:  
a The RF suppress ion  system must be i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  i n i t i a t o r .  
a It i s  necessary  t o  c e r t i f y  t h e  i n i t i a t o r s  over  t h e  f requency range o f  
10,000 t o  40,000 mc. Th i s  i s  ex t reme ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  do because t h e r e  i s  
no t e s t  equipment a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i r e c t  t e s t  a t  these  f requenc ies .  
8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The d e s i g n  o f  t h e  ordnance system i s  n o t  t h e  des ign  o f  t he  i n i t i a t o r  a lone;  
t h e  o v e r a l l  system must be s tud ied .  I t  i s  necessary t h a t  t he  ground equipment 
wh i ch  p r o v i d e s  t h e  s i g n a l  must bs s tud ied.  The c a b l i n g ,  power s u p p l i e s ,  cab le  
r o u t i n g ,  s h i e l d i n g  requ i rements ,  and g round ing  requi rements  must a l l  be included. 
As systems become more and more complex and more and more ordnance i tems a r e  
used on m i s s i l e s  and space v e h i c l e s ,  t h e  hazards compound be'cause o f  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t s  t h a t  must be i nco rpo ra ted  i n t o  t h e  system. I n  o rde r  t o  
assure s a f e t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  - which go hand i n  hand - i t  i s  necessary t o  
. 
l o o k  a t  t h e  t o t a l  system and n o t  i n d i v i d u a l  components. T e s t i n g  and a n a l y s i s  
must be done on a t o t a l  system bas is .  
- .  
Lec tu re  Number Four 
- 
'ISENS IT  I VITY OF EXPLOS I V E S  AND PROPELLANTS - 
TO IMPACT AND FRICTION" 
M r .  Frank Fedowitz,  J r .  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Most readers  who have worked a t  Cape Kennedy f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t ime a r e  we1 1 -aware 
o f  t he  developments t h a t  have taken p l ace  i n  recen t  years  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  b i g g e r  
and b e t t e r  boos te rs .  These l a r g e r  boosters  have r e q u i r e d  developments o f  h i g h e r  
and h i g h e r  energy p r o p e l l a n t s .  I n  the p a s t ,  t h e r e  was a  g rea t  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
p r o p e l l a n t s  and exp los i ves ;  b u t ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  development o f  newer p r o p e l -  
l a n t s ,  t h e  1 i ne  o f  demarcat ion,  o r  d i f f e r e n c e ,  between p rope l  l a n t s  and exp los i ves  
i s  n o t  as g r e a t  as i t  was be fo re .  P r i m a r i l y ,  t h i s  i s  because they  e i t h e r  c o n t a i n  
f a i r  percentages o f  exp los i ves ,  o r  behave i n  a  s im i  l a r  manner t o  e x p l o s i v e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n a d v e r t e n t l y .  
2.0 INITIATION OF EXPLOS I VES AND PROPELLANTS 
Safe ty  i s  o f  paramount importance i n  t h e  manufacture,  t h e  t e s t ,  and the  use o f  
p rope l  l a n t s  and exp los i ves .  One index o f  t h e  s a f e t y ,  o f  these m a t e r i a l s  o r  ccsm- 
ponents  c o n t a i n i n g  them, i s  s e n s i t i v i t y .  I n  o r d e r  t o  understand t he  impor tacce 
o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  and t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  one must have some backgrourd 
o f  t h e  process,  f rom t h e  p o i n t  o f  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  exp los i ves  and p r o p e l l a n t s  t o  
e i t h e r  d e f l a g r a t i o n  (burn ing)  o r  de tona t ion .  
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F igu re  4-1 i s  a  graphica l  rep r e s e n t a t  ion o f  what occurs  f rom , t h e  t ime a  p r o p e l  l a n t  
o r  exp los i ve  i tem i s  i n i t i a t e d ,  t o  the t ime  i t  i s  p rog ress ing  a t  a  steady s t a t e .  
The process s t a r t s  a t  t he  i n i t i a t i o n  p o i n t  ( a t  t ime zero) ,  through a c t i o n  o f  a  
squ ib ,  a  de tona to r ,  o r  an i nadvc r t en t  i n i t i a t i o n .  As t ime  progresses,  t he  . 
r e a c t i o n  acce le ra tes .  I n  t he  case o f  a  d e f l a g r a t i o n  o r  a  bu rn ing  process,  ( f o r  
p r o p e l l a n t s ) ,  t h i s  r e a c t i o n  proceeds a t  a  r a t e  o f  a  few inches pe r  second and 
a t  a  p ressure  o f  perhaps 1,000 p s i .  I n  t he  case o f  an exp los i ve ,  o r  a  p r o p e l l a n t  
which i s  misbehaving, a  sudden change i n  r e a c t i o n  r a t e  occurs which leads t o  a  
de tona t i on .  The r e a c t i o n  r a t e  i n  a  de tona t ion  process i s  ve ry  r a p i d ,  i n  t he  
o r d e r  o f  600 t o  2,400 f e e t  p e r  second. The pressures assoc ia ted  w i t h  t h i s  r a t e  
a  r e  i n  t h e  neighborhood o f  one hundred thousand atmospheres. Obvious 1 y  , the re  
i s  a  g r e a t  d i f f e r e n c e  between d e f l a g r a t i o n  and de tona t ion .  A k ~ o w l e d g e  o f  the 
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  i n i t i a t i o n  i s  ve ry  impor tan t ;  p r i m a r i l y ,  i n  t he  case o f  whether 
one does o r  doesn ' t  want i t  t o  occu r .  There have been numerous i n i t i a t i o n  s t c d i e s  
o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  and exp los i ves ;  and o f  course, everyone who has s tud ied  t he  phenom- 
enon, has proposed some s o r t  o f  t e s t  t o  determine t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t he  m a t e r i a l .  There a r e  as many t e s t s  as there a r e  s t u d i e s  o f  i n i t i a t i o n .  
One o f  t h e  p r ima ry  f a c t o r s  t o  understand, i s  t h a t  i n i t i a t i o n  requ i  res a  g i v e n  
i npu t  o f  energy i n t o  t h e  system, u s u a l l y  a  r a p i d  i n p u t  o f  energy, and n o t  neces- 
s a r i  l y  hea t  energy. The energy inpu t  can be through impact,  f r i c t i o n a l  f o r c e ? ,  . 
a  number o f  m i  s ce l  laneous forms, and o f  course, hea t .  
2 . 1  Impact Energy 
Heat i s  produced i f  an e x p l o s i v e  o r  p r o p e l l a n t  i s  impacted. T h i s  may be caused - 
by  t h e  f l o w  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l s  due t o  the impact,  a  compression o f  gas o r  vapor 
bubbles i n  t he  m a t e r i a l ,  o r  shear ing  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p o r t i o n s  o f  t he  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  
e x p l o s i v e  ; a1 1 o f  which tend  t o  form "hot spots." "Hot spot  ," a term used i n  
e x p l o s i v e  work,  i s  cons idered t o  be a smal l  area i n  t h e  p rope l  l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  
where t h e  i n p u t  energy i s  concentrated.  The "hot spot"  t heo ry  i s  t he  p r e s e n t l y  
accep ted  t heo ry  o f  i n i t i a t i o n  f o r  p rope l  l a n t s  and exp los ives .  
2.2 F r i c t i o n  Enerqy 
F r i c t i o n a l  i n i t i a t i o n  i s  ano ther  means o f  i n i t i a t i o n  and i s  a c t u a l l y  s i m i l a r  t o  
impact.  I t  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  f o rma t i on  o f  ho t  spots ,  s i m i l a r  t o  those f o r m ~ d  
by impact ,  except  f o r  t h e  r a t e s  o f  format i o n  and method o f  energy supply .  
2.3 Thermal l n i t i a t i o n  
Thermal i n i t i a t i o n  i s  caused by hea t i ng  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  t o  t h e  p o i n t  
where i t decomposes and/or i g n i  t es  . 
2.4 Misce l laneous  Causes f o r  I n i t i a t i o n  
l n i t i a t i o n  may a l s o  be brought  about by  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  d ischarge ,  gamma r a d i a t i o n ,  
u l t r a v i o l e t  r a d i a t i o n ,  o r  v i s i b l e  r a d i a t i o n .  R a d i a t i o n  i s  cons idered t o  decom- 
pose the  m a t e r i a l  i n t o  more s e n s i t i v e  compounds, which then a r e  more s e n s i t i v e  
t o  p r e v i o u s l y  ment ioned types o f  input  energy. 
3.0 SENSITIZERS AND DESENSITIZERS 
The s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  a  m a t e r i a l  can be a f f e c t e d  i n  a  number o f  ways, some o f  which 
a r e  d iscussed i n  t he  f o l l o w i n g  sec t i ons .  
3.1 Mechanical  S e n s i t i z e r s  
Perhaps t he  most common s e n s i t i z i n g  e f f e c t  i s  a  mechanical e f f e c t .  A h o t  spot 
cou ld  be formed around a  p a r t i c l e  o f  g r i t ,  a  p i e c e  o f  sand, o r  o t h e r  m a t e r i a '  
mixed i n  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  exp los i ve .  The p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t he  g r i t  a r e  v c r y  
impor tan t ;  hardness, shape, s i z e ,  and most impor tan t ,  i t s  thermal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
The m e l t i n g  p o i n t  o f  t h e  g r i t  p a r t i c l e  i s  impor tan t .  When an impact,  o r  a  
f r i c t i o n a l  f o r c e  i s  a p p l i e d ,  a  h o t  spot s t a r t s  fo rming  a t  t h e  s i t e  o f  t h e  g r i t  
p a r t i c l e .  I f  t h e  m e l t i n g  p o i n t  o f  the g r i t  pan- t i c le  i s  low, be fo re  t h e  h o t  spot 
can b u i l d  up t o  a  h i g h  enough temperature t o  i q i t i a t e  t he  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  exp los i ve ,  
t he  p a r t i c l e  may e i t h e r  decompose, o r  m e l t ,  and e l i m i n a t e  the source o f  t he  h o t  
spo t .  I f ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  m e l t i n g  p o i n t  o f  t h e  g r i t  p a r t i c l e  i s  h i g h e r  
than t h e  m e l t i n g  p o i n t  o f  t he  exp los i ve  o r  p r o p e l l a n t ,  t h e  temperature o f  the  
h o t  spo t  w i l l  i nc rease  t o  a  p o i n t  where t he  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  w i l l  be 
i n i t i a t e d .  Another  t ype  o f  mechanical source o f  i n i t i a t i o n  which has t o  be con- 
s i d e r e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  d u r i n g  assembly-type ope ra t i ons ,  i s  t h e  screw th read .  A  b i t  
o f  p r o p e l  l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  i n  a  th read  can be sub jec ted  t o  a  l o c a l  i z e d  h i g b  energy 
i n p u t ,  and can e a s i l y  be a source o f  i n i t i a t i o n  as t h e  mat ing  p a r t  i s  assembled 
t o  i t .  
3.2 Chemical S e n s i t i z e r s  
A second method o f  s e n s i t i z a t i o n  i s  ach ieved by means o f  chemica ls .  Chemical 
s e n s i t i z e r s  tend  t o  lower t he  decompasit ion energy o f  a  m a t e r i a l .  For  example, 
consider  copper and ammonium perch  l o r a t e  combinat ions .  When copper i s  i n  con tac t  
w i t h  ammonium p e r c h l o r a t e ,  i t  lowers the  decomposit ion temperature o f  t h e  ammonium 
p e r c h l o r a t e .  As ano ther  example, copper i n  con tac t  w i t h  ammonium n i t r a t e  d i r e c t l y  
increases i t s  s e n s i t i v i t y .  Therefore,  i n  any des ign  work o r  f a b r i c a t i o n  o f  these 
assembl ies,  copper i s  kep t  f rom con tac t  w i t h  e i t h e r  an~monium n i t r a t e  o r  ammonium 
p e r c h l o r a t e .  I n  o r d e r  t o  check t h e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  m a t e r i a l s  w i t h  
exp los i ves  and p r o p e l  l a n t s  , a t ype  o f  compat i b i  1 i t y  t e s t  i s  run-  between t h e  p r o -  
p e l  l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  and any m a t e r i a l  t h a t  may come. i n  con tac t  w i t h  them. The 
t e s t  i s  u s u a l l y  conducted a t  an e l eva ted  temperature i n  which a  t e s t  tube s i z e  
sample, o r  l a r g e r ,  i s  sub jec ted  t o  e l eva ted  temperature,  and decomposi t ion p roduc t s  
a r e  measured a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t ime.  Double base p r o p e l l a n t s ,  n i t r o g l y c e r i n  o r  
n i t r o c e l l u l o s e  c o n t a i n i n g  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  have t h e i r  own problems a l s o .  They tend  
t o  decompose s l o w l y ,  p roduc ing  an a c i d  p roduc t  which' tends t o  increase t h e  sensi  - 
t i v i t y .  However, s t a b i l i z e r s  a r e  incorpora ted  i n  these p r o p e l l a n t s  which se lec -  
t i v e l y  r eac t  w i t h  t h e  decomposi t ion p roduc t ,  and remove them from t h e  system, so 
they  do n o t  have an adverse e f f e c t .  
3.3 . Phys i ca l  S e n s i t i z e r s  
A t h i r d  method o f  s e n s i t i z a t i o n  o r  d e s e n s i t i z a t i o n  i s  a  p h y s i c a l  method. Tem2era- 
t u r e  changes, e i t h e r  h i g h  temperatures o r  low, can cause changes i n  t h e  c r y s t a l  
s i z e  o f  an e x p l o s i v e  o r  p r o p e l l a n t ,  the reby  e i t h e r  s e n s i t i z i n g  them i f  they  a r e  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e i r  c r y s t a l  s i z e  o r  d e s e n s i t i z i n g  them. O f  course, as temperaLure 
inc reases ,  r e a c t i o n  r a t e  increases,  so the  temperature has a d i r e c t  s e n s i t i z i n g  
e f f e c t  . 
4.0 MEASUREMENT OF SENSITIVITY 
One m i g h t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e r e  should be a  c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  i n p u t  energy 
r e q u i r e d  t o  i n i t i a t e  a  material and j t c .  ~ 2 t n - f  y L  . =.-.--- I i y u t c :  ?i-2 i i i u s t r a t e s  
F i g u r e  4-2. SENSITIVITY VS. BRISANCE (OUTPUT) 
Decreasinq Impact S e n s i t i v i t y  Decreasing Br isance 
Lead Az ide  RDX 
P ETN P ETN 
RDX TETRY L 
T ETRY L TNT 
TNT Lead Az ide  
(o ther  t e s t  methods w i  1 l produce some rearrangement .) 
t he  i npu t / ou tpu t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f o r  a few o f  t he  norinal m i l i t a r y  exp los i ves .  
Lead Az ide ,  f o r  example, s b w s  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  a  h i g h  impact s e n s i t i v i t y  f o r  
a  low Br isance o r  o u t p u t .  Br isance,  by  t he  way, i s  a  term f o r  s h a t t e r i n g  power 
o f  t he  e x p l o s i v e .  There may be some i nve rse  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  Lead Az ide ,  b u t  
f o r  t h e  o t h e r  exp los i ves  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  does n o t  e x i s t .  I t  becomes apparent  
f rom F i g u r e  4-2, t h a t  t h e r e  i s  r e a l l y  no c o r r e l a t i o n  t h a t  can be made between 
i n p u t  and o u t p u t  power. How then does one measure s e n s i t i v i t y ?  A  number o f  
e f f e c t s  regard ing  s e n s i t i z e r s  and d e s e n s i t i z e r s  have been ment ioned and t h e  many 
ways i n  which the  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  o r  exp los i ves  may v a r y  has been 
exp la ined .  One may be l e d  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  migh t  be a  b i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  measure 
t he  s e n s i t i v i t y  o;' a  m a t e r i a l  a c c u r a t e l y .  T h i s  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  t r u e .  Most t e s t i n g ,  
thus f a r  developed, has been developed toward t he  aim o f  t r y i n g  t o  resemble f i e l d  
c o n d i t i o n s  and a c t u a l  o p e r a t i o n a l  type c o n d i t i o n s .  
4.1 Types o f  Tes t s  -
F i g u r e  4-3 i s  a p a r t i a l  l i s t  o f  t e s t s .  O f  t he  twe lve  t e s t s  l i s t e d ,  t h e  t w e l f t h  
F i g u r e  4-3. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
Impact Tes t  ( f a l l i n g  we igh t )  
F r i c t i o n  Test ( s l i d i n g  we igh t )  
Card Gap Test 
B u l l e t  Impact Tes t  
40 f o o t  Drop Tes t  
M i  nimum Detonat ing Charge 
C r i t i c a l  Diameter 
E l e c t r o s t a t i c  Discharge 
Auto l gn  i t ion Temperature 
Vacuum S t a b i l i t y  T e s t s  
11. D i f f e r e n t i a l  Thermal A n a l y s i s  
12. E t  Cetera 
one i s  t h e  most compl icated;  i t  cons i s t s  o f  twenty  o r  t h i r t y  more t e s t s  t h a t  
have been used throughout  the  i n d u s t r y .  Everyone has some s ~ r t  o f  t e s t ,  t h a t  
they  t h i n k  i s  t h e  bes t  t e s t ,  f o r  measuring a p a r t i c u l a r  t y p z  o f  s e n s i t i v i t y .  
Three o f  these t e s t s  use heat  i n p u t  as a  means o f  i n i t i a t i o n ;  Numbers 9, 10, 
and 11. Four use impact o f  one s o r t  o r  ano ther ;  Numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5 .  Three 
use d e t o n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  o r  e x p l o s i v e  as an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  sens i -  
t i v i t y ;  Numbers 3 ,  6,  and 7. Number 8 i s  a  measure o f  t h e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  
s e n s i t i v i t y .  
a Thermal T e s t i n g  
I n  thermal s e n s i t i v i t y  t e s t i n g ,  temperature i s  usual  l y  t h e  parameter t h a t  
i s  be ing  looked f o r ;  i .e., temperature a t  which a  r e a c t i o n  occurs ,  o r  t h e  
t ime  a t  which r e a c t i o n s  occu r  a t  c e r t a i n  temperatures.  The a u t o - i g n i t i o n  
t e s t ,  f o r  example, i s  a  t e s t  i n  which one looks f o r  f lame, o r  de tona t i on  
o r  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  some s o r t ,  t o  occur  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  temperature.  The 
. d i f f e r e n t i a l  thermal a n a l y s i s  t e s t  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t he  a u t o - i g n i t i o n  t e s t ,  i n  
t h a t  i t s  c r i t e r i a  i n v o l v e s  heat  gene ra t i on ;  b u t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  f lame,  o t h e r  
hea t  gene ra t i on .  Thermograv imetr ic  a n a l y s i s  i,s one o f  t h e  e t  ce te ras  i n  
F i g u r e  4-3, and looks f o r  a  weight  change as t he  sample i s  heated.  There 
a r e  many sources o f  v a r i a b i  l i t y  i n  these types  o f  t e s t s .  One can imagine 
t h a t  t h e  hea t i ng  r a t e ,  t h e  sample s i z e ,  comilaction o f  t he  sample, and t h e  
m a t e r i a l  f rom which t h e  con ta ine r  i s  made, a l l  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t .  These 
v a r i a t  ions  requ i  r e  t h a t  anyone, who i s  go in t j  t o  make a  comparison between 
t e s t s ,  must be c a r e f u l ,  and be sure they  h a l e  a l l  t h e  da ta  and know a l l  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  t e s t s  b e f o r e  a  v a l i d  comparison 
between t e s t s  can be made. 
o Impact Tes t  i n y  
The n e x t  t ype  o f  t e s t s  i s  t h e  impact t e s t s  3nd, as i n  t he  case o f  t he  
thermal  t e s t s ,  comparison here  aga in  i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t .  Resu l t s  a r e  some- 
t imes  ambiguous and t h e r e  a r e  many v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  t e s t i n g .  The "hot 
spo t "  t heo ry  s t a t e s  t h a t  one has t o  produce l o c a l  i zed  hea t  a t  a  f a i r l y  h i g h  
r a t e  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n i t i a t e  a  compound. Therefore,  t h e  method o f  energy 
a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  impo r tan t ,  and the mechanics o f  t he  apparatus i t s e l f  e n t e r  
i n t o  t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  one o b t a i n s .  For  example, t he  
hardness o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l ,  t h e  f i n i s h ,  t he  thermal  c h a r a c i e r i s t i c s  a r e  aga in  
impo r tan t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  problems w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  standards 
t h a t  a r e  used i n  these t e s t s .  Many people use t he  "Three S system," (S igh t ,  
Sound, and Smel l ) ,  t o  determine whether a  r e a c t i o n  has taken p l a c e  o r  n o t .  
Some o t h e r s  may be a  b i t  more s o p h i s t i ~ d i e d  and use mea5"r ing  device; - 5zt 
these  a l s o  have v a r i a t i o n s .  
4.2 Impact S e n s i t i v i t y  and Tes t s  
I n  impact t e s t i n g  , befo re  the  I tho t  spot1'  t heo ry  was developed, peop le  thought  
t h a t  impact e i t h e r  produced a  d i  r ec t  e x c i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x p l o s i v e  o r  p rope l  l a n t  
mo lecu les  o r  a  r u p t u r e  o f  t h e  molecules themselves. The "hot spot"  t heo ry ,  
however, s t a t e s  t h a t  r a p i d ,  l o c a l i z e d  h e a t i n g  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
e f f e c t  i n i t i a t i o n .  F i g u r e  4-4  i s  an example o f  one o f  t h e  p i e c e s  o f  t e s t  
appara tus  t h a t  i s  used f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  impact  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  a  m a t e r i a l .  
T h i s  i s  t h e  P i c a t i n n y  A r s e n a l  s tandard  a p p a r a t u s .  I t  i s  n o t  an e x t r e m e l y  c o m p l i -  
c a t e d  p i e c e  o f  equ ipment ,  n o t h i n g  more t h a n  a  w e i g h t  t h a t  i s  suspended on  a  
. 
c a l  i b r a t e d  s t a n d  and  then  dropped o n t o  an assembly,  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  m a t e r i a l  under  
t e s t  w h i c h  i s  suppor ted  on an a n v i  I-. F i g u r e  4-5 i s  a n o t h e r  example o f  an  impact  
F i g u r e  4-4. P I CAT I NNY APPARATUS F i g u r e  4-5. BUREAU OF M I N E S  A P P A W T U S  
apparatus;  i t  i s  t h e  Bureau o f  Mines impact a9para tus .  I t  looks somewhat more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  than  t h e  P i c a t i n n y  Apparatus,  bu t  i s  a c t u a l l y  no b e t t e r .  I n  a  
few ins tances ,  i t  does no t  produce q u i t e  as good r e s u l t s .  There a r e  many 
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  impact s e n s i t i v i t y  which can occu r .  One o f  these v a r i a t i o n s  i s  
due t o  temperature and i s  shown i n  F i gu re  4-6.  When t h e  impact t e s t  i s  p e r -  
. 
formed a t  v a r y i n g  temperatures,  the - impac t  h e i g h t ,  t h e  h e i g h t  t o  wh ich  t he  
F i g u r e  4-6. EFFECT OF TEHPERATURE ON IMPACT SENSITIVITY 
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t e s t ,  v a r i e s  v e r y  w i d e l y  w i t h  respect  t o  temperature.  The t e s t s  were per formed 
on  some o f  t h e  s tandard  m i l i t a r y  p r o p e l l a n t s  and amvonium n i t r a t e .  The a s t e r -  
i s k e d  numbers i n d i c a t e  t h o s e ' t e s t s  i n  which t h e  m a t e r i a l  was i n  t h e  mo l t en  s t a t e .  
- 
One can see t h a t  t h e  m o l t e n  m a t e r i a l  i s  ex t reme ly  s e n s i t i v e .  W i t h i n  the  genera l  
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u s i n g  range o f  t h e  e x p i o s i v e s  o r  p r o p e i i a n t s  t h e i r  s e n s i t i v i t y  i s  r e i a i i v e i y  
c o n s t a n t ;  i .e., up t o  1 7 0 ~ ~ .  A number o f  v a r i a b l e s  have been ment ioned,  because 





impact appara tus ,  i f  one has n i c e l y  p o l  ished s t e e l  su r faces  and t e s t s  a  p r i m a r y  
e x p l o s i v e  l i k e  mercury  f u l m i n a t e  (a p r i rna ry  e x p l o s i v e  be ing  one which i s  ve r y  
e a s i l y  s e t  o f f  by  heat  o r  impact and i s  used i n  i n i t i a t c r s ) ,  i t  u s u a l l y  explodes 






a t  a h e i g h t  o f  approx imate ly  15 cen t imete rs  and f?DX a t  a  h e i s h t  o f  25 cen t ime te r s  
AMMON l UM 






o r  so.  TNT g e n e r a l l y  does n o t  i n i t i a t e  on  t h e  P i c a t i n n y  apparatus when us i ng  
p o l i s h e d  s t e e l  su r f aces .  A l l  one has t o  do, i s  t o  add a  t h i n  l a y e r  o f  t i n  f o i  l 
ove r  t he  TNT and i t  becomes a lmost  as s e n s i t i v e  as R D X ,  so t he  t i n  f o i l ,  j u s t  
i n  i n t i m a t e  c o n t a c t ,  tends t o  a c t  as a  p h y s i c a l  s e n s i t i z e r ,  Wax i s  ano ther  com- 
pound which may s e n s i t i z e  o r  d e s e n s i t i z e  a  m a t e r i a l .  I f  wax i s  p u t  on t he  4 
su r f ace  o f  t he  sample be ing  t e s t e d ,  i t  may l o ~ e r  the impact h e i g h t  ( inc rease  
the  s e n s i t i v i t y ) .  But i f  wax i s  mixed i n t i m a t e l y  i n t o  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i t  a c t s  as  
a d e s e n s i t i z e r ,  a  ve r y  good d e s e n s i t i z e r ,  and i s  i n  s tandard  use i n  m i l i t a r y  
exp los i ves  such as RDX and Composit ion B. Most f o r e i g n  m a t e r i a l s ,  when added 
t o  exp los i ves  o r  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  tend  t o  d e s e n s i t i z e ,  o n l y  i f  t hey  have low m e l t i n g  
p o i n t s  and they  a r e  n o t  g r i t t y  substances, as was ment ioned be fo re .  W i t h  a l l  
these v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t e s t i n g ,  when one t r i e s  t o  ana lyze  t he  r e s u l t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
g a i n  e i t h e r  a  no-go p o i n t  o r  an a l l - g o  p o i n t  ( a l l - f i r e  p o i n t )  t h e  r e s u l t s  
u s u a l l y  f a l l  i n  a  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  o r  S-shaped curve. See F igu re  4-7. 
DISTRIBUTION 
OF 
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F igure  4-7 
Fcr e,v,mp!e, assume t h s t  t h e  i x p a c t  a p p a i a t i i s  i s  be i i i g  "~euJ. Tile riorllidi p r o -  
p e l l a n t  n o - f i r e  p o i n t  w i l l  be a t  one extreme, and as the  impact h e i g h t  i s  
inc reased ,  one s t a r t s  g e t t i n g  more i n i t i a t i o n s .  An S-shaped curve w i  l l s l o w l y  
form, u n t i l  t h e  100X p o i n t  i s  reached, a t  which t ime  the curve l e v e l s  o f f .  I t  
i s  a  f a i r l y  f l a t  cu rve ,  o r  a  gradual  s l o p i n g  curve ,  i n  most a c t u a l  c i rcum- 
s tances .  What i s  r e a l l y  des i r ed ,  i s  a  f a i r l y  steep curve;  where in  the  nc-go 
p o i n t  i s  f a i r l y  c l o s e  t o  t he  a l l - f i r e  p o i n t .  T h i s  may be approached by  c l ean ing  
up t h e  t e s t  methods and t r y i n g  t o  s tandard ize  methods thereby  m i n i m i z i n g  v a r i -  
a t i o n s .  The des igner ,  o r  use r ,  o f  a  system c o n t a i n i n g  de tona to rs  o r  squ ibs ,  wants 
t o  know the  n o - f i r e  o r  a l l - f i r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  extreme d e t a i l ;  w i t h  a  h i g h  r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  a t  a  h i g h  con f idence  l e v e l .  I f  i t  i s  a  1 amp n o - f i r e  squ ib  o r  de tona to r ,  . 
one wants t o  be sure  i t  does n o t  go o f f  a t  1 amp. One method, o t h e r  than runn ing  
thousands o f  t e s t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  i .e . ,  thousands o f  
t e s t s  s u b j e c t i n g  each squ ib  t o  1 amp, i s  t o  use what i s  c a l l e d  t h e  Bruceton ana l y -  
s i s .  The Bruceton o r  s t a i r c a s e  a n a l y s i s  method i s  shown below. 
BRUCETON (STAIRCASE) METHOD 
FOR DETERMINATION OF 
ALL FlRE / N O  F lRE  POINTS 
I n  t h i s  method, one chooses a v a r i a b l e ;  such as t he  drop h e i g h t ,  i n  t h e  drop 
t e s t  machine, o r  a  c u r r e n t  va r y i ng  around t he  50"L f i r e  c u r r e n t  o f  a  squ ib .  A 
s e r i e s  o f  t e s t s  i s  run ,  i n  which each t ime  one ge t s  a  n o - f i r e ,  he w i l l  e i t h e r  
inc rease  t he  c u r r e n t ,  o r  i nc rease  t h e  drop h e i g h t .  Each t ime one g e t s  a f i r e ,  
he w i  1 1  decrease t h e  c u r r e n t ,  o r  decrease t h e  drop h e i g h t .  A Bruceton a n a l y s i s  
i s  run,  usua l  l y  w i t h  many more than the 18 t e s t s  shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e .  From t h i s  
s e r i e s ,  as can be seen on the  r i g h t  s ide ,  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  i s  ob ta i ned  
f rom wh i ch  a  de te rm ina t i on  can be made as  t o  where t h e  mean va lue  1 i e s  and the  
v a r i a b i l i t y  around t he  mean. Once the mean va lue  i s  ob ta i ned ,  us i ng  s t a t i s t i c a l  
p rocesses ,  one can d e r i v e ,  w i t h  a h i gh  re1  i a b i  1 i t y ,  r e s u l t s  which show t h a t  no 





i ns tance ,  one may ge t  an answer t h a t ,  w i t h  a  99/ r e l i a b i l i t y  a t  90; conf idence 
l e v e l ,  no samples w i l l  f i r e  when the we igh t  i s  dropped from 1 c e n t i m e t e r .  The 
main advantage o f  the  Bruceton a n a l y s i s ,  i s  t o  reduce t he  number o f  t e s t  i tems 
requ i r ed  f o r  a  g i v e n  r e l i a b i l i t y .  One can imagine, t h a t  i f  t he  i tems cos t  
$1,000 ap iece ,  i t  would be senseless t o  shoot up a  thousand i tems;  e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  he can ge t  t h e  same o r  equ i va l en t  r e s u l t  w i t h  50 i tems.  De te rmin ing  n o - f i r e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and a l  I - f  i re  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  a  ve r y  impor tan t  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  
regard t o  s a f e t y .  
4.3 F r i c t i o n a l  S e n s i t i v i t y  and Tests  
F r i c t i o n  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  as was mentioned e a r l i e r ,  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  impact ,  i n  the  
sense t h a t  i t  i s  exp la i ned  by l o c a l i z e d  ho t  spo ts  be ing  produced. F i g u r e  4-9 
F igu re  4-3. PENDULUM FRl CTl ON TEST APPARATUS 
i l l u s t r a t e s  one p i e c e  o f  apparatus t h a t  i s  used i n  de te rm in i ng  f r i c t i o n  sens i -  
t i v i t y  o f  a  m a t e r i a l .  I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  pendulum w i t h  a  w e i g h t ,  a t t a c h e d  t o  the 
end i s  a f r i c t i o n  shoe, ( e i t h e r  a  f i b e r  shoe o r  a  s t e e l  shoe) ,  and t he  f r i c t i o n  
a n v i  l w h i c h  i-i a q ~ r r a t ~ r l  o r r ~ r o ~ v p d  anvi 1 , en w h i c h  ~ n m ~  e , y p l s ~ i ~ e  I S  n r l ~ , r n c l  ---".
The t e s t  i s  perforri led by r e l e a s i n g  the pendulum and a l l o w i n g  i t  t o  brush ac ross  
t he  a n v i  l ; de te r in in ing  through use o f  t he  Three S system, how many i n i t i a t i o n s ,  
snaps, c rack l es  o r  pops occu r .  Usual l y ,  one t e s t s  about 10 samples and t he  
r e s u l t s  a r e  tu rned  o u t  as the number o f  i n i t i a t i o n s  per  t he  t e n  samples, o r  
pe rcen tage  o f  i n i t i a t i o n s .  There i s  n o t  much o f  a  c o r r e l a t i o n  between the  
r e s u l t s  one o b t a i n s  f rom t h e  impact t e s t  o r  t h e  f r i c t i o n  t e s t .  The o n l y  t h i n g  
t h a t  can be s a i d  about  i t  i s  t h a t  the  f r i c t i o n  t e s t  appears  t o  use a t  l e a s t  a s  
much k i n e t i c  ene rgy  as  t h e  impact  t e s t .  
4.4 B u l l e t  Impact Tes t  
The B u l l e t  lmpact  Tes t  i s  a  combinat  ion  o f  f r i c t i o n  and impac t .  I t  u t i l i z e s  a  
[ i [ - - I ) I  
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v e r y  c o m p l i c a t e d  p i e c e  o f  equ ipment ;  a  p i e c e  o f  ~ i p e  w i t h  two end caps screwed 
o n t o  i t .  T h i s  t y p e  o f  t e s t  may seem t o  have more o f  a m i l i t a r y  v a l u e .  But  i t  
does p roduce  r e s u l t s ,  w h i c h  do t e n d  t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  same c a t e g o r y  a s  f r i c t i o n  
a n d  impact  s e n s i t i v i t y  t e s t s .  T h i s  t e s t  i s  p e r f c r m e d  w i t h  a  p i e c e  o f  e x p l o s i v e  
loaded p i p e  and,  a t  a  range o f  30 y a r d s ,  a  .30 c z l i b e r  b u l l e t  i s  f i r e d  i n t o  i t ;  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  made w h e t h e r  t h e  e x p l o s i v e  i n i t i a t e d ,  burned,  o r  what d i d  
happen. O b v i o u s l y ,  a  t e s t  l i k e  t h i s  s u p p l i e s  much more energy ,  t o  t h e  materiel 
b e i n g  t e s t e d ,  than t h e  f r i c t i o n  t e s t  o r  t h e  impact t e s t .  The s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  a  
m a t e r i a l  undergo ing  t h i s  t e s t ,  depends v e r y  much o n  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  con- 
t a i n e r  and some o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i t s e l f .  F o r  example,  
i f  G i i e  takes  p u r e ,  i u u b e i y  pdcked,  powdered RDX o r  Compos i t i on  B, t h e s e  w i  l l 
u s u a l l y  be i n i t i a t e d  b y  b u l l e t  impac t ,  even i f  t h e y  a r e  s i m p l y  c o n t a i n e d  i n  a  
paper  c o n t a i n e r .  O n l y  t h e  v e r y  i n s e n s i t i v e  m a t e r i a l s  f a i l  t o  i n i t i a t e  i n  t h i s  
t e s t ,  u n l e s s  h e a v i l y  encased;  f o r  example, TNT. I n  g e n e r a l ,  r e g a r d i n g  s e n s i -  
t i v i t y ,  a  low d e n s i t y  powder tends  t o  be more s e n s i t i v e  than  a  c a s t  m a t e r i a l ;  
w h i c h  i n  t u r n ,  i s  somewhat more s e n s i t i v e  than  a  v e r y  h i g h l y  p r e s s e d  m a t e r i a l .  
Under some r e l a t i v e l y  s t a n d a r d  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  b u l  l e t  impact  t e s t ,  t h e  normal  
r a t i n g s  o f  t h e  comlnon e x p l o s i v e s  ( f rom lower  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  s e n s i  - 
t i v i t y )  a r e :  TNT a t  t h e  l e a s t  s e n s i t i v e  end;  c o m p o s i t i o n  B ,  T e t r y l ,  RDX and 
PETN a t  t h e  more h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e  end. T h i s  i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  same o r d e r  . 
t h a t  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  impact and f r i c t i o n  t y p e  mach ines;  p r i m a r i  l y  t h e  impact  
machines.  A  s i d e  e f f e c t ,  however,  comes i n t o  b e i n g  w i t h  t h e  b u l l e t  impact  
t e s t  - s i z e .  TNT d i d n ' t  show r e p r o d u c i b l y  i n  a  s m a l l  b u l l e t  impact  t e s t ;  however,  
a  l a r g e  bomb f i l l e d  w i t h  TNT w i l l  a lmos t  a lways go o f f  w i t h  a t  l e a s t  a  low 
o r d e r  d e t o n a t i o n .  Aluminum i s  a  s e n s i t i z e r  when i t  comes t o  t h e  b u l l e t  impact  
t e s t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  l a r g e  charges.  T h i s  can be e x p l a i n e d  due t o  t h e  alu i , , 'num 
p a r t i c l e s  caus inc  numerous h o t  spo ts  i n  t h e  m a t e r i a l .  
4.5 Heat S e n s i t i v i t y  and T e s t s  
Hea t ,  as was s a i d  e a r l i e r ,  t ends  t o  cause t h e  c e c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  a  m a t e r i a l  and 
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r a t e  o f  r e a c t i o n  as  the t e m p e r a t ~ r e  i n c r e a s e s .  Most p r o p e l l a n t s  
and  e x p l o s i v e s  e x h i b i t  a  c r i t i c a l  h i g h  tempera tu re ,  be low w h i c h  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i s  
v e r y  s t a b l e  and above wh ich  i t  becomes l e s s  s t t b l e .  N i t r o g l y c e r i n ,  f o r  e x a v p l e ,  
0 has a  tempera tu re  i n  t h e  a rea  o f  about  125 F.  Above 1 2 5 O ~ ,  i t  s t a r t s  under -  
0 g o i n g  some adverse  changes a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e ;  whereas be low 125 F,  t h e r e  
a r e  no e f f e c t s  due t o  a g i n g .  TNT and T e t r y l ,  and a  number o f  t h e  o t h e r  h i g h l y  
used m i l i t a r y  e x p l o s i v e s ,  have c r i t i c a l  t empera tu res  up i n  tk hundreds o f  
degrees . 
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F i g u r e  4-11 i l l u s t r a t e s  one o f  t h e  p i e c e s  o f  equipment used f o r  de te rm in i ng  
e x p l o s i o n  temperature.  I t  i s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s imp le  arrangement,  p r i m a r i l y  an 
e l e c t r i c  fu rnace ,  i n  which i s  p u t  some Wood's m e t a l ,  (a low m e l t i n g  p o i n t  me ta l  
t h a t  i s  used i n  s p r i n k l e r  systems f o r  f i r e s ) ,  and an empty b l a s t i n g  cap she1 1 .  
4 
The e x p l o s i v e ,  o r  p r o p e l l a n t ,  i s  loaded i n  t h e  s h e l l  and i s  lowered i n t o  t h e  
m o l t e n  Wcod's s e t a l .  The o b j e c t  7s t o  t r y  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  tempera tu re  a t  wh ich  
f l a s h e s ,  de tona t i ons ,  o r  r eac t  ions occu r .  The t e s t  i s  r un  o v e r  a  sma l l  range 
o f  temperatures,  then i t  i s  determined a t  what temperature t h e  t e s t  sample 
exp loded i n  a  f i ve-second p e r i o d .  The f i ve-second temperature i s  one o f  the  
s tandard  ways o f  r e c o r d i n g  t h i s  s e n s i t i v i t y .  Another  s im i  l a r  method, uses 
mo l t en  Wood's meta l  on wh ich  p a r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  a r e  dropped, and, us i ng  
t h e  Three S system, i t  i s  determined whether  o r  no t  i t  reac ted .  
4.6 Spark S e n s i t i v i t y  
Ano ther  t y p e  o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  t e s t  i s  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  s e n s i t i v i t y  t e s t i n g .  We a r e  
a l l  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  e l e c t r o e x p l o s i v e  dev ices  t end  t o  be s e n s i t i v e  
dev ices ,  when i t  comes t o  e l e c t  r o s t a t  i c d i  sche rges . One, t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o t e c t s  
a g a i n s t  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  o r  a r c  d ischarges across e l e c t r o e x p l o s i v e  dev ices .  As 
f a r  a s  e x p l o s i v e s  and p r o p e l  l a n t s  a re  concerned, t h e r e  i s  no s tanda rd i zed  t ype  
o f  t e s t .  The r e s u l t s  o f  some t e s t s  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  4-12. 
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PETN, RDX, and TNT a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  nonhazardous, when i t  comes t o  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  
t ype  d ischarges .  A l o o k  a t  t h e  hazardous s i d e  o f  F i g u r e  4-12 shows, however, 
t h a t  most o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  exp los i ves  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  d ischarge .  
T e t r y l ,  though no t  a  p r i m a r y  exp los i ve ,  i s  somewhat s e n s i t i v e  t o  d i scha rges .  
B lack  powder heads t h e  1 i s t - - i t  i s  ex t r eme l y  hazardous when i t  comes t o  e l e c t r o -  
s t a t i c  d ischarge .  There i s  another  t y p e  o f  s p a r k i n g  a c t i o n  wh ich  may  cause an 
i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a  m a t e r i a l .  T h i s  i s  t h e  n o n e l e c t r i c - t y p e  spark ,  i .e . ,  those  
produced i n  g r i n d i n g  ope ra t  i ons ,  o r  hammering on ano ther  meta 1 .  Most e x p l o s i v e s  
and p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  hazardous w i t h  r cspec t  t o  t h i s  t ype  o f  h o t  spark .  T h i s  i s  
one o f  t h e  p r ime reasons t h a t  nonspark ing t o o l s  a r e  used i n  a l l  assembly ope r -  
a t i o n s  hav ing  e x p l o s i v e  dev ices .  B lack  powder, aga in ,  tends t o  l ead  t h e  l i s t  
as  f a r  as be ing  she most hazardous i tem.  
4.7 S o l i d  P r o p e l l a n t  S e n s i t i v i t y  
The t e s t s  t h a t  have been d iscussed u s u a l l y  g i v ?  v e r y  good c o r r e l a t i o n  w i t h  
r espec t  t o  e x p l o s i v e s  hand1 i n g  exper ience o b t a i n e d  o v e r  a  number o f  yea rs .  I f  
an e x p l o s i v e  sho l~s  up as a  ve r y  low impact s e n s i t i v e  i tem,  i t  u s u a l l y  has n a t  
exper ienced  t o o  many i n a d v e r t e n t  i n i t i a t i o n s  due t o  impact,  and t h e  o p p o s i t e  
h o l d s  t r u e  f o r  a  h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e  impact i tem.  Bu t ,  when i t  comes t o  us i ng  
some o f  these t e s t s  f o r  sc reen ing  s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  do n o t  appear 
t o  c o r r e l a t e  t o o  w e l l  w i t h  a c t u a l  exper ience .  Many t imes ,  a p r o p e l l a n t  wh ich  
has been i n  s t anda rd  use f o r  a  number o f  years  looks  hazardous by  v i r t u e  o f  
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  an impact o r  f r i c t i o n  t e s t i n g  machine. A number o f  t e s t s  i n d i -  
c a t e  these  ~ r o p e l l a n t s  t o  be j u s t  as s e n s i t i v e  as  some o f  t h e  h i g h  e x p l o s i v e s .  
o Card Gap T e s t  
F i g u r e  4-13 i l l u s t r a t e s  a  t e s t  wh ich  seems t o  g i v e  reasonable c o r r e l a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  a c t u a l  hand l i ng  exper ience o f  p r o p e l l a n t s .  The s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  
sample i s  determined by  a t t emp t i ng  t o  de tona te  i t  w i t h  a  T e t r y l  boos te r  
wh i ch  i s  separated f rom t h e  sample by  a  v a r y i n g  t h i ckness  o f  i n e r t  m a t e r i a l  
(.010 i n c h  t h i c k  c e l l u l o s e  ace ta te  ca rds ) .  The g r e a t e r  t h e  number o f  cards 
th rough  wh ich  t h e  shock wave from t h e  donor detonates t h e  sample, t he  
g r e a t e r  i s  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  sample. T h i s  t e s t  i s  performed by  va r y -  
i n g  t h e  number o f  cards (s low ly  i n c r e a s i n g )  u n t i l  no de tona t i ons  o f  t h e  
p r o p e l l a n t  a r e  ob ta i ned .  Po in t s  a r e  then  determined f o r  0 ,  50 and 1007;. 
T h i s ,  aga in ,  i s  s u i t e d  ve r y  w e l l  t o  a B r ~ c e t o n  a n a l y s i s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
a r r i v e  a t  h i g h l y  r e l i a b l e  r e s u l t s  w i t h  a  minimum number o f  samples. The 
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on t h e  w i t ness  p l a t e .  A  de tona t i on  punches a  c lean  h o l e  th rough  t h e  
w i t n e s s  p l a t e ,  whereas a  nondetonat ion,  o r  a bu rn i ng  a c t i o n ,  w i l l  e i t h e r  
do no damage o r  s l i g h t l y  bow o r  dent i t .  Lcok ing a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  some 
o f  t he  double  base and composite p r o p e l  l an t s  , most o f  t h e  composi te p r o -  
p e l l a n t s ,  most o f  t h e  composi te p r o p e l l a n t s ,  po lyu re thene ,  p o l y v i n y l -  
c h l o r i d e  types,  do no t  de tona te  i n  t h e  d iameter  t es ted .  " I n  t h e  d iameter  
t e s t e d t 1  i s  m e ~ t i o n e d  because t he re  i s  a  v a r i a b i  l i t y ,  which wi  1 1  be covered 
l a t e r ,  c a l l e d  t h e  " c r i t i c a l  d iameter"  o f  the m a t e r i a l .  The double  base 
p r o p e l l a n t s ,  on t he  o t h e r  hand, do sometimes de tona te .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
t r u e ,  i f  they  have an e x p l o s i v e  b i nde r  i nc l uded  w i t h i n  them. Then, they  
do de tona te  and a c t  1 i ke exp 10s ives . 
o D e f e c t i v e  P r o p e l l a n t  Gra ins  
There i s  ano ther  area o f  concern i n  s o l  i d  p r o p e l l a n t  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  and 
t h i s  i s  d e f e c t i v e  g r a i n s .  Sol i d  p r o p e l l a n t s  a re  sometimes n o t o r i o u s  f o r  
e x p l o d i n g ,  e i t h e r  d u r i n g  o r  a f t e r  i g n i t i o n .  Some i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  per formed 
b y  D r .  Bryan and h i s  assoc ia tes  were concerned w i t h  t he  s e n s i t i z i n g  e f f e c t  
o f  vo i ds  i n  s o l  i d  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  (holes,  c racks ,  o r  bubbles). F i g u r e  4-14 
i l l u s t r a t e s  some o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  ob ta i ned .  The v e r t i c a l  a x i s  shows card  
gap t e s t  r e s u l t s ;  i .e. ,  t h e  h i ghe r  t h e  number o f  cards through ~ { h i c h  a  
d e t o n a t i o n  occu rs ,  t h e  more s e n s i t i v e  t he  sample i s .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  
shows card  gap t e s t  v a r i a t i o n s  w i t h  temperature.  A so l  i d  p r o p e l l a n t  w i t h  
no d e f e c t s  looks f a i r l y  i n s e n s i t i v e .  As t he  nuinber o f  vo i ds  s t a r t  i n c reas -  
i n g ,  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  appears t o  inc rease .  Note t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two types 
o f  vo i ds  shown: cont inuous vo ids ,  which cou ld  be cracks t h a t  r un  through 
t h e  m a t e r i a l  ; and noncont inuous vo ids ,  smal l  bubbles throughout  t h e  m a t e r i a l  
There i s  n o t  much v a r i a t i o n  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  w i t h  respect  t o  temperature,  
w i t h  t h e  cont inuous vo ids .  However, when one looks a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  fop the 
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noncont inuous vo ids ,  (or bubbles) ,  i t  was i n i t i a l l y  a  b i t  shock ing t o  see 
how s e n s i t i v e  t h e  samples became a t  lower temperatures.  Th i s  was subse- 
q u e n t l y  exp la i ned  a l ong  t he  l i n e s  t h a t :  a l t hough  t h e r e  may be d iscon-  
t i n u o u s  bubbles throughout  t h e  m a t e r i a l ,  a t  t he  lower temperatures these 
m a t e r i a l s  a r e  more b r i t t l e ,  and as  t h e  m a t e r i a l  i s  h i t  w i t h  a shock o r  an 
i g n i t i o n  shock, i t  i s  s imu l taneous ly  h e a t i n g  and s t a r t i n g  t o  burn ,  thus  
c r a c k i n g  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t .  A nuvber o f  smal l  c racks r unn ing  th rough  t he  
p r o p e l l a n t ,  connec t ing  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  bubbles and i nc reas ing  the  su r f ace  
a rea ,  r e s u l t s  i n  an e s s e n t i a l l y  con t inuous  v o i d  i n  t he  p r o p e l l a n t .  I t  
i s  obv ious then, t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  tremendous d i f f e r e n c e  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  
s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  w i t h  respec t  t o  t he  number o f  vo i ds  o r  d e f e c t s  t h a t  a r e  
p resen t  i n  a  gra in .  
5.0 CROSSOVER PROBLEMS 
One o f  t he  problems encountered i n  a l l  t e s t s  per formed i s  c a i i e d  "crossover."  
Crossover i s  a  term which e x p l a i n s  t h a t  r e s u l t s  ob ta i ned  f rom one t e s t  may no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  be i n  t h e  same sequence as o t h e r  t e s t s .  D i f f e r e n t  t ype  t e s t s  show 
d i f f e r e n t  s e n s i t i v i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  ca rd  gap t e s t  shows 
one s e n s i t i v i t y  and t h e  f r i c t i o n  o r  impact t e s t  i s  another  s e n s i t i v i t y .  (See 
F i g u r e  4-15.) 
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There i s  a  crossover  between t h e  f i r s t  two impact t e s t s ,  shown on  t he  l e f t  
p o r t i o n ,  between t he  lead a z i d e  and PETN. N o r n a l l y ,  lead a z i d e  i s  an ext re 'ne ly  
s e n s i t i v e  m a t e r i a l  and PETN i s  somewhat l ess  s e n s i t i v e .  But i n  t h e  second 
impact t e s t ,  t he  lead a z i d e  showed up as l ess  s e n s i t i v e  than PETN. By t h e  way, 
inc rease  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  i s  downward on  t h i s  c h a r t .  Looking a t  lead a z i d e  i n  
t h e  remainder o f  t he  t e s t s ,  i f  one were t o  judge t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  lead  a z i d e  
o n l y  on temperature r e s u l t s ,  one might  t h i n k  i t  was a  f a i r l y  safe n o n s e n s i t i v e  
e x p l o s i v e ,  a lmost  as good as TNT. But  one has t o  look  a t  a1 l the  cha rac te r -  
i s t i c s .  Lead a z i d e  a u t o - i g n i t i o n  temperature i s  t h e  o n l y  t ype  o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  
t h a t  i s  low. Lo3k ing a t  t h e  double base p r o p e l l a n t s  shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e ,  t h e  
shock t e s t  shows d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  than  t h e  im?act t e s t .  There i s ,  aga in ,  3 
crossover  between t h e  double base and t h e  TNT, o r  t he  o t h e r s .  The l a s t  t e s t  
on  t h e  r i g h t ,  i s  an a n a l y t i c a l  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t he  exp los i ves  and ~ r o p e l l a n t s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t he  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l  c r i t i c a l  mass. I t  i s  assumed here t h a t  a 
l a r g e r  and l a r g e r  d iameter  sphere o f  t he  e x p l o s i v e  o r  p r o p e l l a n t  i s  cons t ruc ted ,  
and f i n a l l y  a  p o i n t  i s  reached where i n t e r n a l  decomposi t ion p roduc t s ,  and t h e  
temperatures produced, cause i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t he  m a t e r i a l  i t s e l f .  L u c k i l y  
though,  t h e  d iameters  a r r i v e d  a t  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  a r e  much l a r g e r  than d iameters  
b e i n g  used i n  any m i s s i l e  o r  space system, now o r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  -However, t h i s  
i s  ano the r  method o f  e v a l u a t i n g  a  p o s s i b l e  mode o f  s e n s i t i v i t y .  
- 
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6.0 SCALE-UP PROBLEMS 
Another f a c t o r  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t e s t s  i s  the sca le-up f a c t o r .  I t  
i s  the  comparison o f  t e s t  r e s u l t s  between smal l  s ca le  (few m i l l i g r a m  samples 
up t o  a  .few pounds) t o  the  amount a c t u a l l y  used i n  f u l l  s ca le  r ocke t  motors.  
As was s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  and as can be seen i n  the  nex t  f i g u r e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  • 
parameter c a l l e d  t h e  c r i t i c a l  d iameter o f  an e x p l o s i v e  o r  a  p r o p e l l a n t .  The 
c r i ' t i c a l  d iameter  i s  the d iameter  o f  a  m a t e r i a l ,  below which t h e  m a t e r i a l  w i l l  
no t  s u s t a i n  a  de tona t i on  and above which, i t  w i l l  s u s t a i n  a  de tona t i on  i f  i t  
i s  i n i t i a t e d .  RDX and PETN, on t he  l e f t  s i d e  o f  t h e  f i g u r e ,  have r e l a t i v e l y  
smal l  c r i t i c a l  d iameters ,  i n  the  area o f  l e s s  than a  h a l f  cen t ime te r  o r  so, ' 
depending on t h e  conf inement.  TNT has a  somewhat g r e a t e r  c r i t i c a l  d iameter .  
P r o p e l l a n t s  (ammo7ium n i t r a t e  f o r  example) have a  much l a r g e r  c r i t i c a l  d iameter  
than  normal m i l i t a r y  exp los ives .  Some p r o p e l l a n t s  d o n ' t  have an apparent  
c r i t i c a l  d iameter;  i.e., they  never detonate.  S r i t i c a l  d iameter  i s  an impo r t -  
a n t  f a c t  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  t he  r e s u l t s  o f  s e n s i t i v i ~ y  t e s t s .  A l though  a sample 
may show up as a  nondetonable i n  a small d iamet.?r,  i t  may show up a s  detonabie  
i n  t h e  f u l l  s ca le  a p p l i c a t i o n .  There a r e  a  num'jer o f  f u l l  s ca le  t e s t s  t h a t  
a r e  impor tan t  and must be per formed i n  e v a l u a t i i g  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  m i s s i l e  systems, 
as s h w n  i n  F i gu re  4-17. These t e s t s  were f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  m i s s i l e  system which 
was developed. The sma l l e r  upper stage i n  t h e  l e f t  p o r t i o n  i s  known t o  be a  
CRITICAL DIAMETERS OF SOME EXPLOSIVL S 
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F igu re  4-1 7. FULL SCALE TEST 
de tonab le  p r o p e l l a n t .  The l a r g e r  stage on the  r i g h t  was no t  known t o  be deton-  
a b l e  a t  the  t ime.  What was done then, i n  a  sense, was t o  boos te r  i t ,  s i m i l a r l y  
t o  a  ca rd  gap t e s t  i n  e f f e c t ,  w i t h  the upper sta5,e as the  donor. I t  was d e s i r e d  
t o  f i n d  ou t  whethe;  t he  lower s tage would de tona te .  The method used was t o  
i n i t i a t e  t h e  upper s tage  t o  see i f  i t  would ,  i n  t u r n ,  i n i t i a t e  t he  lower s tage .  
These f u l l  s ca le  t e s t s  a r e  ve r y  impor tant  when i t  comes t o  t h e  I C C  and m i l i t a r y  
hazard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  i tem f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t  i o n  and s to rage .  T h i s  t ype  
o f  t e s t i n g  i s  impor tan t  i n  de te rmin ing  t h e  I C C  ar:d m i l i t a r y  hazard c l a s s i f i -  
c a t i o n  f o r  s to rage  and shipment.  Class A ,  de tonab le - type  p r o p e l l a n t ,  a c c o r d i ~ g  
t o  t h e  I C C  s tandards has t o  be handled a  l o t  more c a r e f u l l y  than a  Class 6 o r  
bu rn i ng  type  p r o p e l l a n t .  
7.0 CONCLUS l ONS 
i n  gene ra i ,  i n  hand l i ng  any o f  these m a t e r i a l s ,  t h e r e  a re  a  few genera l  r u l e s ,  
shown i n  F i g u r e  4-18, which should  be l i v e d  by when hand l i ng  any p r o p e l l a n t s  
o r  e x p l o s i v e  i tems.  These r u l e s  happen t o  be taken d i  r e c t l y  f rom the  e x p l o s i v e  
i n d u s t r y ,  bu t  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  anyone hand l i ng  these m a t e r i a l s .  The p r e s c r i b e d  
s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  based on as much data as p o s s i b l e ,  f rom a l l  t e s t s ,  
and a r e  u s u a l l y  ve ry  conse rva t i ve .  Assembling ar, i t em,  o r  d isassembl ing an i tem,  
shou ld  n o t  be done near  o t h e r  p r o p e l l a n t s  o r  e x p l o s i v e s ,  o r  i n  an area where 
GENERAL RULES FOR HANDLING EXPLOS lVES 
1 .  Consu l t  t h e  p r e s c r i b e d  s a f e t y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  
2.  Conduct a1 1 work  i n  the p r e s c r i b e d  space, never near  
s t o r a g e  spaces o f  b u l k  e x p l o s i v e s  o r  p r o p e l  l a n t s .  
3 .  Keep a l l  work  areas f-ree f rom contaminants .  
4. A v o i d  accumulat ion o f  charges o f  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y .  
5. Avo id  f lame and spark-produc ing equipAent .  
6. Keep t o  a  minimum t h e  number. o f  personnel  a t  work i n  
t h e  same area,  b u t  one man shcu ld  never  work a l one .  
7. Be sure  t h a t  t h e  chambers f o r  " load ing"  and t lexp lod ing"  
a r e  w e l l  sh i e l ded .  
F i gu re  4-18 
t h e r e  m igh t  be ext raneous peop le .  Reasons f o r  keeping an a rea  f r e e  o f  contami-  
nan t s  i s  obv ious .  One doesn ' t  want t o  have something s e n s i t i z e d  by  hav ing  sand 
o r  g r i t  g e t  i n t o  i t .  
Nonspark i  ng t y p e  shoes and grounding s t r a p s  a r e  ex t reme ly  impor tan t  when i t  
comes t o  e l e c t r o e x p l o s i v e  dev ices .  Care must be taken n o t  t o  use t h e  handy 
s c r e w d r i v e r  you happen t o  have i n  your  back pocke t .  Never use a s t e e l  screw- 
d r i v e r  when wo rk i ng  on e x p l o s i v e  i tems.  Keep t h e  number o f  pe rsonne l  down i n  
an a rea  where wcrk  i s  go ing  on. That i s  impo r tan t .  Loading and un losd ing  i n  
t h e  p r o p e r  area!; reduces t h e  danger t o  o t h e r  peop le .  
Modern h igh-energy  p r o p e l  l a n t s  e i t h e r  c o n t a i n  exp los i ves ,  i n  v a r y i n g  degrees, . 
or behave i n  a  s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n  t o  exp los i ves ,  w i t h  respec t  t o  i n p u t  energy and 
o u t p u t  energy.  P rope l  l a n t s  and exp los i ves  can be handled w i t h  s a f e t y ,  as  has 
been demonstrated i n  t h e  many years o f  t h e i r  use. However, w i t h  t h e  number o f  
nex c c ~ p s ; I t l o z s  b e i n g  d e v e l ~ p e d  and rne  v a r i a b i i i t y  o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  t e s t  r e s u l t s ,  
one must use care  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  an i tem w i t h  respec t  
t o  i t s  s a f e t y .  
Lec tu re  Number F ive  
"SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF L  l QU l D PROPELLANTS" 
Par t  I 
M r .  L. T. Dombras 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Since l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  used t o  produce l a r g e  volumes o f  gases a t  ex t reme ly  
h i g h  temperatures,  they  a re  i n h e r e n t l y  dangerous. I n  some cases, t he  r e a c t i o n  
p roduc t s  a re  a l s o  hazardous. Therefore,  t o  p reven t  a c c i d e n t s ,  a l l  personnel 
i nvo l ved  i n  ope ra t i ons  u s i n g  these p r o p e l l a n t s  should be t r a i n e d  t o  handle them 
proper  1  y. ) 
Numerous l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s  have been success fu l l y  used and many more e x o t i c  
p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  contemplated i n  f u t u r e  rocke t  and c o n t r o l  systems. A  p e r f e c t  
p r o p e l l a n t  combinat ion,  t h a t  i s ,  one hav ing  no undes i rab le  q u a l i t i e s ,  has y e t  
t o  be d iscovered.  As a  ma t te r  o f  f a c t ,  some l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  chemists  appear 
t o  f o l l o w  the  t heo ry  t h a t  i f  a  substance i s  d iscovered  which has an e v i l  sme l l ,  
i s  h i g h l y  t o x i c ,  c o r r o s i v e ,  exp los i ve ,  and g e n e r a l l y  dangerous i t  v e r y  p robab ly  
would make a  good p r o p e l l a n t .  
O x i d i z e r s  a r e  n o t o r i o u s  f o r  be ing  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c o r r o s i v e  and hazardous. Most 
o x i d i z e r s  r e a c t  r e a d i l y  w i t h  hydrocarbons such as p a i n t ,  o i l s ,  and many o t h e r  
substances no rma l l y  found around launch areas. cue l s ,  on t he  o t h e r  hand, i n  t h e  
presence o f  a i r  o r  an o x i d i z e r ,  a re  dangerous f r t ~ m  t h e  f i r e  hazard s tandpo in t .  
2.0 PRINCIPLES OF LIQUID PROPELLANT MOTORS 
The same b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  and c a l c u l a t i o n s  used i n  e v a l u a t i n g  s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  
motors  app l y  t o  t he  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s .  I n  b o t h  cases, the  source o f  energy f o r  
p r o p e l l i n g  a  rocke t  i s  con ta ined  as l a t e n t  chemical energy. Th i s  energy i s  
r e l eased  d u r i n g  t he  chemical  r eac t i on .  The hea t  f rom the  chemical r e a c t i o n  i s  
impar ted  t o  t he  gaseous p roduc ts  which escape th rough t he  t h r o a t  area o f  the  
rocke t  motor.  The nozz le  p rov ides  the meens f o r  e f f i c i e n t l y  expanding the gases 
so t h a t  t h e  heat  energy i s  conver ted  i n t o  k i n e t i c  enersy which p rope l s  the  v e h i c l e .  
I n  most cases, t he  h i g h  combustion temperatures o f  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s  r e q u i r e  
c o o l i n g  o f  t h e  t h r u s t  chamber and p o r t i o n s  o f  the  nozz le  assembly. Th is  c o o l i n g  
i s  accompl ished by t r a n s f e r r i n g  t h e  heat t o  one o f  t he  p r o p e l l a n t s  p r i o r  t o  i t s  
i n j e c t  i on .  
L i q u i d  propel l a n t  systems are  general 1 y  more conipl i cated than sol  i d  motors. At 
t h i s  t ime, l i q u i d  p rope l l an t  motors have many advantages over the  s o l i d s ;  s p e c i f -  
i c a l l y ,  the c a p a b i l i t y  o f  being t h r o t t l e d  t o  var ious  t h r u s t  l e v e l s  and, o f  course, 
they can be turned on and o f f  dur ing f l i g h t .  This  i s  a  d e f i n i t e  advantage i f  
• 
i n - f l i g h t  t r a j e c t o r y  c o r r e c t i o n  i s  requi red.  S o l i d  rockets  soon  ill be capable 
of r e l i a b l e  r e s t a r t s ;  however, more research i s  needed i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  area. 
The f i g u r e  o f  m e r i t  used t o  evaluate l i q u i d  p rope l l an ts  i s  c a l l e d  the s p e c i f i c  
impulse (I ) S p e c i f i c  impulse i s  de f ined as the amount o f  t h r u s t  i n  pounds o f  
s P 
f o r c e  de l  ivered f o r  each pound o f  mass o f  p r o p e l l a n t  f low ing i n  one second. From 
a  chemical s tandpoint ,  i t  may a l s o  be def ined as being p ropo r t i ona l  t o  the square 
roo t  o f  the heat o f  reac t i on  and i nve rse l y  p ropo r t i ona l  t o  the square r o o t  o f  the 
average molecular weight o f  the exhaust products. 
where : F = t h r u s t  i n  pound; - fo rce  
h = f l ow  r a t e  i n  pom~nds per second 
K = mechanical-heat conversion f a c t o r  
AH = heat o f  r e a c t i o i  
- 
M = average molecular weight o f  exhaust 
The above equat io, i  shows t h a t  i n  order  t o  achieve h igh  s p e c i f i c  impulse, the  
chemical r e a c t i o n  should produce a la rge  amount o f  heat per u n i t  mass and the 
exhaust products should have as low a  molecular  weight as poss ib le .  This  i s  
why a  combinat ion o f  diborane (8 H ) and oxygen d i f l u o r i d e  (OF ) produces such 2 6 2 
a  h i g h  s p e c i f i c  impulse. These p rope l l an ts  produce h igh  combustion temperatures 
and r e a c t i o n  products w i t h  a  very low molecular weight.  
The o x i d i z e r - t o - f u e l  m ix tu re  r a t i o  must be c o n t r o l l e d  t o  p rov ide  the maximum 
p o s s i b l e  s p e c i f i c  impulse. I n  some cases, a  t r a d e - o f f  i s  necessary between the 
combustion temperature and the molecular weight  o f  the exhaust products. Most 
p r o p e l l a n t  combinations produce t h e  h ighes t  combustion temperature a t  the 
s t o i c h i o m e t r i c  ( t h e o r e t i c a l  chemical m ix tu re )  r a t i o .  With some propel  l a n t  coni- 
b i n a t i o n s ,  a  h igher  s p e c i f i c  impulse can be achieved by opera t ing  s l i g h t l y  on 
t h e  f u e l - r i c h  s i de .  Th i s  r e s u l t s  i n  a  s l i g h t l y  lower  combust ion temperature 
b u t  has t h e  advantage o f  a  lower average n lo lecu la r  we igh t  o f  t h e  exhaust  p rod-  
u c t s ,  s i nce  they  c o n t a i n  more hydrogen. T h i s  t r a d e - o f f  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  "optimum 
m i x t u r e  r a t i o . "  
3.0 GENERAL PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS 
I n  choos ing a  p r o p e l l a n t  combinat ion f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  m i s s i o n  o r  p r o j e c t ,  f o u r  
major  f a c t o r s  must be cons idered:  economics, p h y s i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  p ro -  
p e l l a n t s ,  chemical p r o p e r t i e s ,  and the o p e r a t i o n a l  requ i rements .  
3.1 Economic Fact.ors i n  S e l e c t i n q  L i q u i d  P rope ! l an t s  
One o f  t h e  p r ima ry  economic f a c t o r s  cons idered  i n  s e l e c t i n g  a  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  
comb ina t ion  i s  cos t .  A  l a r g e  percentage o f  p r o p e l l a n t  research  money i s  a l l o -  
ca ted  t o  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  hazards o f  the p r o p e l l a r l t  system. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  cos t  on a  pound b a s i s  and the s i z e  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  i n v o l v e d  de te rmine  
wh ich  p r o p e l l a n t  comb ina t ion  w i l l  be used. A 1,jrge boos te r  o f  the  Saturn V ca te -  
go ry  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a  l a r g e  q u a n t i t y  o f  p r o p e l l a n r .  Approx imate ly  5 t o  7 years  
a r e  r e q u i r e d  i n  deve lop ing  a  m i s s i l e  o r  l a r g e  boos te r  system. The l a r g e  number 
o f  t e s t s  and s t a t i c  f i r i n g s  r e q u i r e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  can become ex t reme ly  
expens ive.  
Another  f a c t o r  wh ich  must be cons idered  i s  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  manufacture t h e  p r o p e l l a n t .  A l though  some e x o t i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  produce 
ve ry  h i g h  s p e c i f i c  impulses,  t h e y  cannot y e t  be manufactured i n  t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  
necessary  f o r  eng ine  development and q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  F a c i l i t i e s  and equipment 
necessary  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  rocke t  p r o p e l l a n t s  shou ld  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  e l i m i -  
n a t e  unnecessary de lays  d u r i n g  t h e  eng ine  research  phase. 
3.2 Phys i ca l  P r o p e r t i e s  Des i r ed  - i n  L i q u i d  P-nts - 
8 High  d e n s i t y  i s  d e s i r a b l e  i n  a  p r o p e l l a n t  s i n c e  a  g r e a t e r  mass can be 
c a r r i e d  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  a i r f r ame .  Large tanks  mean more we igh t  and 
a r e  more v u l n e r a b l e  t o  me te r i od  impact and t he  e f f e c t s  o f  s o l a r  r a d i a t i o n  
i n  o u t e r  space. 
a Low vapor p ressure  i s  a  d e s i r a b l e  q u a l i t y .  P r o p e l l a n t s  hav ing  r e l a t i v e l y  
h i g h  vapor p ressures  can ove rp ressu r i ze  t h e  m i s s i l e  tankage i f  t he  tenper -  
a t u r e  becomes t o o  h i gh .  A low vapor p ressu re  i s  a l s o  impor tan t  bzczuse i t  
reduces t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  pump c a v i t a t i o n  which r e s u l t s  when gas bubbles 
a r e  formed a t  t he  i n l e t  o f  a  h i gh  speed pump. 
A low f r e e z i n g  po ing  i s  r e q u i r e d  i f  launches a r e  a n t i c i p a t e d  d u r i n g  c o l d  
per iods .  Even more impor tan t  i s  t h e  ex t reme ly  low temperature encountered 
i n  space. The p r o p e l l a n t  must no t  f r e e z e  o r  s l u s h  o r  i t  w i l l  b l o c k  smal l  
openings and va lves .  
e Low v i s c o s i t y  p r o p e l l a n t s  s i m p l i f y  pumping problems. I t  a l l o w s  b e t t e r  . 
i n j e c t i o n  and m i x i n g  o f  t he  p r o p e l l a n t s  and p rov i des  b e t t e r  combust ion and, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  b e t t e r  s p e c i f i c  imp"lse. Low v i s c o s i t y  p r o p e l l a n t s  a1 so simp1 i f y  
pump, t h r u s t  chamber and i n j e c t o r  des igns.  
3.3 Chemical P r o p e r t i e s  Des i red  i n  L i q u i d  P r o p e l l a n t s  
There a r e  many chemical  p r o p e r t i e s  d e s i r a b l e  i n  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s .  A d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  these  p r o p e r t i e s  f o l l o w s .  
e High  Heat o f  Combustion - H igh l y  r e a c t i v e  p r o p e l l a n t  comb ina t ions  wh ich  
produce a  h i g h  heat  o f  combustion a re  d e s i r a b l e  s i nce  these combinat ions 
g e n e r a l l y  p r o v i d e  h i g h  s p e c i f i c  impulse. Many h i g h l y  r e a c t i v e  p r o p e l l a n t s  
have been synthes ized;  however, because o f  c o s t  and a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  they  a r e  
n o t  ready f o r  use i n  l a r g e  boos te r  systems. 
a Low Mo lecu la r  Weight o f  Exhaust Products  - High s p e c i f i c  impulses a r e  
ach ieved  w i t h  p r o p e l l a n t s  hav ing v e r y  low mo lecu la r  we igh t  exhaust products .  
T h i s  i s  t h e  reason LH2 i s  used i n  i n t e r p l a c e i a r y  spacec ra f t ;  i t  p rov i des  
t h e  h i g h  impulse r e q u ~ r e d  o f  the upper s tage  motors.  
Chemical S t a b i l i t y  - Chemical s t a b i l i t y  i s  d e s i r a b l e  i f  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  t o  
be t r a n s p o r t e d  over  long  d i s t ances ,  s t o r e d  f o r  l ong  p e r i o d s  a t  t h e  launch  
a rea ,  o r  used i n  v e r y  l ong  space f l i g h t s  wh ich  r e q u i r e  r e s t a r t s .  
e Low I g n i t i o n  Delay - I n  v e r y  l a r g e ,  h i g h  t h r u s t  r o c k e t  systems, p r o p e l l z n t  
f l o w  r a t e s  may be o f  t h e  o r d e r  o f  thousand:, o f  pounds per  second. l g n i  t - ion 
de lays  o f  any s i g n i f i c a n t  magnitude, d u r i n g  engine s t a r t  and d u r i n g  t he  
i n j e c t  on p rocess ,  can r e s u l t  i n  i n s t a b i l i t y  and d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t he  engine. 
The i g n i t i o n  de lay  t ime ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  must be minim.-ized. I n  some cases t h i s  . 
can be done by  s l i g h t l y  p rehea t i ng  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  o r  b y  u s i n g  chemical  
s e n s i t i z i n g  agents.  
a Non-Corrosiveness - P r o p e l l a n t s  shou ld  be compat ib le  w i t h  t h e  m a t e r i a l s  i n  
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o x i d i z e r s  i n  c u r r e n t  use have c o r r o s i v e  q u a l i t i e s .  T h i s  problem i s  c i rcum- 
ven ted  by choos ing compat ib le  m a t e r i a l s  o r  by spec ia l  t r ea tmen t  o f  su r faces  
wh i ch  w i l l  be exposed t o  co r ros i on .  
3.4 Opera t iona l  Requirements o f  L i q u i d  P r o p e l l a n t s  
I n  some cases t he  cho ice  o f  a  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  i s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  
requ i rements  imposed by launch f a c i l i t i e s  o r  program o b j e c t i v e s .  These o p e r a t i o n a l  
requ i rements  a p p l y  more t o  m i l i t a r y  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  than  space boos te r  systems. 
Some f a c t o r s  which must be cons idered a re :  
e S t a b i l  i t y  - P r o p e l l a n t s  should be s t a b l e  over  long  s to rage  per iods .  
e S e n s i t i v i t y  - P r o p e l l a n t s  should be i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  mtc5sn ica l  shock. 
T o x i c i t y  - T o x i c i t y  should be min imized i f  boos te rs  c o n t a i n i n g  l a r g e  
amounts o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  launched near i n h a b i t e d  areas.  
- 
o R e a c t i v i t y  - P r o p e l l a n t s  should n o t  r eac t  w i t h  m a t e r i a l s  used i n  s to rage  
tanks,  m i s s i l e  tanks,  o r  motor components. 
Some m i l i t a r y  m iss ions  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  r e a c t i o n  p roduc ts  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  
d e t e c t  v i s u a l l y  and t h a t  they  have a minimum a t t e n u a t i o n  o f  RF s i gna l s .  
4.0 L 1 QU I D  PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Var ious p r o p e l l a n t  systems have evolved and have been developed f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
a p p l i c a t i o n s .  A b r i e f  d i scuss ion  o f  these systems f o l l o w s :  
4.1 Monopropel l a n t s  
A monopropel lant  i s  no rma l l y  a  s t a b l e  l i q u i d  u rder  ambient pressures and t e r p e r -  
a tu res .  When s u i t a b l y  i n i t i a t e d ,  i t  decompose: t o  produce h o t  gases w i t h o u t  the 
a d d i t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  a  f u e l  o r  o x i d i z e r .  Some e>amples a re  hydrogen perox ide ,  
e t h y l e n e  ox ide ,  hydraz ine ,  and n i t romethane.  
These p r o p e l l a n t s  can be decomposed by severa l  techniques. Most monopropel lants  
w i l l  r e a c t  s imp ly  b y  e l e v a t i n g  t h e i r  temperature t o  t he  decomposi t ion p o i n t  o r  
by  i n t r o d u c i n g  c a t a l y s t s .  Hydrogen perox ide ,  f o r  example, r e a c t s  v i g o r o u s l y  
when i n  con tac t  w i t h  s i  l v e r  o r  potassium perma~ganate.  The V-2 and Redstone 
turbo-pumps were d r i v e n  by h o t  gases produced t y  pass ing  hydrogen perox ide  
t h rough  a c a t a l y s t  bed o f  potassium permanganate. 
The s p e c i f i c  impulse o f  monopropel lants  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low when compared w i t h  
o t h e r  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  systems. They a r e  used p r i m a r i l y  i n  gas genera to rs ,  
v e c t o r  c o n t r o l  dev ices,  and r e t r o  systems. T h e i r  pr ime a t t r i b u t e  i s  s i m p l i c i t y .  
4.2 B i  p rope l  l a n t s  
B i p r o p e l l a n t s  a re  t h e  most common systems used i n  present  day rocke ts .  They con- 
s i s t  o f  a  l i q u i d  o x i d i z e r  and a  l i q u i d  f u e l  which a r e  i n j e c t e d  independent ly  
i n t o  t h e  combustion chamber. These systems a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  complex s ince  they  
r e q u i r e  two d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e l l a n t  tanks, turbo-pumps, and p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  systems. 
However, they  do produce t h e  h ighes t  s p e c i f i c  impulses o b t a i n a b j e  w i t h  conven- 
t i o n a l  p r o p e l l a n t  systems. 
I n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  i t  i s  h i g h l y  p robab le  t h a t  l i q u i d  hydrogen and l i q u i d  f l u o r i n e  
w i l l  be used. T h i s  comb ina t ion  o f f e r s  t h e  h i g h e s t  performance p o t e n t i a l  o f  
p r e s e n t l y  known chemical  p r o p e l l a n t s .  The h a n d l i n g  and m a t e r i a l s  problems f o r  
g r e a t  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  these p r o p e l l a n t s  must be overcome b e f o r e  t hey  can be used . 
f o r  space opera t ions .  
4.3 H y b r i d  P r o p e l l a n t  Con~b ina t ions  
H y b r i d  p r o p e l l a n t  combinat ions c o n s i s t  o f  one s o l i d  and one l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t .  
The genera l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  a  h y b r i d  p r o p e l l a n t  r o c k e t  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  s o l i d  
g r a i n  hav ing  an i n t e r n a l  passage through which l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  i s  i n j e c t e d .  
The l i q u i d  r e a c t s  w i t h  t h e  s o l i d  on c o n t a c t  and c rea tes  t he  h i g h  p ressure  and 
h i g h  temperature gases r e q u i r e d  f o r  p r o p u l s i o n .  Cons iderab le  research  i s  p res -  
e n t l y  i n  p rogress  t o  develop h y b r i d  systems because t hey  a r e  s imp le ,  r e q u i r e  
pumping o n l y  one l i q u i d ,  and can be r e p e t i t i v e l /  t u rned  on and o f f .  The problem 
wh ich  must be overcome i s  i nadve r t en t  breakup o f  a s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  caus ing i t  
t o  be e x p e l l e d  f rom the  nozz le ,  the reby  l owe r i n3  the  t o t a l  impulse o f  t h e  system. 
Another  o b s t a c l e  which must be overcome i s  t h e  development o f  a  p roper  i n j e c t i o n  
and m i x i n g  system which w i l l  m a i n t a i n  a r e l a t i v z l y  cons tan t  chamber p ressure  
and o x i d i z e r  t o  f u e l  b u r n i n g  r a t i o .  
4.4 T h i x o t r o p i c  P r o p e l l a n t s  
I t  has been recogn ized  f o r  some t ime t h a t  marked increases i n  impulse can be 
ach ieved  by  adding f i n e l y  ground meta ls  o r  hyd r i des  t o  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s .  The 
ma jo r  problem encountered has been i n  keeping these f i n e  m e t a l l i c  p a r t i c l e s  
suspended so t h a t  t he  m i x t u r e  i s  homogenous. Recen t l y ,  methods have been dev ised  
f o r  suspending s o l i d s  i n  l i q u i d s  by making them g e l a t i n o u s  - v e r y  much l i k e  
" Je l l o " .  These m i x t u r e s ,  when i n  a g e l  form, a r e  c a l l e d  t h i x o t r o p i c .  Under 
o r d i n a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  t he  f i n e i y  ground meta is  a r e  a d d e d  t o  t l ie  f u e l ,  t h e  fiie? 
i s  m i xed  t ho rough l y  and, when a g i t a t i o n  has ceased, t he  p r o p e l l a n t  t u r n s  i n t o  
a  g e l  wh ich  can be s t o r e d  f o r  cons ide rab le  t ime. When t he  ge l  i s  submi t ted  t o  
a  shear  f o r c e  i t  immediate ly  becomes a  l i q u i d .  Large boos te r s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  may 
v e r y  w e l l  u t i l i z e  t h i x o t r o p i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  c o n t a i n i n g  f i n e  suspensions o f  aluminum, 
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engine s t a r t ,  t he  py ropho r i c  i s  i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t he  t h r u s t  chamber w i t h  t h e  f u e l ,  
and on con tac t  w i t h  the  oxygen, i t  i g n i t e s .  I g n i t i o n  by t h i s  techn ique  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  smooth. Pyrophor ic  compounds must be handled c a r e f u l l y  s i nce  a  l eak  
o r  s p i l l  w i l l  produce a  f i r e  i f  a i r  o r  any o x i d i z e r  i s  present .  • 
5.3 Pyro techn ic  Devices 
These i g n i t e r s  c o n s i s t  o f  a  smal l  s o l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  charge wh ich  produces a  h i g h  
temperature f lame. A smal l  squ ib  i s  u s u a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  by an e l e c t r i c a l  b r i d g e -  
w i r e  wh ich  i n  t u r n  i g n i t e s  a  l a r g e r  s o l i d  i n i t i a t o r .  Var ious des igns a r e  used 
i n  c u r r e n t  r ocke t  systems; f o r  example, t he  T i t a n  I i nco rpo ra ted  a  s e r i e s  of  
i n i t i a t o r s  ar ranged i n  a  Christmas t r e e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  Th i s  arrangement inc reased  
the  i g n i t i o n  r e l i a b i l i t y  and assured a  l a r g e  amount o f  f lame d u r i n g  the s t a r t  
phase. 
Another  py ro techn i c  dev ice ,  used mos t l y  i n  l a r g e  s o l  i d  motors,  i s  the "pyrogen" 
i g n i t e r .  Th i s  dev i ce  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  a smal l  sc . l i d  p r o p e l l a n t  r ocke t .  Holes i n  
i t s  case d i r e c t  j e t s  o f  f lame i n t o  t he  r o c k e t ' s  main motor chamber. Th i s  i n -  
tense f lame q u i c k l y  i g n i t e s  a l l  exposed u n i n h i b i t e d  su r f ace  o f  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  
g r a i n .  Pyrogen i g n i t e r s  a r e  r e l i a b l e ,  p rov ide  rep roduc ib l e  s t a r t s  and a r e  
e a s i l y  i n s t a l l e d  o r  rep laced.  
5.4 l q n i t i o n  by E l e c t r i c a l  Enerqy 
E l e c t r i c a l  enersy may be used t o  i g n i t e  smal l  motors  d i r e c t l y  o r  l a r g e r  motors 
i n d i r e c t l y .  
Small r ocke t  motors  can be s u c c e s s f u l l y  i g n i t e d  by e l e c t r i c a l  energy us ing  
g low p lugs ,  h o t  w i r e s ,  a r c s  and exp lod ing  b r i dgew i res .  
Large r o c k e t  motors r e q u i r e  a  tremendous amount o f  energy t o  p r o v i d e  r e l i a b l e  
Igi,;h; . . L - - - Z -  - -  L ~ I C I C I U ~ C ,  e l e c t r i c a l  d a v i ~ e s  a r e  used t u  i n i i i a i e  S I T ~ ~ ; ;  bquib5 which 
i n  t u r n  i g n i t e  l a r g e r  i n i t i a t o r s .  
5.5 Hype rqo l i c  l q n i t i o n  
H y p e r g o l i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  i g n i t e  spontaneously when mixed t oge the r  a t  ambient 
p r e s s u r e  and temperature. Some w e l l  known rocke t s  us ing  h y p e r g o l i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  
a r e  Vanguard (stage I I ) ,  T i t a n  1 1 ,  and Agena. Th i s  type o f  i g n i t i o n  i s  d e s i r -  
a b l e  as i t  e l i m i n a t e s  t he  need f o r  i g n i t e r s  and e l e c t r i c a l  dev ices (other than  
v a l v e  so leno ids ) .  Hype rgo l i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  p r o v i d e  a  r e l i a b l e  means f o r  repeated 
s t a r t s  i n  space and l u n a r  r e t u r n  miss ions.  
6.0 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LIQUID PROPELLANTS 
There a r e  many and v a r i e d  hazards assoc ia ted  w i t h  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s .  Some o f  
these  a r e  d iscussed below. 
6.1 Cryoqen i c  Hazards 
o Cryogens, be ing  ex t r eme l y  co l d ,  can damage s k i n  t i s s u e  and r e s u l t  i n  
s e r i o u s  permanent i n j u r y .  
o Very l a r g e  s p i l l s  have been known t o  weaken t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  m a t e r i a l s  
n o r m a l l y  found  on launch complexes. 
o Cryogens must no t  be t rapped  i n  c l osed  systems which do n o t  c o n t a i n  a  
s u i t a b l e  v e n t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y .  The gases fcrmed can generate  s u f f i c i e n t  
p ressu re  t o  produce an exp los ion .  A  re1 i e f  v a l v e  o r  b u r s t  d i s c  (or b o t h )  
i s  mandatory t o  p reven t  overpressures.  
+ Another  hazard which may be encountered w i t h  cryogens, such as l i q u i d  
h e l i u m  and hydrogen, i s  t h a t  a i r  w i l l  conc'ense and f r eeze  i n  these  l i q u i d s  
i f  a l l owed  i n  t h e  system, thereby becominc e n r i c h e d  w i t h  oxygen. I f  t h e  
c o n t a i n e r s  a r e  n o t  f r e e  o f  hydrocarbons, 2 s e r i o u s  f i r e  hazard and pos- 
s i b l e  e x p l o s i o n  can occur.  
Rap id  pumping o f  cryogens i n t o  warm s to race  o r  m i s s i l e  tanks can r e s u l t  
i n  sudden f l a s h - o f f  and the  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t.remendous q u a n t i t i e s  o f  gas 
wh i ch  cou ld  r e s u l t  i n  r u p t u r e  o f  t h e  system. 
6.2 Contami n a t  i . n  Hazards 
Numerous f i r e s  and smal l  exp los ions  have been r e p o r t e d  which were t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
' 
unc lean  l i q u i d  oxygen systems. O i l  f i l m s  l e f t  i n  t h e  system as a  r e s u l t  o f  
improper degreas ing techniques o r  f rom f i n g e r p r i n t s  can r e a c t  w i t h  l i q u i d  oxygen 
under  p roper  c o n d i t i o n s .  Adequate q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  and f r equen t  system sampl ing 
w i  1 1  h e l p  e l  im ina te  t h i s  problem. 
I n  some ins tances ,  n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  systems may r e q u i r e  de tank ing  and n e u t r a l i -  
z a t i o n  o f  r e s i d u a l  p r o p e l l a n t s .  Recent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  some o f  t h e  
c l e a n i n g  s o l u t i o n s  used i n  these tanks reac ted  w i t h  r e s i d u a l  n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  
and formed e x p l o s i v e  p roduc ts .  By f o l l o w i n g  recormended procedures and by u s i n g  
a u t h o r i z e d  n e u t r a l i z i n g  agents ,  acc iden ts  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  can be e l i m i n a t e d .  
Hydrogen peroxide, a l though a  monopropel lant,  can be handled s a f e l y  i f  proper 
precaut ions are taken. Since hydrogen peroxide reac ts  r e a d i l y  i n  the  presence 
o f  c a t a l y t i c  agents, i t  must be stored i n  conta iners  which have been pass i -  
vated. This  pass i va t i on  process involves t r e a t i n g  the sur face o f  conta iners  4 
o r  p i p i n g ,  e i t h e r  w i t h  chemicals or b y  exposing them t o  reduced concent ra t ions  
o f  hydrogen peroxide. Unless t h i s  i s  done, concentrated hydrogen peroxide 
w i l l  r eac t  s lowly ,  bubbles o f  gas and heat w i l l  be evolved, thereby causing 
a  bu i l dup  i n  pressure and an increase i n  the r e a c t i o n  ra te .  I f  the  r e a c t i o n  
becomes t o o  rap id ,  a  v i o l e n t  explos iof i  may r e s u l t .  
S t a t i c  E l e c t r i c i t y  Problems 
S t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  has been the cause o f  numerous f i r e s  and explosions. F l u i d s ,  
e i t h e r  conduct ive or  non-conductive, w i l l  b u i l d  up a  s t a t i c  p o t e n t i a l  i f  sprayed 
o r  a1 lowed t o  drop through a i r  o r  vapors. I f  the pumpin; systems a re  no t  t h o r -  
oughly bonded t o  a  common ground, a spark can occur, Several cases have been 
repo r ted  where gaso l ine  and s i m i l a r  substance: were i g n i t e d  by s t a t i c  discharge 
du r ing  a pumping process. I t  i s  recommended t h a t ,  i f  poss ib le ,  l i q u i d s  be 
pumped i n t o  the bottom o f  a  tank or ,  i f  t h i s  i s  not  poss ib le ,  from the top 
through a  long stand p ipe  w i t h  an opening which i s  below l i q u i d  l e v e l .  The wide 
f l ammab i l i t y  range and low i g n i t i o n  energy recu i red  t o  i n i t i a t e  combustion o f  
hydrogen requ i res  e x t r a  precaut ions. 
6.4 S p i l l s  
Several acc idents  have been repor ted which a re  be l i eved  t o  have been caused by , 
s p i l l i n g  l i q u i d  oxygen on the ground. One o f  these acc idents  occurred du r ing  
a  l i q u i d  oxygen t r a n s f e r  from a  t ruck  t o  a  storage tank. A steady leak o f  
l i q u i d  oxygen apparent ly  penetrated the  surface o f  a  macadam road. Subsequently, 
..^,LA L = L I I I \ ; C ; Z ~ I  dr upped a wrench on the sp i  i i area and an exp los ion  occurred 
r e s u l t i n g  i n  ser ious  i n j u r y  and extensive proper ty  damage. 
I n  work ing  w i t h  hype rgo l i c  p rope l l an ts ,  care must be exerc ised t o  prevent leaks. 
F i  res  have been repor ted  wh i ch resul  t e d  from sp i  1 1  agc o f  UDf!!-I wh l ch penetrated 
t h e  sur face o f  the p a i n t  o f  an engine t e s t  f a c i  1 i t y .  A1 though the area o f  
s p i l l a g e  was cleaned, a  l a t e r  s p i l l  o f  a small amount o f  o x i d i z e r  caused a f i r z .  
Many booster  engine systems conta in  a l a rge  number o f  trz-nsducers and p r o p t l l a n t  
l i n e s  w h i c h  a r e  wrapped w i t h  r e f l e c t i v e  f o i l  t o  p r o t e c t  them f r o m  r a d i a t i o n  
tempera tu res .  The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  under  t h e s e  wrapp ings  must be 
avo ided.  
Hypergo l  i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  p r e s e n t  s e r i o u s  f i r e  haza rds  i f  s p i  11s a r e  n o t  n e u t r a l -  
i zed.  Wherever p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  f u e l  and o x i d i z e r  systems must be s e p a r a t e d  and 
c a r e  must  be e x e r c i s e d  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s i n g  a  f u e l  system 
component i n  a n  o x i d i z e r  system. T h i s  i s  b e s t  a c h i e v e d  b y  u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  
f i t t i n g s  o r  l i n e  s i z e s  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between o x i d i z e r  and f u e l  sys tem 
component. 
6.5 A d i a b a t i c  Compression and l q n i t i o n  
I g n i t i o n  o f  p r o p e l l a n t s  has o c c u r r e d  as a  r e s u l t  o f  a d i a b a t i c  compress ion o f  
gaseous b u b b l e s  i n  a l i q u i d  system. An a d i 3 b a t i c  p rocess  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  on2 i n  
w h i c h  no h e a t  e n t e r s  o r  l eaves  a system. I f  a gas b u b b l e  i s  compressed v e r y  
r a p i d l y ,  v e r y  h i g h  tempera tu res  can b e  a t t a i n e d  i n  t h e  compressed gas. The 
t h e o r e t i c a l  t c rnpe ra tu re  w h i c h  may b e  a t t a i n e d  b y  a d i a b a t i c  compress ion i s  
shown below. 
THEORETICAL TEMPERATURE ATTAINED 
BY ADIABATIC COMPRESSION 
/ CALCULATED FROM THE EXPRESS I O N :  
WHERE : 
C" 
T I  = 2 9 3 ' ~  
PI = 14.7 p54a 
PRESSURE - P S I A  
F i g u r e  5-1 
- . . 
- -  . 
I f  a bubb le  i s  i ns tan taneous l y  compressed t o  about 2000 p s i a  (which i s  pos- 
0 
s i b l e  i n  h i g h  v e l o c i t y  pumping systems), a temperature o f  a lmost  900 C. 
(1650°~.) can be a t t a i n e d .  I f  a contaminant i s  p resen t  o r  i f  t h e  1 i q u i d  i s  
a monopropel lant ,  a smal l  r e a c t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  which can t r i g g e r  a more 
s e r i o u s  monopropel lant  exp los i on .  A d i a b a t i c  compression problems can be 
avo ided  by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  p ressure  accumula to rs ,  o r  by c l o s i n g  system va l ves  
s l o w l y  t o  p reven t  "water-hammer" e f f e c t s .  
7. o CONCLUS IONS 
I n  conc lus ion ,  t he  most s e r i o u s  s a f e t y  hazard i n v o l v e d  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  l i q u i d  
p r o p e l l a n t s  i s  r o t  t he  p r o p e l l a n t s  themselves b u t  t h e  personnel  hand l i ng  them. 
Personnel wo rk i ng  w i t h  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  i n  many cases, become d i s d a i n f u l  
of  t h e  i nhe ren t  hazards. I n i t i a l  t r a i n i n g  must be f o l l o w e d  by a con t inuous  
t r a i n i n g  program which i nco rpo ra tes  demonstrat: ions, q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t s ,  
l e c t u r e s ,  and p e r t i n e n t  up- to-date i n f o r m a t i o n  on acc i den t  p r e v e n t i o n  
techniques.  
A f o l l o w - u p  t r a i n i n g  program o f  t h i s  t ype  w i l l  serve two purposes: 
1 .  I t  w i l l  p reven t  t he  occurrence o f  a c c i d e n ' : ~  wh ich  normal l y  r e s u l t  f rom 
boredom. 
2. It w i l l  b r i n g  personnel  up- to-date on acc ;den ts  wh ich  have occur red ,  
w i l l  i nc rease  t h e i r  knowledge o f  p r o p e l l a a t  hazards and w i l l  t r a i n  them 
i n  t h e  hazards a n t i c i p a t e d  w i t h  f u t u r e  p r o p e l l a n t s .  
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"SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF L  I QU l D PROPELLANTS" - 
Part I I 
Mr. G .  N. Woodruff 
1.0 TOXIC PROPELLANTS • 
T o x i c i t y  i s  one o f  t he  major problems associated w i t h  c e r t a i n  l i q u i d  p rope l l an ts .  
Typ ica l  of  t o x i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  a re  n i t rogen  t e t r o x i d e  (N 0  ), Unsymmetrical 2 4 
dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) , f l u o r i n e ,  hydrazine,  monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) , and 
c h l o r i n e  t r i f l u o r i d e  (CTF). 
2.0 DEFINING TOXIC HAZARD LIMITS 
"Toxic" means t h a t  i n h a l a t i o n  o f  enough o f  the vapor, o r  s k i n  contac t  w i t h  the 
l i q u i d ,  w i l l  be i n j u r i o u s  t o  hea l th  i n  some manner. The word " t o x i c "  imp l i es  t o  
the  layman r a p i d  i n j u r y  o r  death, however, t h i s  i s  not  the same meaning t h a t  
i n d u s t r i a l  h y g i e n i s t s  apply t o  t h e  word. "Toxic" does not  de f i ne  a  hazard s ince 
a grea t  many th ings  w i t h  which we come i n  d a i l y  contact  a re  t o x i c  t o  some degree. 
To de f i ne  the  t o x i c  hazard associated w i t h  a  p ~ . o p e l l a n t ,  o r  f o r  t h a t  mat te r ,  
a n y - m a t e r i a l ,  some numerical va lue i s  requ i red .  There are  several numerics! 
va lues which app ly  t o  work i n  the  m i s s i l e  launching and space f i e l d s ;  the most 
important  o f  these are  the  Maximum Al lowable Concentrat ion and the Emergency 
Tolerance L i m i t .  
2.1 The Maximum Al lowab le  Concentrat ion (MAC) 
The l i m i t s  o f  t o x i c i t y  which have been accu ra te l y  es tab l i shed  a re  the  lower 
l i m i t s ;  t h a t  i s ,  the  concentrat ions which present  no danger t o  humans. The 
work ing  lower l i m i t  i s  c a l l e d  the Maximum Al lowable Concentrat ion (MAC). The 
MAC represents a  f i g u r e  f o r  vapor or  dust concentrat ions t o  which a  human can 
be exposed f o r  8 hours a  day, 5 days a  week, f o r  a1 1 o f  h i s  work ing 1 i f e  without 
i n j u r y  t o  h i s  hea l th .  I t  i s  important t o  note t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  weighted average 
concent ra t ion ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  exposures t o  s l i g h t l y  l a r g e r  concent ra t ions ,  f o l l ~ ~ v e d  
by pe r iods  o f  no exposure o r  lesser  exposures w i l l  presumably do no harm.. 
F igu re  5-2. MAXIhIUM ALLOWABLE CONCENTRATION (MAC) 
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The M A C  d i d  n o t  grow o u t  o f  t he  rocke t  i n d u s t r y  and the  hand l i ng  o f  l i q u i d  
p r o p e l l a n t s .  I t  i s  a  f i g u r e  which o r i g i n a t e d  i n  t h e  chemical process indus- 
t r i e s ,  where workers  a r e  exposed t o  chemical  fumes and vapor on a  d a i l y  bas i s .  
MAC'S a r e  commonly expressed i n  terms o f  p a r t s  pe r  m i l l i o n  o f  vapor i n  a i r  
3 (pprn), o r  as m i l l  igrams o f  m a t e r i a l  per  cub i c  rreter o f  a i r  (mg/m ). F igu re  5-2 
shows some o f  t he  MAC values f o r  p r o p e l l a n t s  which may be used on t he  A p o l l o  
program. 
To g e t  some idea as t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  t o x i c i t y  o f  these p r o p e l l a n t s ,  one can 
compare t h e i r  MAC va lues  w i t h  a number o f  i n s e c t i c i d e s  commonly used around 
t h e  home; e.g., pyrethrum, l i ndane  and DDT have MAC l i m i t s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  those 
o f  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s .  Even moth c r y s t a l s  a re  t o x i c  and have an MAC o f  about 
400 ppm. Jus t  as i n  t h e  home, where i n s e c t i c i d e s  a r e  n o t  used a1 1 day every  day, 
peop le  engaged i n  launch ope ra t i ons  a r e  n o t  u s u a l l y  exposed t o  vapor concen- 
t r a t i o n s  on a  d a i l y  bas is .  A launch v e h i c l e  a r r i v e s ,  i s  checked o u t ,  and 
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f i n a l l y  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  loaded on board. The a c t u a l  t ime  t h a t  personne l ,  o t h e r  
than those i n  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  s torage a reas ,  may be exposed t o  t o x i c  vapors  i s  
o n l y  a  few days per  month. However, a  launch o p e r a t i o n  p resen t s  t h e  r i s k  o f  
r e l e a s i n g  a  l a r g e  q u a n t i t y  o f  p r o p e l l a n t  a t  one t ime,  and c r e a t e s  a  s i t u a t i o n  . 
where personnel  may be exposed t o  h i gh  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  f o r  ve r y  s h o r t  p e r i o d s  
o f  t ime. 
2.2 Emerqency Tolerance L i m i  t (ETL) 
H y g i e n i s t s  have e s t a b l i s h e d  some numbers which a r e  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  once- in-a- 
w h i l e  exposure and a r e  t o  be used o n l y  i n  t h e  case o f  an emergency. These 
va lues ,  t h e  Emergency Tolerance L i m i t s ,  a r e  emergency t o l e rances  and a r e  no t  
recommended by anyone as p lanned  work ing  l i m i t s .  The Emergency To le rance  L i m i t  
i s  a  t ime-weighted number which e s t a b l i s h e s  exposure l i m i t s  f o r  v a r y i n g  con- 
c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  vapor ,  based on t h e  t i m e  o f  expc~sure t o  t he  vapor.  F i g u r e  5-3 
shows the  ETL's e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  se l ec ted  m i s s i l e  p r o p e l l a n t s .  
F i gu re  5-3. EMERGENCY TOLERAllCE LIMITS 
;?American Counci l  o f  Government l n d u s t r i a l  H y g i e n i s t s  
dab --American I n d u s t r i a l  Hygiene A s s o c i a t i o n  
Some d i s c u s s i o n  o f  o t h e r  parameters wh ich  m igh t  be used t o  d e f i n e  t o x i c i t y  may 
be i n  o rder .  The MAC and ETL f i g u r e s  a r e  those which t he  body can w i t h s t a n d  
w i t h o u t  i n j u r y ,  e i t h e r  temporary or  permanent. I t  i s  ve r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  
much da ta  on e x a c t l y  what t h e  body can t o l e r a t e  and, o f  course,  imposs ib le  t o  
o b t a i n  l e t h a l  l i m i t s ,  excep t  by e x t r a p o l a t i n g  da ta  f rom l a b o r a t o r y  t e s t s  on 
an ima l s .  E x t r a p o l a t e d  l e t h a l  f i g u r e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  have no a p p l i c a t i o n  
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3.0 HAZARD SOURCES 
A t o x i c  problem i s  caused by vapor (or fume, e t c )  o r  1  i q u i d  coming i n t o  con tac t  
w i t h  a  human. I n  t heo ry ,  t o x i c  p r o p e l l a n t s  a r e  handled i n  c l osed  systems and 
no such con tac t  i s  poss ib l e ;  however, exper ience  b e l i e s  t h a t  theory.  . 
When us ing  l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t s  t he re  a r e  t h r e e  sources o f  t o x i c  hazards pos- 
s i b l e  i n  the  launch environment:  the  l eak ,  t h e  s p i l l ,  and t h e  d i s a s t e r .  
0 .  The l e a k  i s  t h e  sma l l es t  o f  these and a l s o  the  most p reva len t .  A 
s tudy  o f  h i s t o r y  o f  t he  T i t a n  1 1  and o t h e r  m i s s i l e s  us ing  s t o r a b l e  
p r o p e l l a n t s ,  shows t h a t  leaks  occur  i n  unat tended systems. Leaks 
- p r i m a r i l y  o r i g i n a t e  a t  gaskets and sea ls ,  o r  i n  cas t i ngs  which may 
have porous imper fec t ions .  Genera l l y ,  l esks  p resen t  no major t o x i c  
hazard; t he  q u a n t i t i e s  invo lved  a r e  compara t i ve ly  smal l .  
The s p i l l  represen ts  the most se r i ous  sogrce o f  a  t o x i c  hazard. 
S p i l l s ,  i n  genera l ,  do n o t  occur un less  pc.ople a re  around. Discon- 
nec t s ,  f i t t i n g s ,  and p r o p e l l a n t  l oad ing  ope ra t i ons  a r e  sources o f  
s p i l l s  which may i n v o l v e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  p r o p e l l a n t s ,  f rom one g a l l o n  
up t o  severa l  hundred g a l l o n s .  , S p i l l s  ma:. p resen t  a  major  t o x i c  
hazard o r  a  major  thermal hazard, o r  both,  Spi 11s a r e  t h e  problems 
t o  be cons idered  most se r i ous l y .  
8 A d i s a s t e r  may cause a major  t o x i c  hazard. Launch v e h i c l e s  have 
been known t o  exp lode  o r  impact on the  Cape. I n  t he  pas t  these were 
LOX-RPI f u e l e d  v e h i c l e s  wh ich  p resen ted  o n l y  f i r e  and e x p l o s i o n  haz- 
ards. C u r r e n t l y  the  T i t a n  I I  and A p o l l o  systems c a r r y  s t o r a b l e s  
and, i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  the  f i r e  hazard, a  t o x i c  hazard i s  p resen t .  The 
exac t  l o c a t i o n  o f  t he  hazard i s  imposs ib le  t o  p r e d i c t  s i nce  t h e  
prob lem can occur  e i t h e r  on the launch s tand  o r  i n  the e a r l y  p o r t i o n s  
o f  f l  i g h t .  
4.0 M I  NlMl Z A T l  ON AND CON'TROL OF TOX i C RAZARDS 
4.1 M i n i m i z a t i o n  o f  Tox ic  Hazards 
Once t he  sources o f  the  hazards ar.e known, methods f o r  m i n i m i z i n g  the hazards 
may be  es tab l i shed .  There a r e  f ou r  e f f e c t i v e  methods employed t o  m in im ize  
t o x i c  hazards: des ign,  procedures, educa t ion ,  and p r o t e c t i o n .  
8 The des ign o f  t he  system i s  the f i r s t  s tep ;  i t  should be designed as 
f a i l s a f e  as poss ib le .  Wherever f e a s i b l e ,  components should be used 
t h a t  have been proven i n  serv ice.  F i t t i n g s ,  sea ls ,  and j o i n t s  should 
be kep t  t o  a  minimum i n  a l l  space v e h i c l e  systems. 
8 Procedures and educa t ion  a r e  the two most impor tant  f a c t o r s  i n  con- 
t r o l l  i n g  t o x i c  hazards. These two methods w i l l  be cons idered s i m u l t a -  
neous ly  because o f  t h e i r  interdependency. The f o l l o w i n g  i n c i d e n t  i s  
r e l a t e d  as an example o f  what can happen when procedures a r e  no t  f o l l o w e d  
and personnel  a r e  n o t  p r o p e r l y  educated. A procedure was n o t  f o l l o w e d  and 
two va l ves  were n o t  c losed.  As a r e s u l t ,  severa l  hundred g a l  l o n s  o f  n i t r o -  
gen t e t r o x i d e  backed i n t o  a  vent system. A s a f e t y  procedure was n o t  a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  handle  t h i s  problem. I n  an a t t emp t  t o  cope w i t h  t he  s i t u a t i o n ,  
wa te r  was dumped on t h e  s p i l l .  (water and n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  mix  t o  form 
n i t r i c  a c i d ,  b u t  i n  t h e  m ix ing ,  n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  vapors  a r e  evo lved. )  
E v e n t u a l l y  t h e r e  were two problems: a  dense c l oud  o f  n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  
vapor and a pool  o f  n i t r i c  acid.  
F o l l o w i n g  procedures would have p reven ted  t h i s  s p i l l  and p roper  educa t i on  
would have min im ized  t he  hazard. Procedures and educa t i on  o f f e r  t h e  most 
p romis ing  methods f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  and f o r  reduc ing  t o x i c  hazards.  
P r o t e c t i o n  i s  t h e  f o u r t h  method o f  combat ing a t o x i c  hazard.  P r o t e c t i o n  
i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  anyone work ing  on p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous systems and f o r  
those  i n  t h e  immediate area. P r o t e c t i o n  i s  a c t u a l l y  a  comb ina t ion  o f  
m i n i m i z i n g  and c o n t r o l l i n g ;  once a hazard i s  p resen t ,  p r o t e c t i o n  can o n l y  
m in im ize  t he  personal  danger t o  t h e  people  wo rk i ng  i n  t he  area.  Procedures 
and educa t i on  w i l l  i n d i c a t e  the requi rement  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  which i s  e f f e c -  
t i v e  o n l y  i n  t h e  even t  o f  an  immediate danger. 
4.2 Con t ro l  
I f  a  hazard  occurs  i t  may be suppressed and/or n e u t r a l i z e d .  Suppress ion i s  a  
q u i c k  s t e p  which does n o t  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  hazard,  b u t  reduces i t  t o  t h e  p o i n t  
where people  can come i n t o  t h e  area and make necessary c o r r e c t i o n s .  As an 
example, n i t r o g e n  t e t r o x i d e  vapors  f rom s p i l l s  may be suppressed w i t h  a  f i n e  
sp ray  o f  wa te r  (NOT A DELUGE). However, t he  n e t  r e s u l t  w i l l  be n i t r i c  a c i d  
wh ich  must be nec t r a  1 i zed. 
There a r e  t h r e e  e f f e c t i v e  methods f o r  t he  suppress ion o f  t o x i c  p r o p e l l a n t  
s p i l l s :  a )  A f i n e  wa te r  spray w i l l  m in im ize  t he  r a t e  o f  v a p o r i z a t i o n  
and removes p r e v i o u s l y  vapor i zed  p r o p e l l a n t  f rom t h e  atmosphere. b )  Freez 
i n g  w i l l  s o l i d i f y  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t  and p reven t  any f u r t h e r  v a p o r i z a t i o n .  
c )  Foams may be a p p l i e d  and w i l l  p reven t  f u r t h e r  v a p o r i z a t i o n  w h i l e  s imu l -  
t aneous l y  d i l u t i n g  t he  p r o p e l l a n t  as t he  foam d e t e r i o r a t e s .  
There i s  o n l y  one method o f  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n :  a  chemical r e a c t i o n .  The 
s p e c i f i c  chemical  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  each p r o p e l l a n t .  I n  
gene ra l ,  p r o p e l l a n t s  must be d i l u t e d  be fo re  they  can be n e u t r a l i z e d  so 
t h a t  suppress ion  must precede n e u t r a l i z a t i o n .  
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"PROCEDLJRES - T f l E  CO :.IERSTONE OF SAFETY" 
Pa r t  I 
Mr. J. Larks  
( W r i t t e n  by G .  J. Bryan and J. Larks )  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Good procedures a r e  t h e  co rners tone  o f  any e f f e c t i v e  s a f e t y  program. They a r e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  t a c t i c s  and s t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  b a t t l e 1  i n e .  They a r e  v i t a l  f o r  s a f e  
o p e r a t i o n s  as  w e l l  as f o r  meet ing  e n g i n e e r i ~ g  requ i rements .  I f  a  program i s  
be ing  per formed w i t h  good p rocedures ,  t h i s  i s  goc,d ev idence t h a t  i t i s  under 
c o n t r o l  and v i c e  ve rsa .  Con t ro l  o f  procedures i~ a v i t a l  element i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  
o f  a  program. 
What i s  a  procedure? I t  i s  a  w r i t t e n  s tep-by -s tep  s e t  o f  c l e a r  d i r e c t i o n s  wh ich  
i nco rpo ra tes  s a f e t y  aspec ts  and e f f e c t  i l e l y  per forms an o p e r a t  i on .  I n  add i  t ior i ,  
i t  i s  des igned f o r  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  buy -a f f  and as a  permanent record .  
On l y  reasonable  i n t e l  l igence shou ld  be assumed f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  pe r fo rming  t ! i e  
j o b .  S u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  h i g h l y  educated eng ineers  f o r  t e c h n i c i a n s  i s  no exccrse f!)r 
poo r  o r  m i s s i n g  procedures.  Good i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  and t r a i n i n g  a r e  r equ i r ed .  These 
a r e  a  complement t o  good procedures - n o t  a  s u b s t i t u t e .  I n  t heo ry ,  a good p r o -  
cedure c o u l d  p robab l y  be per formed w i t h o u t  s p e c i a l  t r a i n i n g .  (Th is  would ,  o f  
course,  n o t  be a l l ~ w e d . )  
Why a r e  we p u t t i n g  so much emphasis on procedures? There a r e  f o u r  ma jo r  r easo l s :  
1 .  Good procedures a r e  v i t a l l y  impor tant  w i t h  r ega rd  t o  s a f e t y  as we1 1 
as  eng inee r i ng  requ i  rements . 
2. Exper ience has shown t h a t  t h e  development and use o f  good procedures 
r e q u i r e s  heavy emphasis a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  msnagement and o p e r a t i o n .  
3. Exper ience a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  few i n d i v i d u a l s  f u l l y  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  
sys tena t  i c approach and thoroughness o f  de ta  i 1 requ i  r ed  t o  p repare  
and use procedures . 
4. I tems 2 and 3 a r e  p a r t i a l l y  dtie t o  widespread psycho log i ca l  antagonism 
t o  t h e  r e g i m e n t a t i o n  and t e d i u n  i nvo l ved  i n  the  thorough p r e p a r a t i o n  
and use o f  procedures.  
I n  many respec ts ,  procedures should be cons idered  as a  p i ece  o f  equipment 
which must be designed, prepared,  d e l i v e r e d  on date,  and used f o r  i t s  in tended  
purpose. And a procedure,  l i k e  a p i ece  o f  equipment,  must be m o d i f i e d  . 
( rev i sed )  when necessary t o  do i t s  job .  
2.0 PREPARATION, REVIEW, AND APPROVAL OF PROCEDURES 
2.1 I d ~ n t i f i c a t i o n  and Naminq 
The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  p r e p a r i n g  a procedure i s  t o  determine t h e  u n i t s  o f  o o e r s t i o n  
wh ich  r e q u i r e  coverage. Th i s  s e l e c t i o n  o f  u n i t  ope ra t i ons  shou ld  have been 
made d u r i n g  e a r l y  R & D phases f o r  t he  more s i g n i f i c a n t  procedures.  Otherwise, 
how a r e  t h e  r i g h t  t e s t  equipment, t h e  r i g h t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and c o r r e c t l y  t r a i n e d  
men t o  be a v a i l a b l e  on schedule? These a r e  a l l - i m p o r t a n t  f rom t h e  s a f e t y  
v i e w p o i n t ,  as w e l l  as t h e  eng inee r i ng  v i ewpo in t .  I n  many cases, i t  w i l l  be 
found  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many procedures which have n o t  been g i v e n  e a r l y  recog- 
n i t i o n ,  because they  a r e  n o t  c l o s e l y  t i e d  t o  l ong  l e a d  t imes.  The respons- 
i b i l i t y  and a u t h o r i t y ,  t o  i d e n t i f y  and assemble t h e  names o f  a l l  u n i t  ope -a t i ons  
needed, must he de lega ted  e a r l y  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  phase. . 
2.2 Assiqnmer.t o f  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
Once an o p e r a t i o n  has been i s o l a t e d ,  i t  must be ass igned by management t o  
someone f o r  development o f  a  procedure.  Dke dates f o r  completed (reviewed 
and r e v i s e d )  ~ r o c e d u r e s  must a l s o  be  assigr.ed. These dates must be ma in t3 ined  
i n  much t h e  same manner t h a t  hardware a r r i v a l  dates a r e  mainta ined.  
I n d i v i d u a l  procedures w i l l  no rma l l y  be prepared t o  cover  a  l o g i c a l  u n i t  o f  work. 
These u n i t  prpcedures must then  be t i e d  t oge the r  i n  a  l o g i c a l  and sa fe  sequence. 
- l h i s  c o m p i i a t i o n  needs t he  same thorough dppr0dc.h r e q u i r e d  f ~ i  prapar;ng, 
r e v i e w i n g ,  approv ing ,  u s i n g ,  and changing o f  u n i t  procedures.  Log i ca l  groups 
o f  procedures must be des ignated,  and t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  u n i f y i n g  them 
must  a l s o  be assigned. 
The i n i t i a l  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  a  procedure w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be ass igned t o  an i n d i -  
v i d u a l  who w i l l  d i r e c t l y  superv ise an ope ra t i on .  
2.3 P repa ra t i on  
A procedure i s  a  wo rk i ng  document. I t s  language shou ld  be conc ise ,  c l e a r ,  . 
s imp le ,  d i r e c t ,  and unambiguous. l l l u s t r a t i o n s  shou ld  be l i b e r a l l y  used. 
C lear -cu t  c r i t e r i a  o f  acceptance and r e j e c t i o n  shou ld  be inc luded .  I n  p r e -  
p a r i n g  a  procedure we need t o  examine i t  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h a t  i t  con ta i ns :  
1. A statement  o f  t h e  purpose o f  t h e  ope ra t i on .  
2. A c o r r e c t  l i s t  o f  a l l  equipment, t o o l s ,  and drawings needed. 
3. I n i t i a l  s t a t u s  o f  i t em  on wh ich  work i s  t o  be performed. 
4. D e t a i l e d  s teps  t o  be performed. 
5 .  P r o v i s i o n  f o r  r e c o r d i n g  data.  
6. P r o v i s i o n  f o r  r e c o r d i n g  t h a t  s teps  have been c o r r e c t l y  performed. 
7. P r o v i s i o n  f o r  r e c o r d i n g  problems unzovered and b r i n g i n g  such 
problzms t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t he  co;rect people  t o  r e s o l v e  them. 
 his may be i n  t h e  form o f  r e fe renze  t o  an SOP.) 
8. F i n a l  s t a t u s  and d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  i te-ns on which work has been per -  
formed . 
9. D e t a i l e d  s a f e t y  comments and p roceddra l  s teps  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  
p o r t i o n  and i n  t h e  body o f  t he  proczdure.  These must be i n  t h e  
most e f f e c t i v e  l o c a t i o n  and sequent?. 
The person w r i t i n g  a  procedure must be t ho rough l y  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  a l l  o f  t h e  
equipment t h a t  i s  t o  be used, bo th  t e s t  and f l i g h t  equipment. He shou ld  a l s o  
be f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  environment i n  which t h e  o p e r a t i o n  i s  t o  be per formed,  
t h e  b u i l d i n g  and a rea ,  a l ong  w i t h  s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  and o t h e r  nearby o p e r a t i o n s  
( a c t i v e  o r  inac t i ve ! .  
The procedure w r i t e r  should ,  o f  course ,  be f a m i l i a r  w i t h  e a r l i e r  procedures.  
Many e lementary  procedures must be worked o u t  e a r l y  i n  R & D i n  o rde r  t o  develop,  
p rocu re ,  o r  l o c a t e  adequate and a v a i l a b l e  t e s t  equipment,  s p e c i a l  t e s t s  and 
cab les ,  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and f l i g h t  eqzipment.  These procedures a r e  never  s a t i s -  
f a c t o r y  as  a c t u a l  procedures.  Many procedures a r e  o f t e n  n o t  worked o u t  a t  a1 1 
i n  e a r l y  R & D ;  f o r  i ns tance ,  v i s u a l  r e c e i v i n g  and i n s p e c t i o n ,  and maintenance . 
and checkout procedures f o r  t e s t  equipment. I n  many cases, f a i r l y  d e t a i  l e d  
procedures a r e  developed a t  home p l a n t s  d u r i n g  checkout f o r  s t a t i c  f i r i n g  o r  
o t h e r  t e s t s .  These a r e  u s u a l l y  v e r y  h e l p f u l ,  b u t  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e  s i g n i f i -  
can t  changes be fo re  be ing  used a t  Cape Kennedy. 
Sa fe ty  pub1 i c a t  ions  cove r i ng  SOP'S 2nd genera l  s a f e t y  i n f o r m a t  i o n  shou ld  be 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  procedure w r i t e r .  Some o f  these,such as  s tandard  b u i l d i n g  o r  
a rea  p r e c s u t  ions ,  may be i nco rpo ra ted  w i t h  l i t t l e  change. Others ,  such as 
g round ing ,  s h i e l d i n g ,  no v o l t a g e  checks, e t c . ,  w i  I 1  r e q u i r e  t h o u g h t f u l  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  see t h a t  t hey  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  i nco rpo ra ted  a l ong  w i t h  o t h e r  eng inee r i ng  
s tep-w ise  d e t a i l .  
The w r i t e r  shou ld  have a  s a f e t y  c h e c k l i s t  a v a i l a b l e ,  p r e f e r a b l y  as p a r t  o f  a  
s a f e t y  p u b l i c a t i o r .  A few s imp le  ques t i ons  w i l l  o f t e n  show weak p o i n t s :  I s  
s p e c i a l  c l o t h i n g ,  s p e c i a l  b u i l d i n g  des ign,  o r  o t h e r  s p e c i a l  s a f e t y  equipment 
needed? Have a l l  g round ing  d e t a i l s ,  c l o t h i n g  d e t a i l s ,  equipment d e t a i l s ,  weather  
r e s t r i c t  i ons ,  necessary sequences, e tc . ,  been c a r e f u l  l y  and c l e a r l y  s t a t e d ?  I s 
t h e r e  some s p e c i a l  hazard  p r e s e n t ?  What can be done t o  reduce t h a t  hazard? 
Should  t i g h t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  be ma in ta i ned  on personnel  access? I s  remote oper -  
a t i o n  necessary? 
To uncover  a l l  ordnance o r  p r o p e l l a n t  prob lems,  i t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  l i s t  a l l  
o rdnance o r  p r o p e l l a n t  i tems p resen t  o r  nearby.  Each i t em  shou ld  then  be exam- 
i ned  versus  t h e  p lanned  o p e r a t i o n  t o  see whether t h e r e  i s  a  s a f e t y  problem. 
T h i s  p rocess  w i  11' o f t e n  Encover unsuspected problerns f rom o p e r a t  ions  n o t  o r i g -  
i n a l  l y  cons idered  t o  have ordnance o r  p r o p e l  l a n t  s a f e t y  imp1 i c a t  i ons .  
A wa l k - t h rough  v i s u a l i z a t i o n  shou ld  be made a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  rough d r a f t .  T h i s  
means t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  wou ld  n o t  a c t u a l l y  be per formed,  b u t  t h e  w r i t e r  would  
examine equipment,  sw i tches ,  s a f e t y  equipment, f a c i  1 i t i e s ,  e t c . ,  as they  were 
c a l l e d  f o r  i n  h i s  procedure.  I n  many case;, when i n e r t  equipment i s  i nvo l ved ,  
- 
he may then  i n f o rma l  l y  have t h e  p ~ o c e d u r e  per formed by a  t e c h n i c i a n ,  T h i s  shou ld  
o n l y  be  done w i t h  t he  approva l  o f  h i s  supe rv i so r  and t h e  rev i ewe r ( s )  f o r  h i s  
p rocedu re .  
2.4 Foq lndex 
To eva lua te  t he  c l a r i t y  and b r e v i t y  o f  w r i t t e n  procedures,  we can make use o f  a 
y a r d s t i c k  known as t h e  "Fog Index." T h i s  i s  a t o o l  t o  gauge t he  readabi  1 i t y  o f  , 
m a t e r i a l .  The Fog lndex corresponds rough l y  w i t h  t h e  number o f  years  o f  schoo l -  
i ng  a person would r e q u i r e  t o  read a passage w i t h  ease and unders tand ing .  The 
s teps  f o r  t he  c a l c u l a t i o n  a r e :  
6%- FOG INDEX 
( w a v p  + W3 s y l  ) X 0.4  = FI 
Where: 
W ~ v g  = average number of words per sentence 
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8 F i n d  t h e  average number o f  words p e r  sentence u s i n g  a sample o f  a t  
l e a s t  100words  (W ) .  
a "9 
Count t h e  number o f  words o f  t h r e e  s y l l a b l e s  o r  more p e r  100words  
8 Add t he  two f a c t o r s  t oge the r  and m u l t i p l y  by 0.4. 
8 Do n o t  count words which become p o l y s y l l a b l e s  (3 o r  more) by  t h e  a d d i t i o n  
of  ::ed!: !!e,!! , such as crea ted  ( ed )  2nd t r e z p a s s e s  (es ) ,  o r  a r e  a ccm- 
b i n a t i o n  o f  s imp le  words, such as bookkeeper. 
A Fog lndex f o r  a procedure should no t  exceed twe lve  and shou ld  g e n e r a l l y  be 
i n  t h e  8 t o  10 b r a c k e t .  
FOG INDEX EX4MPLE 
Sa fe t y  N o t i c e  S a f e t y  N o t i c e  
A t  a  recen t  meet ing o f  t h e  
S a f e t y  Committee, i t  was 
repo r t ed  t h a t  i n  some l o c a t i o n s  
wa te r  i s  l e f t  runn ing ,  equ ip -  
ment i s  o p e r a t i n g ,  and o t h e r  
c o n d i t i o n s  e x i s t  where no 
spec ia  1 i n s t r u c t  i ons  have been 
l e f t  f o r  Watchmen . 
W i l l  you p l ease  warn t h e  
members o f  your  s t a f f  t o  p o s t  
a  s i g n  on any equipment t h a t  i s  t o  
be kep t  o p e r a t i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  n i g h t ,  
o r  i f  wa te r  i s  t o  keep f l o w i n g ,  e t c .  
I n  t h e  absence o f  such i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  
i t  w i l l  be t h e  d u t y  o f  t h e  Watchmen 
t o  d isconnec t  e l e c t r i c a l  equipment, 
t u r n  o f f  any wa te r  they  f i n d  runn ing ,  
o r  t u r n  o f f  any k i n d  o f  runn ing  
machinery .  When i t  i s  necessary 
t o  have i tems o p e r a t i n g  d u r i n g  
t h e  n i g h t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t he  no te  
s t a t i n g  "Do Not  Turn O f f N 1 ,  t h e  
name and te lephone number o f  
t h e  person  r e s ~ . o n s i b l e  shou ld  be 
no ted  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  Watchman 
may con tac t  t h a t  pe rson  i n  t h e  
even t  something seems t o  go 
wrong d u r i n g  t h e  n i g h t ,  such as 
o v e r h e a t i n g ,  e t c .  Your coopera t ion  
w i l l  be g r e a t l y  app rec i a ted .  
FOG INDEX - 17 p l u s  
T o t a l  Words - 164 
T o t a l  P o l y s y l l a b l e s  - 20 
W -35-33-33-57-6: 33 
a"J 
F igu re  6-2 
Neg lec t  o f  n i g h t  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
f o r  watchmen was r e p o r t e d  a t  
a  recen t  S a f e t y  Committee meet- 
i ng .  
W i l l  you p l ease  warn your  
s t a f f  aga in  t o  p o s t  a  s i g n  on  
equipment t h a t  i s  t o  run  a t  
n i g h t  o r  have wa te r  f l o w i n g .  
When such s i gns  a r e  l a c k i n g  
watchmen a r e  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  
t u r n  o f f  wa te r  o r  runn ing  
mach i ne ry .  When apparatus 
must ope ra te  a t  n i g h t  be su re  
t o  mark w i t h  a  "Do Not  Turn 
O f f "  s i g n  and add name and 
phchne number o f  pe rson  i n  
c h ~ r g e .  The watchman w i l l  
c a i l  t h a t  person i f  something 
seems t o  go wrong d u r i n g  t h e  
n i l h t .  Thank you f o r  your  
he:p.  
FO5 I N D E X  - 8 
T o t a l  Words - 99 
T o t a l  P o l y s y l l a b l e s  - 4 
W -14-23-15-27-15-5: 16 
av9 -
W 3  syl-  4% 
2.5 Review and Approva l  
A f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  o u t p u t  i s  ready,  the o r i g i n a t o r  needs access t o  a  r ev i ew ing  
a u t h o r i t y  o r  a u t h o r i t i e s  who can cover a1 1 t e c h n i c a l  r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  procedure 
( i n c l u d i n g  s a f e t y ) .  
The i n i t i a l  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  rev iewing a ~ t h o r i t y  o r  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i  11 o f t e n  r e s u l t  
i n  cons ide rab le  dismay t o  t h e  procedure w r i t e r ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d u r i n g  i n i t i a l  
phases o f  a  new program when t h e  exper ience f a c t o r  i s  l o v ~ .  When t h i s  occu rs ,  
t he  rev iewer  must o f t e n  per form a t r a i n i n g  r o l e .  S ince t he  rev iewer  w i l l  u s u a l l y  
. 
be a busy man w i t h  many o t h e r  d u t i e s ,  he  cannot a f f o r d  t o  succumb t o  t he  temp- 
t a t i o n  t o  do t h e  j o b  h i m s e l f .  T h i s  t r a i n i n g  w i l l  l a t e r  r e s u l t  i n  h i s  rev iew 
r e q u i r i n g  no more than  a reasonable  amount o f  t ime .  
I n  l a r g e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  advantageous t o  have a procedure handbook and a 
s h o r t  procedure w r i t i n g  course ava i  l a b l e .  O f t e n  " tech  w r i t e r "  a s s i s t a n c e  i s  
a v a i l a b l e .  Where such ass i s t ance  i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  rev iewer  has t h e  r i g h t  t o  
expect t h a t  t h e  procedure w r i t e r  make use o f  i t .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  even i n  a  l a r g e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e  i n i  t i a  1 p roduc t  the rev iewer  r ece i ves  may be i n  !'sad shape .'I 
Sometimes earnes t  conve rsa t i ons ,  w i t h  t h e  procedure t r a i n i n g  head o r  h i s  s u p e r i o r ,  
w i l l  be more f r u i t f u l  than t he  t r a i n i n g  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
The rev iewer  must always keep i n  mind t h a t  most peop le  respond b e t t e r  t o  t a c t  
than t h e y  do t o  temper, b u t  f i rmness  i s  n e a r l y  always a r e q u i s i t e .  A f t e r  a l l ,  
t h e  r ev i ewe r  has h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  a t  s take f o r  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  soundness o f  a  p r o -  
cedure wh ich  he approves. The h i g h  l e v e l  o f  exper ience  and competence needed, 
f o r  f i n a l  rev iew o f  ordnance and p r o p u l s i o n  procedures,  was i n  t h e  f i r s t  l e c t u r e .  
b 
The rev i ewe r  w i  l! normal l y  r e q u i r e  h i s  own presence d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  fo rma l  run .  
T h i s  shou ld  be done w i t h  i n e r t  ordnance and p r c p u l s i o n  systems a t  t h e  beg inn ing  
o f  a  program. Often t h i s  i s  a l s o  d e s i r a b l e  l a t e r  i n  a  program. H i s  a t tendar .ce 
w i l l  n o r m a l l y  be r e q u i r e d  d u r i n g  t he  f i r s t  live run .  
Review and approva l  may sometimes be combined i n  one person. There should  be a 
method o f  s i g n - o f f ,  so t h a t  rev iew and acceptance o f  a l l  necessary p a r t i e s  must 
be s i g n i f i e d  i n  w r i t i n g ,  p r i o r  t o  use o f  a  procedure.  
3.0 REVIS.ION OF PROCEDURES 
The most  impor tan t  requi rement  f o r  r e v i s i o n s  i s  t h a t  they  be as c a r e f u l l y  p r e -  
pared  and reviewed as  t h e  o r i g i n a l  procedure.  Papetwork should  n o r m a l l y  be 
des igned,  so t h a t  page r e v i s i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  r e w r i t i n g  
an e n t i r e  p r o c e d ~ r e .  Changes i n  procedures shou ld  be h i g h l i g h t e d  i n  some manner, 
so t h a t  t he  r ev i ewe r  has t o  rev iew o n l y  t he  changes, and n o t  t h e  e n t i r e  procedure,  
o r  even t he  e n t i r e  page. H i g h - l e v e l  rev iew requ i  res  care  n o t  t o  overuse t he  
rev iewe r ' s  t ime.  
Good procedures shoc ld  r e q u i r e  few changes, b u t  a  d e f i n i t e  and e s s e n t i a l  r o u t e  
f o r  e f f e c t i v e  r e v i s i o n  must be es tab l i shed .  Format and l i t e r a r y  m a t t e r s  should . 
be i nco rpo ra ted  i n  t he  o r i g i n a l ;  l a t e r  changes f o r  such reasons should be d i s -  
couraged. I t  must be rea I i zed  t h a t  a change o f  format  r e q u i r e s  de ta  i l e d  word- 
by-word s tudy o f  t h e  w r i t e r  and o f  the rev iewer .  Seemingly s l i g h t  changes i n  
word ing,  o r  i n  sequence, can have se r i ous  s a f e t y  and/or o t h e r  eng inee r i ng  
\ 
consequences. 
There must be a d e f i n i t e  method es tab l  i shed, whereby t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  r e v i s e d  
procedure i s  t he  procedure used, n o t  a  superseded one, and n o t  one designed f o r  
new equipment which i s  no t  y e t  be ing  u t i l i z e d .  
REV l S l ON OF PROCEDURES 
Ca re fu l  p r e p a r a t i o n  and r=v iew 
0 Pagewise r e v i s i o n  
o H i g h l i g h t  t h e  changes 
D e f i n i t e  and e f f e c t i v e  approval  r o u t e  
e I nsu re  c o r r e c t  procedure usage 
F igu re  6 - 3  
4.0 ENFORCEMENT OF PROCEDURES 
R i g i d  enforcement o f  work ing  e x a c t l y  by procedures and do ing a1 1 work by p r o -  
cedures, i s  c r i t i c a l  f o r  sa fe  ope ra t i ons  as w e l l  as f o r  eng ineer ing  reasons. 
T h i s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  procedures mcst be p rope r  and workable.  I f  they  a r e  n o t ,  
t h e y  shou ld  be rev i sed ,  n o t  ignored .  I f  t ime i s  o f  t h e  essence, then q u a l i f i e d  
peop le  can be brought  t o  t h e  ope ra t  ion t o  make, rev iew,  and approve r e v i s i o n s  
on  t h e  spo t .  
I n tense  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  and r i g i d  enforcement i s  n o r m a l l y  needed t o  have complete 
c6mpl iance  w i t h  procedures.  Such compl iance i s  c r i t i c a l  and must be ob ta ined .  
A c t i v e  management back ing i s  necessary a t  a l  l l e v e l s .  
A few ques t ions  a r e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  importance f o r  ordnance and p r o p e l l a n t  oper -  
a t  ions.  Have a1 1 personnel per forming these  procedures been p r o p e r l y  t r a i n e d ,  
i n d o c t r i n a t e d ,  and c e r t i f i e d ?  Do t echn i c i ans  and t h e i  r superv iso rs  know who must 
approve changes i n  procedures? Have personne l ,  work ing  i n  t he  v i c i n i t y  o f  
ordnance dev ices and p rope l  l a n t s ,  been t r a i n e d  and i n d o c t r i n a t e d ,  so t h a t  t hey  
w i  11 n o t  b lunder  i n t o  an ordnance problem? 
5.0 CONCLUS I O N S  
If a1 1 ope ra t i ons  a r e  performed accord ing t o  we1 1 prepared and adequate p r o -  
cedures, sa fe  and e f f e c t i v e  ope ra t i ons  w i l l  r e s u l t .  A l though b a s i c a l l y  s imple 
t o  do, t h i s  occurs o n l y  i f  management i n s i s t s  or1 t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  p r e p a r i n g  
and us ing  good procedures e a r l y  i n  a  program; and con t inuous ly  mon i t o r s  t h a t  
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  ma in ta ined  throughout t h e  program. Procedures a r e  indeed t t e  
corners tone  o f  any sa fe ,  e f f e c t i v e  t e s t  program. 
Lec tu re  Number S i x  
IISTATIC ELECTRI  CITY AND L IGHTN ING HAZARDS" 
Pa r t  I I  
D r .  G .  J .  Bryan 
1.0 SQU l B AND DETONATOR SENS I T  l VlTY 
The vo l t ages  r e q u i r e d  t o  cause de tona to rs  and squ ibs  t o  f i r e  a re  v e r y  s m a l l .  
Most o f  those used a t  Cape Kennedy meet t h e l 1 l  amp n o - f i r e ' l s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and 
t h e i r  r es i s t ances  range f r om 0.04 t o  1 .0 ohm. T h i s  means t h a t  1 ampere i s  
\ 
exceeded when 0.04 t o  1 .0 v o l t s  are a p p l i e d  t o  these r e s p e c t i v e  r e s i s t o r s .  
Iniliotien B.od- ( ' I L  Boo*t.r Chars. 
F i g u r e  6-4 
The amount o f  en- rgy r e q u i r e d  t o  i n i t i a t e  e i t h e r  a  squ ib  o r  a  de tona to r  i s  v e r y  % 
sma l l  when i t  i s  a p p l i e d  as a  sharp s p i k e .  Exaggerated energy l e v e l s  o f  400,000 
e r g s  magnitude a re  sometimes quoted, when t h i s  f i g u r e  rnay a c t u a l l y  be r e f e r r i n g  
t o  a  t ype  o f  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  t e s t  i n  wh ich  a  5000 ohm r e s i s t o r  i s  i n  s e r i e s .  
!n  t h i s  czsz z c a r l y  a::  ~f the energy goes i n t o  t h e  s e r i e s  r e s i s t o r .  Values o f  
200 t o  20,000 e rgs  a re  i n  t h e  c o r r e c t  range, w i t h  t h e  lower  f i g u r e  be ing  more 
t y p i c a l  o f  de tona to r s  and t h e  h i ghe r  more t y p i c a l  o f  squ ibs .  Un less  r e l i a b l e  
da ta  i s  a v a i l a b l e  p r o v i n g  h i g h e r  va lues,  200 e rgs  shou ld  be used. Such va lues  
can be  ob ta i ned ,  u s i n g  square wave gene ra to r s  combined w i t h  a  c a r e f u l l y  se t -up  
h i g h  speed o s c i l l o s c o p i c  r eco rd i ng .  Many i n i t i a t o r s  a l s o  e x h i b i t  g r e a t e r  sens i -  
t i v i t y  i s  be ing  measured, r a t h e r  than t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  due t o  b r i d g e  w i r e  h e a t i n g .  
.I IGNITION TILIE DELAY 
DO n o t  make t h e  mis take  o f  f i g u r i n g  minimum i n i t i a t i n g  energ ies  f r om niinim,~rn 
f i r i n g  c u r r e n t s !  The exac t  oppos i te  c o n d i t i o n  i s  more n e a r l y  a p p l i c a b l e .  M i n i -  
mum energy i s  r e q u i r e d  when ve ry  1 i t t l e  o f  t he  energy i s  conducted f rom t h =  w i  r e  
and thus  most o f  i t  i s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  h e a t i n g  the w i r e .  T h i s  o n l y  occurs  under 
v e r y  h i g h  r a t e s  o f  energy a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  which i n i t i a t i o n  occurs  i n  l e s s  than  
one m i l l i s e c o n d .  
For  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  and l i g h t n i n g ,  t h e  minimum i n i t i a t i n g  energy i s  g e n e r a l l y  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  s e n s i t i v i t y  y a r d s t i c k .  T h i s  may a l s o  be a  good index  f o r  R F  sensi.- 
t i v i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  pu l sed  RF. The minimum vo l t age  r e q u i r e d  f o r  i n i t i a t i o n  
i s  o f t e n  t he  c o n t r o l l i n g  s e n s i t i v i t y  index f o r  s t r a y  c u r r e n t s  and sometimes f o r  
RF . 
2 . 0  S T A T I C  E L E C T R I C I T Y  
A c c i d e n t a l  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  squ ibs  and de tona to rs  and o f  vapors and dus t s  by s t a t i c  
e l e c t r i c i t y  i s  cons ide rab l y  more f r equen t  than i s  g e n e r a l l y  recognized.  F a t a l  
a c c i d e n t s  a r e  genera l  l y  we1 1 pub1 i c i z e d .  Where i n j u r y  i s  s l  i g h t  o r  n o n e x i s t e n t ,  
v e r y  l i t t l e  p u b l i c i t y  r e s u l t s .  
The most p o s i t i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  ordnance aga ins t  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  i s  t o  have 
t h e  d e t o n s t o r  i n  a safe-and-arm dev ice.  T h i s  should n o t  o n l y  p r o t e c t  t h e  sens i  - 
t i v e  element,  b u t  a l s o  p reven t  p ropagat ion  o f  i g n i t i o n  o r  d e t o n a t i o n  and be 
se l f - con ta ined  i n  case the s q ~ i b  o r  de tona to r  a lone i s  somehow se t  o f f .  T h i s  
i s  d e f i n i t e l y  t he  p r e f e r r e d  method o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  
When squibs o r  de tona to rs  are not  p r o t e c t e d  w i t h  safe-and-arm dev ices ,  t hey  
should a t  l e a s t  be e l e c t r i c a l l y  sh ie l ded  and t h e  f i r i n g  leads should be con- . 
netted t o  t h a t  s h i e l d  through a r e s i s t o r  o f  the  o rde r  o f  a  few hundred thousand 
ohms res i s tance .  These should be present  when shipped. T h i s  w i l l  g i v e  cons ider -  
ab le  p r o t e c t i o n .  Any  pera at ions i n v o l v i n g  these dev ices should be done i n  a  
t ho rough l y  grounded env i ronment ,  i n c l u d i n g  nearby personnel .  D e t a i l s  o f  such 
grounding w i l l  no rma l l y  be covered i n  SOP'S. T h i s  grounding i s  somewhat oo re  
complex than might  be immediately apparent,  though i t  i s  s imple i n  p r i n c i p l e .  
Late- in-countdown i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  such unprotecked dev ices i s  o f t e n  r e q u i s i t e .  
Weight p e n a l t i e s  from t h i s  can o f t e n  counterbalance any savings i n  we igh t  o b t s i n e d  
by no t  u s i n g  safe-and-arm dev ice p r o t e c t  i on .  
I n s o f a r  as poss ib , le ,  s t a t i c  accurnul'ating m a t e r i a l s  s h ~ u l d  be kep t  away f r om u l p r o -  
t e c t e d  squibs and de tona to rs .  Nonconductors a r s  i n  general  suspect ,  p a r t i c u l ~ r l y  
many of  t he  common packaging p l a s t i c s .  There a r e  conduct ing p l a s t i c s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  cover many a p p l i c a t i o n s .  Any s t a t i c  accumulators used around unp ro tec ted  
squ ibs ,  de tona to rs ,  e x p l o s i v e  vapors o r  dus ts  a re  d i f f i c u l t  t o  j c s t  i f y  ar,d sh3uld 
be s p e c i f  i c a l  l y  p rov ided  f o r  i f  unavoidably  p resen t .  
There a r e  var ious  survey meters which can d e t e c t  t he  accumulat ion o f  s t a t i c  e l e c -  
t r i c i t y .  T h e i r  Llse, a long  w i t h  severa l  "wip ing c l o t h s "  f o r  genera t ing  charges, 
can be q u i t e  h e l p f u l  i n  assessing the s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  hazards o f  an area.  Non- 
conductors  do va ry  g r e a t l y  i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  a c t  as s t a t i c  accumulators .  
I n  cons ide r i ng  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  the f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  f u n c t i o ~ s  r e q u i r e  a t t e n t i o n :  
Genera t ion  -Some t ype  o f  f r i c t i o n  o r  f l c w  i s  g e n e r a l l y  invo lved .  T h i s  
may be a pe rson ' s  c l o t h i n g  o r  shoes b rush ing  aga ins t  an o b j e c t ,  the  
f l o w i ~ g  of  a l i ' q u i d ,  t he  f l w  o f  p a r t i c l e s ,  th,e f l o w  o f  s~tspended p a r t i -  
c l e s  (dust ,  m i s t s ,  r a i n ) ,  the a c t i o n  o f  machinery,  the m ix i ng  o r  a g i t a t i o n  
o f  so l ven t s ,  o r  o t h e r  t ype  mot ion process.  Mot ion  i s  a  p a r t  o f  l i f e  and 
work,  b u t  ca re fu l  g rocnd ing  and s e l e c t  i o n  o f  con tac t i ng  m a t e r i a l  (cot tor !  
i s  b e t t e r  than n o s t  s y n t h e t i c  c l o t h i n g )  can h e l p  rzduce gens ra t i on .  
e Accumulat ion - The p o s i t i v e  o r  nega t i ve  charges generated must be accumu- 
l a t e d  i f  a v o l t a g e  i s  t o  be b u i l t  up. Thorough grounding p reven ts  t h i s .  
Nonconductors a r e  hard  t o  ground, b u t  may be d ischarged by w ip i ng  w i t h  a  
grounded conductor .  
e Discharge - T o  cause a  problem an accumulated charge must d ischarge .  I f  
s e n s i t i v e  elements such as squibs,, de tona to rs ,  vapors,  o r  dus ts  a r e  p r o -  
t e c t e d  so t h a t  they  a re  no t  p a r t  o f  t h e  d ischarge  pa th ,  then no prob lem 
w i l l  r e s u l t .  I f  i n t e n t i o n a l  d ischarge i s  p rov ided  f o r ,  then a  problem 
can be p reven ted .  
3.0 LIGHTNING 
More deaths a re  caused by l i g h t n i n g  i n  t he  U n i t e d  S ta tes  d u r i n g  an average year  
than by  tornadoes o r  hu r r i canes .  Accord ing t o  the  Na t i ona l  Bureau o f  V i t a l  
S t a t i s t i c s ,  an average o f  230 persons a  year  were k i l l e d  by 1 i g h t n i n g  from 1946 
t o  1955. I n  F l o r i d a ,  8.8 deaths per  year  occur  (based on 1955 through 1964, 
i n c l u s i v e ) .  The f i g u r e  has been lower i n  more recen t  years (poss ib l y  due t o  
t he  i nc reas ing  u r b a n i z a t i o n ) .  On the b a s i s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n ,  i t  appears t h a t  a  
person i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  c u r r e n t l y  has about a  o n e - i n - a - m i l l i o n  y e a r l y  
chance o f  be ing  s t r u c k  by l i g h t n i n g .  T h i s  does n o t  g i v e  a  t r u e  p i c t u r e  o f  t h z  
odds because r u r a l  areas have more f a t a l  s t r i k e s  and fewer people than  urban 
areas.  It has been es t ima ted  t h a t  90 pe rcen t  o f  t he  cases i n  which persons 
were f a t a l l y  s t r u c k  by l i g h t n i n g  occur red  i n  r u r a l  areas. T h a t ' s  n o t  t h e  whole 
s t o r y  e i t h e r .  Accord ing t o  t h e  L i g h t n i n g  Prote.:tion I n s t i t u t e ,  1 i g h t n i n g  k i  11s 
more than  600 persons annua l l y  i f  persons who d i e  i n  f i r e s  caused by  l i g h t n i n ~  
a r e  inc luded .  An a d d i t i o n a l  1,500 more a r e  i n j u r e d  and p r o p e r t y  damage amounting 
t o  $120 m i l l i o n  i s  done. Where you a r e  and what you do,dur ing a  l i g h t n i n g  st3rm, 
can make your  chsnces uncomfor tab ly  good f o r  be ing  i n  o r  near  a  l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e .  
_L I GHTN I NG SAFETY 
Safe Loca t ions  
W i t h i n  b u i l d i n g  w i t h  l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  
a I n s i d e  s tee l - topped automobi le  
Unsafe Loca t ions  
Under t a l l  t r e e  e Open f i e l d  
a Water shore a Open wate r  
e Walk ing highway o Mountain top  
Atop b u i l d i n g  
F igure  6-6 
There i s  much misunders tand ing  and l ack  o f  knowledge about how l i g h t n i n g  occurs  
and what a person  shou ld  do d c r i n g  a  s to rm.  S tand ing  under a  t r e e ,  p a r t i c u -  
l a r l y  i f  i t  i s  i s o l a t e d  and t a l l ,  i s  one o f  t h e  b e s t  ways t o  be k i l l e d  by l i g h t -  
n ing(whether  you a r e  t ouch ing  t h e  t r e e  o r  not) S tand ing  i n  t h e  wa te r  i s  i n v i t i n g  * 
t r o u b l e  i n  two ways: by  d i r e c t  s t r o k e  because you a r e  t h e  h i g h e s t  p o i n t  on a  
f l a t  su r f ace ,  o r  th rough  t h e  wa te r  f rom a  nearby s t r i k e .  
A c t u a l l y ,  a  s t ee l - t opped  c a r  i s  one o f  t h e  s a f e s t  p l a c e s  d u r i n g  a  l i g h t n i n g  
s torm.  No i ns tance  o f  a  f a t a l i t y  i n  a  c a r  f rom a  s t r i k e  has even been recorded. 
\ 
One o f  t h e  wo rs t  problems about l i g h t n i n g  i s  t h a t  peop le  underes t imate  i t .  How 
many t imes  a year  would  you f i g u r e  t h a t  l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e s  t h e  l and  area o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S ta tes?  I f  you guessed 29.5 m i l l i o n  t imes y o u ' r e  r i g h t  (8 s t r i k e s  pel- 
square m i  l e )  . Each nday.;:.throughaut t h e  world, an average o f  44,000 thunders torms 
produce about 100 l i g h t n i n g  s t r o k e s  p e r  second. Accord ing  t o  Pe te r  E.  V iemeis ter ,  
i n  h i s  e x c e l l e n t  . ~ o r k  on t h i s  sub jec t ,  The L i g h t n i n q  Book, an average 30,000- 
ampere s t r o k e  under 125 m i  1 1  i o n  v o l t s  may develop 3,750 m i  1 1  i o n  k i  l o w a t t s .  T h i s  
i s  more than  t h e  t o t a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  a l l  t h e  power p l a n t s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes .  
But  because t h e  d u r a t i o n  i s  s h o r t ,  o n l y  about 250 k i  l owat t -hours  a r e  used, wo r t h  
about  $7.50. 
The U. S. Weather Bureau has compi led  an i soke raun i c  map o f  t h e  Uni  t e d  S t a t e s ,  
b y  wh i ch  i t  i s  p c s s i b l e  t o  es t ima te  t h e  average number o f  thunders torm days p e r  
y e a r  f o r  any a res .  Cen t ra l  F l o r i d a  i s  tops  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  w i t h  up t o  
100 days each year .  By con t ras t , t he  West Coast has fewer than  f i v e  days pe r  
yea r .  (The number o f  storms p e r  year i s  140/5 f o r  Cen t ra l  F l o r i d a h e s t  Coast.) 
Some spo t s  r e c e i v e  f a r  more than t h e i r  f a i r  share o f  l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e s .  H igh  
p o i n t s ,  reach ing  up f rom t h e  ground above o t h e r  nearby o b j e c t s  on  t h e  e a r t h ' s  
sur face,  t ake  t h e  b r u n t  o f  i i g h t n i n g  a t t a c k s .  i d ;  1 i r ~ e e s ,  -- . . - ' - ' - ' - - -  I I I U U ~ ~  L a  I I ILVp2,  f l a g -  
p o l e s ,  church s p i r e s ,  ba rns ,  and t a l l  b u i l d i n g s  a r e  anon3 t h e  leaders .  
The Empire S t a t e  B u i l d i n g  t ook  s i x t y - e i g h t  s t r o k e s  i n  t h r e e  years .  T h i s  d i s p e l s  
t h e  i dea  t h a t  l i g h t n i n g  never s t r i k e s  t w i c e  i n  t h e  same p l a c e .  The f a c t  i s - -  
and i t  i s  wo r t h  remembering--that l i g h t n i n g  more than l i k e l y  w i l l  s t r i k e  t h e  
- same p l a c e  t w i c e  i f  i t  doesn ' t  des t r oy  t h e  t h i n g  i t  h i t  t h e  f i r s t  t ime .  I t ' s  
t r u e  t h e r e  a r e  many random s t r i k e s  t h a t  a r e  never  repeated,  b u t  cho i ce  spo t s ,  
whether because they  a r e  t a l l  o r  loca ted  i n  areas w i t h  a  good conduc t i ve  ground, 
a r e  h i t  r epea ted l y .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  why r u r a l  a reas  have most l i g h t n i n g  f a t a l -  
i t i e s .  T a l l  b u i l d i n g s  i n  c i t i e s  take t h e  s t r i k e s  a t  t h e i r  tops  and conduct t h e  
e l e c t r i c i t y  s a f e l y  i n t o  t he  ground. 
One c u r i o s i t y  o f  l i g h t n i n g  f a t a l i t i e s  i s  t h a t  f i v e  t imes  as many men a r e  k i l l e d  
as women. T h i s  undoubtedly  r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  more men than  women a r e  o u t -  
doors a t  any g i v e n  time.,and thus have more exposure, b u t  i t  a l s o  m i r r o r s  a  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  a t t i t u d e  about l i g h t n i n g .  Men tend  t o  i gno re  l i g h t n i n g  and go 
r i g h t  on do ing whatever they  a r e  a t ;  women, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t ake  no shame 
i n  be ing  a f r a i d  o f  it, and head f o r  the  b e s t  pro.:ection they  can f i n d .  
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  be j u s t  p l a i n  un lucky,  as t h e  t r a g i c  case o f  an I l l i n o i s  
farmer  i l l u s t r a t e s .  The Weather Bureau r e p o r t s  t h a t  t he  man's barn  was se t  
a f i r e  by l i g h t n i n g  and t h e  c o n f l a g r a t i o n  k i l l e d  a l l  h i s  l i v e s t o c k  except  two 
horses.  A week l a t e r  l i g h t n i n g  s t r u c k  aga in ,  d42stroying h i s  meta l  hay shed; 
then a  few days l a t e r  i t  f l i c k e d  along a  fence and knocked t h e  farmer  uncon- 
sc i ous .  A month a f t e r  t h a t  he was s tand ing  i n  3 ne ighbo r ' s  ba rn  when l i g h t n i n g  
s t r u c k  him i n  t h e  chest  and k i l l e d  him b u t  damaged no th ing  e l s e .  
L i g h t n i n g  may be separated i n t o  f o u r  broad c lasses :  
Cloud-to-Ground and G round-to-Cloud - Genera 1 l y  jumps f rom c loud  t o  ground 
w i t h  r e t u r n  s t r o k e  f rom ground t o  c loud .  W.7en b u i  l d i n g  h e i g h t s  exceed 
200 f e e t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  e a r t h  t o  c loud  s t r okes .  
F o r  t h e  Empire S t a t e  B u i l d i n g  (1250 f e e t  h e i g h t )  e i g h t y  pe rcen t  a r e  o f  t h e  
l a t t e r  type.  
Cloud - i nc l udes  i n t r a c l o u d ,  i n t e r c l o u d ,  and c l oud  t o  a i r .  
o Tornado t ype  - i n t e r i o r  o f  tornado i s  t y p i c a l l y  an area o f  cont inuous and 
h i g h  i n t e n s i t y  e l e c t r i c a l  d ischarge.  
B a l l  o r  Bead. 
On l y  t h e  f i r s t  and t h i r d  t ypes  w i l l  be d iscussed,  b u t  c l oud  types  may sometimes 
cause t r o u b l e  due t o  induced ground vo l t ages .  Cloud-to-ground l i g h t n i n g  i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a  t r a n s i e n t  DC d ischarge.  I t  i s  cha rac te r i zed  by a r i s e  t ime  o f  
t h e  o r d e r  o f  a  few microseconds and a  genera l  i r r e g u l a r  decay ove r  a  p e r i o d  o f  
perhaps 0.25 seconds. Tes t  records have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  : 
Seventy percen t  o f  t he  s t r okes  have a  peak p o t e n t i a l  o f  ove r  2,000,000 v o l t s .  
9 The maximum peak p o t e n t i a l  sometimes exceeds 20,000,000 v o l t s .  
e Peak c u r r e n t s  o f  50 percen t  o f  the s t r okes  w i l l  exceed 13,000 amperes. 
e Peak c u r r e n t s  o f  10 percen t  o f  the s t r o k e  w i l l  exceed 32,000 amperes and 
maximum c u r r e n t s  may exceed 160,000 amperes. 
e Most l i g h t n i n g  i n i t i a t e s  as a  s h i f t  o f  e l e c t r o n s  f rom a  c loud  t o  e a r t h .  
D i r e c t  impact o f  a  1 i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e  on a  s o l  i d  p r o p e l l a n t  rocke t  o r  e x p l c s i v e  
dev ice  would have an e x c e l l e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s t a r t i n g  a  se r i ous  f i r e  a t  t he  
impact p o i n t .  Except f o r  t he  impact p o i n t ,  h e a t i n g  by conduct ion through a  
meta l  case would o f t e n  n o t  cause a  problem, bu t  should be s t u d i e d  on an i n d i -  
v i d u a l  case b a s i s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  induc ing  dangerous vo l t ages  i n t o  a  squ ib  
o r  detona to r  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h  when t h e  squ ib  o r  de tona to r  i s  n o t  i n  a 
safe-and-arm dev ice .  Great ca re  must be taken t o  p r o t e c t  such squibs and 
de tona to rs ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when t hey  are i n s t a l l e d  i n  motors o r  f i r i n g  t r a i n s .  
B u i l d i n g s  c o n t a i n i n g  such dev ices might  w e l l  be equipped w i t h  a  separate e l e -  
va ted  "cone o f  p r o t e c t  ion" t ype  o f  1 i g h t n i n g  P I -o tec t  ion, as we1 1 as be ing  p r c -  
v i c e d  w i t h  good b u i l d i n g  s t r u c t u r a l  grounding.  
F i g u r e  6-7. CGNE OF PROTECTION 
L i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t  i o n  can be  most s imply  cons idered f rom the  zone of  p r o t e c t  i o n  
approach.  A w e l l  grounded, po in ted ,  u p r i g h t  conductor w i l l  p r o t e c t  t he  zone 
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Where t a l l  s t e e l  towers and s tee l - f ramed b u i l d i n g s  e x i s t  a t  Cape Kennedy, t hey  
g i v e  exce l  l e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  from d i r e c t  l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e s ,  p rov ided  they  a r e  we1 1 
grounded. They w i  11 a l s o  p robab l y  be s t r u c k  f a i r l y  f r e q u e n t l y .  There must thus  
be c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n  g i v e n  t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  ordnance dev ices which migh t  
c rea te  a  hazard,should they  be i n i t i a t e d  by induced c u r r e n t s  o r  by  c u r r e n t s  
r e s u l t i n g  f rom arc -over .  
Carefu l  s t u d i e s  o f  tornadoes have shown t h a t  they  a r e  v e r y  i n tense  e l e c t r i c a l  
storms as w e l l  as windstorms. T h i s  e l e c t r i c a l  a c t i v i t y  appears t o  be o f  a con- 
t inuous type (more 1  i k e  a massive corona discharge).  S ince  tornadoes a r e  f r e q ~ e n t  
i n  t h i s  a rea ,  t h i s  e l e c t r i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  should be kep t  i n  mind when assess ing 
t h e i  r p o s s i b l e  damage t o  a  rocke t  o r  ordnance f a c i  1 i t y .  
The onse t  o f  l i g h t n i n g  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e  can be p r e d i c t e d  w i t h  cons ide rab le  
success w h i l e  storms a r e  s t i l l  some d i s tance  away. These dev ices g e n e r a l l y  use 
f i e l d  s t r e n g t h  measurements p l u s  coun t ing  and measuring o f  t h e  e l ec t romagne t i c  
- 
f i e l d s  r e s u l t i n g  f rom 1 i g h t n i n g  d ischarges.  They can be o f  cons iderab le  a s s i s -  
tance i n  p l a n n i n g  07e ra t i ons  on an h o u r l y  b a s i s .  
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
f 
S t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  and l i g h t n i n g  have a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i n i t i a t i n g  
squ ibs  o r  de tona to rs  and damaging e l e c t r o n i c  equipment un less  they  a r e  p r o t e c t e d  
by  safe-and-arm dev ices o r  by c a r e f u l  grounding p l u s  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i v e  techn iqves .  
These a r e  a l s o  q u i t e  dangerous w i t h  respect  t o  i n i t i a t i n g  f i r e s  o r  exp los ions  i n  
. the  vapors and dus ts  which occu r  du r i ng  many o p e r a t i o n s ,  such as hand1 ing  1 i q c  i d  
p r o p e l l a n t s  and s o l v e n t s .  
(Th is  l e c t u r e  was accompanied by  a  f i l m  which i s  h i g h l y  recommended t o  t he  
reader ;  " S t a t i c  E l e c t r i c i  t y t l ,  o b t a i n a b l e  f rom t h e  American Gas A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Inc . ,  
New York, N ~ W  ~ 0 r k . j  
i t s  he igh t .  A number o f  p o i n t s  which a r e  v e r t i c a l l y  connected t o  the  ground, 
and a l s o  h o r i z o n t a l l y  connected near t h e i r  p o i n t s , w i l l  g i v e  a  t e n t - l i k e  zone 
o f  p r o t e c t  ion .  
A s t e e l  frame b u i l d i n g  w i l l  g i v e  e x c e l l e n t  p r o t e c t i o n ,  p rov ided i t  i s  w e l l  
grounded and has l i g h t n i n g  rods i n s t a l l e d .  
The above types o f  p r o t e c t i o n  do n o t  g i v e  complete p r o t e c t i o n  from induced 
vo l tages  and secondary arcs .  The very h igh  peak cu r ren ts  mentioned above a re  
accompanied by in tense e lect romagnet ic  f i e l d s  which can induce s i g n i f i c a n t  
vo l tages  i n  nearby l i n e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  few ohms res is tance t o  ground w i l l ,  
(by d i r e c t  I R  d rop) ,  permi t  l a rge  vol tages t o  b u i l d  up w i t h  p o s s i b l e  arc-over 
t o  nearby conductors. 
When t h e  need f o r  secondary p r o t e c t  ion e x i  s t s  , double- layer  p r o t e c t  i on  can be 
o f  g r e a t  he lp .  A well-grounded, s teel - f rame b u : l d i n g  may be one l aye r .  A 
separate l i g h t n i n g - r o d  system o f  a e r i a l  p r o t e c t ' o n  may be used f o r  the  o the r  
l aye r .  P a r t i c u l a l - l y  s e n s i t i v e  devices might  be screened by copper screening 
if very  h igh  protection from the  electromagneti  : f i e l d  i s  desi red. 
Po in ted  l i g h t n i n g  rods do serve t o  reduce the  e l e c t r i c a l  p o t e n t i a l  by e a r l y  
discharge,as we1 1 as a c t  as a  p re fe r red  path .  
Ungrounded o b j e c t s  such as t a l l  t rees  a r e  poor zonductors and a r e  thus no t  
p r o t e c t o r s ,  a l though they a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  p r e f s r r e d  paths t o  a c t  as a  focus 
f o r  l i g h t n i n g  discharge. When l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e s  t r e e s  i t  may jump t o  a  nearby 
o b j e c t .  I t  a l so  tends t o  spread out  about the base o f  the  t r e e .  I f  the  
ground i s  d ry ,  a  person o r  animal may be connected through h i s  f e e t .  F i v e  
hundred and th ree  sheep were k i l l e d  i n  t h i s  manner by a  s i n g l e  l i g h t n i n g  s t roke.  
!n  some caqes i t  would seem worthwhi l e  t o  run a  we1 1 grounded 1 i g h t n i n g  rod up 
a t r e e ,  thus changing a  hazard i n t o  a  p r o t e c t i v e  s h e l t e r .  
Much o f  t h i  s  d iscuss ion  has been about people. Wherever t he re  i s  a  hazard t o  
peop le ,  t he re  i s  a hazard t o  unprotected ordnance devices and e l e c t r o n i c  equip- 
ment. I n  f a c t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  respect t o  induced vo l tages ,  thp ordnance 
dev ices  and e l e c t r o n i c  equipment may be considerably more s e n s i t i v e  than a  
person.  
